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ABSTRACT
One would think that a contractual release of liability for antitrust
violations would be subject to exacting scrutiny, lest the violator buy its way
into blamelessness. One would be wrong. Whether an antitrust action can
be brought despite such releases is governed by the judicially-created “partand-parcel” doctrine, which asks how integral the release is in the
anticompetitive conspiracy. Like so many precepts of American antitrust, the
results are not too predictable, and many decades of fitful evolution have only
muddied the waters further. At base, the riddle reduces to a conflict between
priorities: the private settlement of disputes, conserving judicial resources
and respecting individual autonomy, versus the public protection of
competition by so-called “private attorneys general” whose suits expose
violations. Mindfulness of these competing values, however, points towards
a potentially more serviceable and justifiable rule of decision than the partand-parcel doctrine currently offers.
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“Rarely discussed and more rarely applied, ‘part and parcel’s’ roots
are traced to Justice Cardozo’s statement in Radio Corp. of Am. v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co. that a release to an antitrust claim may be invalid
‘when it is so much a part of an illegal transaction as to be void in its
inception.’”1
“The law regarding the various substantive ways a settlement can
have antitrust implications is little developed. Much of what is
suggested is therefore a discussion of theoretical principles not
refined in the crucible of actual litigation in this area.”2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that in the fabled land of Blackacre where homo economicus
thrives, a troika of widget-makers have long happily co-existed in a glorious
state of profit, mutually enjoying a cozy relationship with the primary
supplier of widget parts. Widget parts are extraordinarily difficult to bring to
market, even if they are not patented per se, and in deference to this, the trio
has long agreed not to try to exact price concessions from the single major
supplier of any volume but rather to allow their friend to set the price, simply
passing on the difference to their ultimate consumers. Widgets are quite
popular, it has proven, and the customers are willing to pay the inflated price.
An imaginative entrepreneuse comes to believe that she could make widget
parts more efficiently, albeit only after great initial investment. She finds
some believers in her plan and, with their help, constructs a factory. She
immediately runs into a problem, however: despite her lower prices, none of
1. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Radio Corp.
of Am. v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 459, 462 (1935)) (citation omitted).
2. Harry M. Reasoner & Scott J. Atlas, The Settlement of Litigation as a Ground for Antitrust
Liability, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 116 (1981).
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the widget-makers will purchase her parts. Even when the price is lowered
further, they say only that they are satisfied with their current supplier. It
seems baffling!
Even after decreasing her price to the barest modicum of a profit margin,
there are still no takers, and, at last, she is forced to declare her enterprise a
loss, seeking to sell it and its fixtures at fire sale price to the evidently more
popular incumbent. Still, she smells a rat: the incumbent must have been
kicking back money to the widget-makers to keep her out of the market, she
supposes—or is that just sour grapes? Her suspicions are accentuated when
the incumbent approaches her half a year after they have reached an
agreement in principle and offers her a fine premium to release any and all
prior-arising claims, asserted or unasserted, “from the beginning of time”
(including antitrust complaints, she thinks darkly) that her enterprise might
have had against it. Though she feels morally vindicated, the price is so rich
(and she is so in debt after losing everything in her foray into the dog-eat-dog
world of business) that she agrees to the offer, including the non-disclosure
clause that comes along with it.
A week later, she was feeling lousy. Sure, she needed the money, but she
had let the big boys squeeze her into letting them get away with blatant market
manipulation, as she now frames it mentally. She spent a year in law school
before dropping out to pursue an M.B.A. instead and knows that she could
renounce the contract, claiming economic coercion. Almost as soon as she
had signed, she realized there could be no other explanation but that there
must have been a conspiracy. With the contract renounced, she would have
to give back all that money—or she could tattle to the government in hopes
of a public prosecution, but that has its own downsides. If the release contract
were held void as against public policy, there went her money again. If it
were upheld, then the non-disclosure clause would—once again—claw back
the loot. The only reason she needed the money so badly was because of
what the conspiracy had done! How could it be possible they could ensure
her silence with the very proceeds of their conspiracy? It was no wonder she
felt so lousy about the whole thing. But looking at her mortgage balance, she
takes a deep breath and resolves to move on. At best, she might renounce the
contract and be able to sue for antitrust damages, but she has a good deal of
money in hand—perhaps more than even treble damages would yield—and
the possibility of victory in such a lawsuit, she realizes, is very uncertain and
very far away. Her evidence thus far is only the release and her own sullen
suppositions, after all. Maybe she should have just finished law school, she
concludes wistfully.
Surely, one might think, the release contemplated in this sorry parable
must somehow violate the antitrust laws, as it quite transparently operated to
shield and conceal the (suppositious) antitrust violations afoot. Alas, as with
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most canons of antitrust law, the truth is not so simple. This Article explores
the precedent regarding the potential antitrust implications of contractual
releases of liability in antitrust, an intriguing sort of self-referential kōan that
has puzzled courts and (perhaps not coincidentally) received fairly little
scrutiny or elaboration. Part II presents the Supreme Court case that first
raised obliquely the possibility that antitrust releases might themselves run
afoul of antitrust law, and Part III then reviews, from varying perspectives,
the lower court decisions that followed to give flesh to the concept, including
the coining of the “part-and-parcel” doctrine to describe it. Part IV turns to
the uneasy tension raised in some cases between public policy opposing
competitive abuses and encouraging the consensual resolution of disputes,
culminating in Part V with a sketch of how these priorities have played out in
the current compromises embodied in the part-and-parcel cases. Part VI
offers a modest proposal to better balance these competing values than the
underutilized and misinterpreted “part and parcel” doctrine presently
accomplishes. A brief conclusion locates this ostensibly minor constellation
of the law within the broader firmament of regulatory theory and the greater
common weal.
II.

A MOMENTOUS HYPOTHETICAL BY MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO

Radio Corp. of America v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.3 (Raytheon) is
not, at first blush, an odd case from which to derive a theory of the potential
nullity of an antitrust release, but it is so upon greater scrutiny. The plaintiff,
Raytheon, had accused RCA of having illegally monopolized their mutual
sector of the newborn electronics industry by 1928, to the natural detriment
of Raytheon’s business, and claimed damages in excess of three million
dollars4—north of $44m in 2020 dollars.5 RCA interposed in defense a
release of liability that Raytheon had executed in its favor when it agreed to
purchase a license from RCA, but Raytheon in turn argued the release to be
void because it had been procured under the economic duress imposed by the
illegal monopoly.6 RCA then succeeded in having the case transferred from
the courts of law to those of equity so that it might argue for the validity of
the release, which Raytheon opposed and, thereafter, sought unsuccessfully
in chancery to revoke, disclaiming any right or remedy that could not be had
at law.7 A decree was ultimately issued in chancery confirming the release’s
3. Radio Corp., 296 U.S. 459.
4. Id. at 460.
5. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, www.bls.gov/data/inflation_cal
culator.htm (input original dollar amount; then original month and year; then current month and year; then
select “calculate”) [hereinfater “LABOR”].
6. Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 460.
7. Id. at 460-61.
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validity and returning the case to law to adjudicate the availability of relief.8
The First Circuit reversed on appeal, finding the release “so connected with
the unlawful combination and monopoly as to be inoperative at law,
irrespective of the possibility of avoiding it in equity.”9 RCA appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the question of whether the
release’s validity was properly triable in equity.10
Although the case itself turned on the legitimacy of an antitrust release,
the actual issue before the justices regarded the purviews of the divided courts
of law and equity,11 a division long since rendered a nullity.12 Justice
Benjamin Cardozo’s unanimous opinion, therefore, addressed that issue
foremost, holding that as Raytheon had conceded it had no relief in equity
and did not seek it, “no one would have insisted that a suitor who refused to
file a bill in chancery could be sent there against his will,” though at the loss
of any remedy that equity might offer.13 It was enough for Cardozo to find
there to be issues remaining to try at law and none to be had in equity given
Raytheon’s disclaimer.14
For good measure, and in avoidance of
overreaching, he added that the Court “d[id] not attempt to say whether the
release will collapse upon the showing of an illegal combination or will retain
an independent life,” leaving the gravamen of the case for the courts below
to reexamine at law in the first instance.15
En route to his genuine holding, however, Cardozo penned the dictum
that would launch a thousand cases,16 distinguishing when the defense of a
release might be void at law versus in equity:
A release under seal is a good defense at law, unless its effect is
overcome by new matter in avoidance. This will happen, for
8. Id. at 461.
9. Id. at 461-62.
10. Id. at 459 (“The question is whether in the circumstances here exhibited the validity of a release
pleaded by a defendant as a bar to a cause of action at law is triable in equity.”).
11. Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 459.
12. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922) (“[T]he formal distinction
between proceedings in law and equity is abolished and remedies at law and in equity are available to the
parties in the same court and the same cause.”); Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883); see generally
Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283 (1928).
13. Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 462-63 (“Accepting the disavowal, a court of equity must decline at
this stage to adjudicate the validity of the release or its effect upon the parties, leaving that issue along
with others to adjudication at law.”).
14. Id. at 463.
15. Id. (“That is matter for the trial at law, where the bond between monopoly and surrender can
be shown with certainty and fulness. Till then it will be best to put aside as premature not a little that is
said in the opinion of the court below.”).
16. Kit Marlowe, of course, famously wrote of Helen of Troy: “Was this the face that launch’d a
thousand ships / And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?” CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, THE TRAGICAL
HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DR. FAUSTUS 61, act 5, sc.1 (Project Gutenberg ed. 1997) (Rev.
Alexander Dyce ed., 1624).
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illustration, when it is so much a part of an illegal transaction as to
be void in its inception. If it is subject to that taint, a court of law is
competent to put it out of the way. We assume that a like competence
exists in other circumstances. True there are times when a release,
unassailable at law, is voidable in equity, and in equity only. If the
plaintiff were demanding relief upon that basis, the equitable issue
would have to be disposed of at the beginning.17
But by its own terms, the Supreme Court’s own emphasized language is
collateral to the holding, hypothetical, and given only by way of
“illustration.”18 Nonetheless, as is so often the fate of dicta,19 Justice
Cardozo’s idle speculation would subsequently be taken by some courts as
the Supreme Court’s imprimatur that a release of antitrust liability could be
disregarded should it constitute an integral part of the antitrust violation
itself.20 Several of the few secondary sources to comment on the case
identified its holding without deviation.21 But courts were not alone in
elevating Justice Cardozo’s brief aside into precedent: Williston’s justly
lauded treatise on contracts cites Raytheon for the rule that “a contract closely
connected with some unlawful plan or act is not enforceable,”22 and some
academic commentaries, too, have transmuted the aside from dictum to
dictate23 though others have explicitly recognized it for what it is.24

17. Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added).
18. Id. Indeed, Justice Cardozo had later labored to be clear beyond peradventure that the Court
was not deciding whether the release was proper held void or not. See Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 463; supra
notes 14-15.
19. See Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dicta Spectrum, GWU LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER No. 2017-1 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863989; Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta
Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. (2010); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under The
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006).
20. See infra Part III. A.
21. See, e.g., 9 ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2311, n.21 (4th
ed. 1986) (citing Radio Corp. as commenting on the “elaborate distinctions between the circumstances
and grounds on which a release could be challenged at law and those available only in equity”); W.M.
Moldoff, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial on Issue of Validity of Release, 43 A.L.R. 2d 786 (1955)
(recapitulating the holding as centering on the purview of a court in equity).
22. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:11 n.2 (4th ed. 2004).
23. E.g., Robert J. Ritacco, Contracts and Antitrust - Economic Duress and Anti-Competitive
Practices - Coercive Tactics Utilized by the National Football League to Prevent Franchise Relocation V.K.K. Corporation v. National Football League, 244 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2001), 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 149, 158 n.77 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, Is There A Constitutional Right to Jury Trial of Equitable Defenses
in New York?, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 50 n.269 (2000) (denominating as “dictum”).
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III.
THE PRECARIOUS PART-AND-PARCEL DOCTRINE OF ANTITRUST
RELEASES
A. Judicial Creation and Development of the Part-and-Parcel Doctrine
It was predominantly the lower courts, however, that deftly molded the
unhewn stone of Justice Cardozo’s opinion into a fully-formed figure of
antitrust law, in the fullness of time to be known as the “part-and-parcel”
doctrine after its characterization in a series of cases in the Ninth Circuit in
the decade from 1965 to 1975.25 To install rhetorical structure, the story of
the slow emergence of the doctrine that follows is fancifully framed by the
Three-Age Model of antiquity—Stone, Bronze, and Iron—first intimated by
Lucretius,26 and popularized in contemporary usage by the Danish
archaeologist Christian Jürgensen Thomsen.27 The conceit of legal history as
archaeology and of cases as artifacts of erstwhile eras for study is hardly
novel28 and lends itself well to the waxing sophistication of the courts shaping
the tools innovated by the part-and-parcel doctrine.
1. 1935 to 1965 — Anteprehistory29 — Describing a Theory
Before It Had a Name
In the most embryonic of relevant cases, the part-and-parcel theory was
discernible, but the nomenclature of “part and parcel” had not yet emerged.
25. See infra Part III. A. 2.
26. TITUS LUCRETIUS CARI, DE RERUM NATURA, LIBER QUINTUS 40, ll.1283-1296 (James D. Duff
ed., 1889) (“Arma antiqua manus ungues dentesque fuerunt / Et lapides et item silvarum fragmina rami, /
Et flamma atque ignes, postquam sunt cognita primum. / Posterius ferri vis est aerisque reperta. / Et prior
aeris erat quam ferri cognitus usus, / Quo facilis magis est natura et copia maior. / Aere solum terrae
tractabant, aereque belli / Miscebant fluctus et vulnera vasta serebant / Et pecus atque agros adimebant ;
nam facile ollis / Omnia cedebant armatis nuda et inerma. / Inde minutatim processit ferreus ensis /
Versaque in opprobrium species est falcis aenae, / Et ferro coepere solum proscindere terrae /
Exaequataque sunt creperi certamina belli.”).
27. See BO GRÄSLUND, THE BIRTH OF PREHISTORIC CHRONOLOGY 17-18 (1987) (“Many
proposals were presented for the division of past time, often in terms of a two- or three-period system,
with a stone age, a copper or bronze age, and an iron age. This is not particularly surprising. During
antiquity, there was a living tradition according to which a bronze age had preceded antiquity’s own iron
age. . . . It has long been clear that Thomsen was not only the first archaeologist to formulate and define
in a clear and unambiguous manner the Three-Age System, but the first to publish it.”); see generally
PETER ROWLEY-CONWY, FROM GENESIS TO PREHISTORY: THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL THREE AGE SYSTEM
AND ITS CONTESTED RECEPTION IN DENMARK, BRITAIN, AND IRELAND (2007).
28. “A reported case does in some ways resemble those traces of past human activity . . . from
which the archaeologist attempts, by excavation, scientific testing, comparison, and analysis to reconstruct
and make sense of the past. Cases need to be treated as what they are, fragments of antiquity.” Debora L.
Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 185, 188 (2000)
(quoting A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (1995)); accord Debora L.
Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing Context, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1197 (2006);
Judith L. Maute, Response: The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 223 (2000).
29. See, e.g., JOSEPH YOUNG BERGEN JR. & FANNY DICKERSON BERGEN, THE DEVELOPMENT
THEORY 198 (1884) (“Of the existence of what one might call ante-prehistoric men, many are no less
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In fairness, the First Circuit panel that the Supreme Court had affirmed in
Raytheon had already been considerably more explicit than the high court
about the nature of this innominate theory in its own dictum to the law-versusequity procedural issue.30 Raytheon had alleged that its sizable business in
rectifying tubes had been “totally destroyed” by RCA through “manipulation
and conspiracy” with others to establish a monopoly in the product.31
Moreover, Raytheon urged that the contract, embodying the ensuing release,
was voidable by virtue of fraud and duress committed by the victorious RCA,
and the panel had agreed in principle (and dictum).32 The appellate court
went further, however, in observing that although “in ordinary cases an
instrument executed under duress is voidable not void, this cannot be so if the
effect would be to give life and substance to an illegal contract.”33 This was
precisely the circumstance that Raytheon argued was at hand:
In the case before us the release alleged to have been signed under
duress enters into and forms an integral part of an agreement alleged
to be illegal because establishing a monopoly in restraint of interstate
trade. If the agreement is void the release is void, and requires no
court of equity to so declare it. The primary issue is the validity or
invalidity of the contract.34
The first case to follow Raytheon, Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. JohnsManville Corp.,35 provided its forebear succinct approbation in denying
dismissal to an antitrust defendant who proffered an executed release as a
shield against the claims lodged of attempted monopoly.36 The court thought
that in order to operate as a “complete defense” meriting dismissal, a release
would need to cover both past and future misdeeds, and that “if the instrument
purported to absolve defendants from liability for future violation of the antitrust statutes, I should hold it void as against public policy.”37 As the release
in question was solely retrospective, no such holding was needed, and the
court rounded out its own laconic dicta by observing enigmatically
(presumably with approval?) that Raytheon’s dictum was “apropos” to
certain than if their bones have been discovered; for, as Sir John Lubbock has well said, the question is
not whether these men had bones, but whether they actually existed; and that they did exist is amply proven
by the rude flakes of flint which they left.”).
30. Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 76 F.2d 943, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1935), aff’d, 296 U.S.
459, 463 (1935).
31. Raytheon, 76 F.2d at 944.
32. Id. at 948-49.
33. Id. at 949.
34. Id.
35. Westmoreland Abestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff’d,
136 F.2d 844 (2d. Cir. 1943).
36. Westmoreland, 39 F. Supp. at 120.
37. Id. at 119.
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plaintiff’s further “contention that the release is void and inoperative because
it forms an integral part, of, and was obtained with the intent to further the
monopolistic conspiracy itself.”38 Whatever this observation meant was left
unsaid; the Second Circuit made no mention of Raytheon or the release in its
affirmance after the eventual trial.39
Only two decades after Raytheon and its terse (to the point of opacity40)
adherence in Westmoreland, the Western District of Missouri in Carter v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.41 offered what would with time prove to
be the rare instance of a release found void on antitrust grounds.42 The sole
plaintiff had been the proprietress of two theaters in Sedalia, Missouri,
bequeathed to her by her deceased husband, which had long been leased to a
Fox affiliate.43 When it came time to renew, Fox pressed for far lower rents,
and Carter declined to extend the lease on such terms.44 Carter attempted to
operate the theaters herself, but when distributors refused to furnish her firstrun films, she was forced to close the venues in 1941.45 Fox, meanwhile, had
leased another theater in Sedalia, and after Carter’s folded, obtained an
agreement providing an option to lease the theaters at a much-reduced price
and to purchase them within two years (and forbidding the properties use for
entertainment if they were sold to anyone else), including a release from all
claims to that date in 1942.46 Subsequently, Carter’s representatives filed
suit, alleging conspiracy to monopolize the theater industry in Sedalia and to
foreclose her from competing via the distributors’ boycott.47 Fox,
predictably, sought summary judgment in its favor on the 1942 release.48
Taking Carter’s well-pled allegations as true, the court found the contract
embodying the lease option and release was itself the very object of Fox’s
antitrust conspiracy: to gain control of the remaining theaters.49 That the
release might have been an “ancillary” clause to the primary (illegal)
38. Id. at 120 (quoting Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 462).
39. See generally Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 136 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1943).
40. See Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 827 (C.D. Cal. 1968)
(discussing and distinguishing Westmoreland).
41. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
42. Id. at 680.
43. Id. at 677.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Carter, 127 F. Supp. at 677.
47. Id. at 678.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 678-79 (“As above noted, the release was integrated into the lease contract, the end result
of which, if plaintiff’s theory of action is sustained, can only be said to have been the culmination of the
conspiracy to effectively remove plaintiff from competition in the business of exhibiting motion pictures
in the Sedalia, Missouri, area. As such, said lease contract is just one of the many acts charged in the
complaint by which defendants are alleged to have been able to establish the impact of the conspiracy and
that caused the unreasonable restraint of interstate trade on which this action is based.”).
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objective was immaterial: the point of the contract was to preclude Carter
from using the theater in competition or selling it to competitor, and “the
consideration for that provision in the lease, as well as that given for the
release clause, are so connected with the whole consideration, and other
provisions of the agreement, as to make the same inseparable.”50 Nor was it
material that the release clause, standing alone, might have been
unobjectionable, for when it was subsumed within a contract whose execution
violated the Sherman Act, the entire contract and all its provisions was void.51
The court neatly distinguished cases where releases were upheld as
independent transactions driven by financial necessity but untethered to the
acts forbidden by the antitrust laws.52 Finally, it invoked the First Circuit’s
views in Raytheon and Justice Cardozo’s dictum to cement its view that
Carter must have the opportunity to prove with “certainty and fullness” the
connection between the alleged monopoly and the offending release.53
Summary judgment was denied, and the case allowed to proceed.54
If these initial results seem to suggest plaintiffs trod an easy road in
urging the invalidation of antitrust releases, the Ninth Circuit in 1950’s
Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated v. Borax Consolidated55 must have
disabused any such misconceptions.56 Most of the Suckow plaintiffs’
antitrust claims of monopolization of the borax industry were foreclosed by
a statute of limitations; only the final sale of their failed enterprise to Borax
Consolidated and accompanying release remained outside.57 Plaintiffs,
therefore, sought to avoid the release by arguing that the purportedly forced
sales transaction were “‘overt acts’ in furtherance of a continuing
conspiracy,” rendering the release void.58 The court frankly called this
argument “difficult to understand,”59 for plaintiffs had received hundreds of
thousands of dollars in exchange, strongly suspected as monopolistic
50. Id. at 679.
51. Carter, 127 F. Supp. at 679-80 (“If such an illegal end is accomplished by use of restrictive
contracts, such contracts cannot be given any legal effect. . . . That the particular contractual provision
with which we are here concerned is a release does not thereby render it valid. Whether the release portion
can be separated out from the other provisions of the contract or not, the contract is invalid in all its parts
if it is found that it formed part of the plan used to obtain a monopoly.”) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 680; see also id. at 680-81 (“The present case, as we have viewed it, is not one in which
the plaintiff is seeking to avoid a release solely by a plea of duress, as defendant assumes, but one where
she maintains that the release was void in its pactum. Whether releases obtained by duress be void or
voidable under the law of Missouri does not now concern us . . . for we believe this contract is made void,
if it is void, by express provision of federal law concerning which state decisions are in no way binding
on us.”) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 680.
54. Id. at 681.
55. Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950).
56. See generally id.
57. Id. at 207-08.
58. Id. at 206.
59. Id.
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behavior at the time, and freely entered into the transaction and release
anyway60—and, to boot, failed to exclude antitrust claims from the general
release despite their suspicions and accusations.61 The court simply could not
fathom how the bargained-for transaction years after the alleged
conspiratorial acts could be viewed as part of that long-ago scheme.62 Rather,
the record suggested the parties sought to “voluntarily ‘wip[e] the slate
completely clean’” via the 1942 agreement, and the panel felt firmly that “we
cannot and should not characterize the act of appellees in entering into a
voluntary ‘peace pact’ with appellants as an illegal or ‘overt act.’”63 Even
though Carter had briskly distinguished Suckow,64 the logic of the latter case
would prove the more influential in the years to come.
Only a year after Carter, a hopeful plaintiff relied heavily on Raytheon
in a failed attempt to defeat a general release in Michael Rose Productions,
Inc. v. Loew’s Inc.65 In a treble-damages antitrust action, the plaintiff,
Michael Rose, sought to avoid a release it had executed in favor of Loew’s
on the grounds that it was limited to a specific cause in breach of contract,
fraud, and mutual mistake.66 In short, the plaintiff argued it intended only to
release a particular claim pending in New York and was defrauded into
providing a broader general release.67 After a bench trial, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendant.68 The court noted that, paradoxically,
what Michael Rose really seemed to want was equitable reformation of the
contract to pare back the general release, even as it disclaimed any remedy in
equity.69 Although Michael Rose had pointed repeatedly to Raytheon in its
arguments, the court—even reading the Supreme Court case as having held

60. Suckow, 185 F.2d at 206-07.
61. Suckow, 185 F.2d at 207 (“[H]ad appellants intended to exclude this kind of a cause of action
from the broad ambit of the releases . . . they would (in view of their oft-repeated prior accusations
concerning appellees’ unlawful attempts to destroy them and to throttle competition) have specifically
excepted antitrust actions from the broad and all-inclusive terms of the general releases which they
executed.”).
62. Suckow, 185 F.2d at 208 (“[W]e cannot understand how these actions can logically be said to
be illegal ‘overt acts’ committed by appellees to the damage of appellants. In exchange for the sale of
their proprietary interests and for the execution of the 1942 release appellants received $350,000 in cash.”).
Three hundred fifty thousand dollars in 1942 would be worth roughly $5.4m in 2020. LABOR, supra note
5.
63. Suckow, 185 F.2d at 208-09 (initial letter altered to minuscule).
64. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 680-81 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
(quoted supra note 52).
65. Michael Rose Productions, Inc v. Loew’s Inc., 19 F.R.D. 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), app.
dismissed, 246 F.2d 605, 606 (2nd Cir. 1957) (finding no jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal).
66. Michael Rose, 19 F.R.D. at 509.
67. Id. at 510.
68. Id. at 511.
69. Id. at 510.
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that a release arising out of an illegal transaction was void70—found
Raytheon’s supposed holding inapplicable because the facts in the case at bar,
where the fraud in inducing the more general release had only even been
alleged rather late in the day (and unconvincingly at that71), clearly fell
“outside its rationale.”72
The Third Circuit shared similar incredulity as the Ninth73 in reviewing
allegations of a rather straightforward antitrust conspiracy complicated by an
intervening release in Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.74 Plaintiffs John and
Bernard Taxin, wholesalers of fruit in Philadelphia, brought suit in 1960
against a wide-ranging group of defendants, including Food Fair Stores and
the Samuel P Mandell Co., on charges that they had conspired to monopolize
the interstate trade in fruit and produce.75 In 1958, however, the Taxins had
entered a general release of liability with Food Fair for all antitrust claims in
exchange for $18,000 and—the Taxins claimed—an undertaking that Food
Fair would place orders with their business in the future.76 When this
undertaking failed to prove out, the suit ensued, and the co-conspirator
defendants collectively raised the release in defense.77 Mandell strenuously
argued that whatever bad faith Food Fair might have had in its undertaking
to further its monopolistic interests, the release was good as to Mandell,
which had nothing to do with that promise, with which the district court had
agreed.78 In the Third Circuit, plaintiffs-appellants further argued that “the
alleged release was obtained by defendants as part of and in furtherance of
the continuing conspiracy among the defendants about which plaintiffs
complain,” making summary judgment on the release inappropriate.79
Without any mention of Raytheon, the Third Circuit found the theory farfetched and unsupported by the evidence, reasoning tautologically that the
70. Michael Rose, 19 F.R.D. at 511 (“The Supreme Court, in affirming the Circuit Court of
Appeals, held: (1) The effect of a release is overcome ‘when it is so much a part of an illegal transaction
as to be void in its inception. If it is subject to that taint, a court of law is competent to put it out of the
way’, (2) Since the plaintiff contends that ‘the release is void at law’ because ‘tainted with the same
illegality as the illegal combination,’ that issue should be tried at law along with the other issue of illegal
combination, at which trial ‘the bond between monopoly and surrender can be shown with certainty and
fulness’”) (citations omitted).
71. Michael Rose, 19 F.R.D. at 510 (“Plaintiff’s theory of fraud seems to have evolved to suit the
exigencies of the litigation, and was simply tacked on to the original and fundamental thesis of plaintiff
that the release was executed through mutual mistake.”).
72. Id. at 511.
73. A district court would later observe the similarity between the reasoning of the two opinions.
See Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54, 57-58 & n.1 (D. Or. 1973).
74. See generally Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1961).
75. Id. at 449.
76. Taxin, 287 F.2d at 449-50. Eighteen thousand dollars in 1958 would be worth roughly
$162,000 in 2020. LABOR, supra note 5.
77. Taxin, 287 F.2d at 449-50.
78. Id. at 449-50.
79. Id. at 451 (quoting appellants’ reply).
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release could not further conspiratorial acts that had already occurred, and the
release had no effect on offenses committed after its execution:80
In such circumstances, we hold that it was at least incumbent upon
plaintiffs, in opposing the motion for summary judgment, to state any
special or unusual relation which the release may have borne to the
general conspiracy. Since nothing of that sort appears in the
affidavits or was even suggested during the discussion of this point
on oral argument, plaintiffs’ unexplained and unsupported allegation
that the obtaining of the release was part of or in furtherance of the
original conspiracy does not suffice to prevent the granting of
summary judgment.81
2. 1965 to 1975 — The Stone Age — Crafting the First Tools to
Assay Releases
So much for the Third Circuit; it was only in the courts of Suckow’s Ninth
Circuit that the nascent theory would finally garner a name.82 Seven years
after Taxin, California Concrete Pipe Co. v. American Pipe & Construction
Co. obligingly supplied one.83 In late 1963, after a year or so in the business
of manufacturing and selling concrete pipe, California Concrete Pipe (CCP)
agreed to sell essentially all its equipment to American Pipe, together with
executing a general release of liability in the latter’s favor.84 Five years later,
apparently having second thoughts, CCP filed suit on claims of conspiracy to
monopolize in the Central District of California.85 American Pipe interposed
the release in defense, which CCP claimed was void in law or equity, and the
court denied summary judgment after severing the voidability question and
seeking briefing on whether (inter alia) the question of the releases validity
required jury findings under Raytheon.86 After a brief bench trial, the court
held the release to be valid in equity,87 and plaintiffs subsequently renewed
their argument for a full jury trial because “the release . . . was ‘inextricably
connected with the conspiracy,’ was ‘an act in furtherance” thereof [sic] and
is thus ‘tainted by the conspiracy and hence void,’” on the supposed authority
of Raytheon and Westmoreland.88 The court readily rejected the authorities

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
See Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 827 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
Id.
Id. at 822-24.
Id. at 824, 826 n.9.
Id. at 824.
Cal. Concrete, 288 F. Supp. at 824.
Id. at 826 (quoting plaintiffs’ papers).
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proffered as saying no such thing.89 All the same, plaintiff reasoned it was
entitled to trial on the question of the release, giving rise to a useful
enunciation of the part-and-parcel theory:
Acts which normally are legal may become illegal if part of, or in
furtherance of, an illegal conspiracy. A release, if it be an illegal
contract, or a contract to achieve an illegal purpose, is void. A release
even though valid, if secured as part of or in furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy becomes tainted thereby and becomes void. (There is, of
course, nothing wrong with the above logical analysis of the state of
the law.) Plaintiff here has pleaded that the defendants participated
in a conspiracy, one aim of which was to eliminate competition.
Logically, elimination of competition carries with it the implication
that the competitor will quit his business. A reasonable foreseeable
result of eliminating CCP would be the acquisition of its capital
assets with a like reasonable foreseeable result of demanding a
release. Therefore, plaintiff concludes, only a jury can determine if
defendants participated in a conspiracy to eliminate CCP as a
competitor; only a jury has the right to determine whether the
defendants acquired CCP’s fixed assets in implementation of the
conspiracy; only a jury could determine, since the release has already
been found to be a condition of the equipment sale, whether or not
the release was but an act in furtherance of the conspiracy and hence
illegal; only a jury could determine after a full trial, from evidence
both circumstantial and direct, whether this release was so tainted and
therefore void. Such is the hypothesis upon which plaintiff maintains
that Raytheon forecloses a summary judgment and demands a jury
trial on its ‘part and parcel’ theory.90
The court remained unconvinced, notwithstanding the more fulsomely
pled theory, declaring that discovery had changed seismically since
Raytheon, and that it was no longer sufficient to defeat summary judgment
for a plaintiff to barely plead a release to be void without supplying further
evidence.91 Despite the ample tools of discovery at its disposal, the court
chided, plaintiff had adduced nothing suggesting an antitrust conspiracy to

89. Id. at 826.
90. Id. at 827-28.
91. Id. at 828 (“Pleadings, standing alone, cannot now stay the impact of a motion for summary
judgment when accompanied by an overwhelming mass of evidentiary material—even in the
hypersensitive area of antitrust litigation. It is no longer a sufficient resistance to a motion for summary
judgment for plaintiff simply and bleakly to contend that the obtaining of a release was a part and parcel
of the antitrust conspiracy.”) (citations omitted).
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obtain the release.92 The court concluded that “it was at least incumbent upon
the plaintiff, in opposing the motion for summary judgment, to show some
special or unusual tie-in of the release with the alleged general conspiracy,”
for after all, invoking Taxin, “[a] release applying only to past acts could not
facilitate any restraint of trade which had already been accomplished.”93
Mere months later, the Central District of California returned to the issue
of antitrust releases in S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.94 Gasoline
distributor plaintiffs filed suit against Atlantic Richfield and other coconspirators alleging they had fixed the prices exacted for the fuel purchased
throughout most of the 1960s.95 In partial exchange for a loan of $25,000,
however, Rondon had granted a general release of liability in 1967, which the
defendants now raised in defense.96 On motion for summary judgment, the
court admitted that the parties disputed the motivation for the release, but
found the fact immaterial, for “even if the release was demanded and
obtained, as plaintiffs’ counsel urged in argument, with the specific intent and
purpose of preventing plaintiffs from filing an antitrust action, that fact would
not invalidate the release.”97 Plaintiffs sought to avoid the release by arguing
they had been financially coerced into granting it by the long course of pricefixing in service of the antitrust conspiracy, but the court would have none of
the “so-called ‘part and parcel’ concept.”98 Unlike Carter, the release was
far later and wholly separate from the agreements effectuating the price
concessions, and there was no evidence of a “tie-in” between the two.99 And
if mere motivation by dire financial straits—even those arising in some sense
from earlier misdeeds—were allowed to vitiate an otherwise valid contract,
courts would face no end of claimants, and parties no ability to depend upon
their agreements, just as the Ninth Circuit had held in Suckow.100
92. Cal. Concrete, 288 F. Supp. at 828-29.
93. Id. at 829 (quoting Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961)).
94. See generally S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
95. Id. at 880.
96. Id. Twenty-five thousand dollars in 1967 would be worth roughly $192,000 in 2020. LABOR,
supra note 5.
97. S.E. Rondon Co., 288 F. Supp. at 881 (majuscules reduced to minuscule).
98. Id. at 881-82.
99. Id. at 882.
100. Id. (“If Plaintiffs’ reasoning were accepted on this point, it would involve courts in the almost
impossible task of reconstructing a releasor’s mental process as of the date of his executing a release
document. The court would have to determine whether a release was executed because the signer felt the
settlement to be a favorable one, or because of his strained financial condition. Certainly every release
executed as consideration for a needed loan, is motivated in some respects by the financial condition of
the releasor. To hold a release void because of the releasee’s pre-existing wrong which resulted in financial
hardship to the releasor would be to invite an attempt to void almost every such settlement and release. It
would greatly impair the policy of encouraging private settlements. Parties negotiating such settlements
need to have confidence in the enforceability of the settlement they reach.”) (citing Suckow, 185 F.2d at
208).
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Five years on but still within the Ninth Circuit, a 1973 case in the District
Court of Oregon, Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.,101 did not stray
far from its brethren.102 The dispute involved claims by Joe and Jerry
Dobbins, who had renegotiated their dealership agreement with Kawasaki
and subsequently claimed damages in antitrust for monopoly and conspiracy
to the same in connection with territorial restrictions.103 As part of that
renegotiation, however, the Dobbinses had executed a general release of
liability in favor of Kawasaki in an “attempt to resolve previous differences,”
and Kawasaki raised the release in defense to the instant suit, seeking
summary judgment.104 In the main, Dobbins disavowed reliance on
Raytheon, seeing that case properly read as a commentary on a “limited
procedural issue [that] has little relevance today, separate courts of law and
equity having been abolished.”105 Nonetheless, despite the “presumption in
favor of the validity of releases . . . even in antitrust cases,” the court
entertained plaintiffs’ argument that the release in favor of Kawasaki was
invalid under the part and parcel doctrine,106 noting the authority of Taxin,107
Carter,108 and S.E. Rondon.109 It concluded that “a part and parcel argument
may be used by a plaintiff to avoid a release in an antitrust action where it is
shown that the release was an object of the combination or conspiracy or
where it was an integral part of the scheme in restraint of trade.”110 On the
facts, however, plaintiffs had not proven any such nexus, nor were they able
to show any “tie-in between the [release] and the prohibited conduct.”111
3. 1970 to 1990 — The Bronze Age — Honing a Test with
Sharper Edges
As the 1970s proceeded towards the 1980s, the baton of thought
leadership in this peculiar niche of the law passed to the Fifth Circuit with
two pivotal decisions that delimited the voidability of antitrust releases and
sharpened the contours of a doctrine that had theretofore largely been

101. Dobbins v. Kawaski Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Or. 1973).
102. See generally Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. 54.
103. Id. at 55-56.
104. Id. at 56.
105. Id. at 57.
106. Id. at 56-57 (“Plaintiffs here, however, attempt to avoid the effect of this release by contending
that the release itself was ‘part and parcel’ of KMC’s antitrust scheme.”).
107. Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. at 57 (discussing Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d
Cir. 1961)).
108. Id. (discussing Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 675 (W.D. Mo.
1955)).
109. Id. (discussing S.E. Rondon Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882).
110. Id. at 58.
111. Id. (analogizing the release to a consignment agreement).
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circumscribed by the plaintiffs who had fruitlessly pled its protection,
fleetingly stated and briskly denied.112
a. 1970 to 1980 — The Early Bronze — Carving Guardrails
Against Abuse
In 1974, a turning point in the philosophical evolution underpinning the
emergent part-and-parcel doctrine was marked by Redel’s Inc. v. General
Electric Co.113 The Fifth Circuit panel begins its narration of the case as
sweetly as “once upon a time”: “Redel’s was for many years a franchised
dealer of G.E. merchandise.”114 In 1969, the franchise agreement subject to
annual renewal was replaced with a new agreement intended to apply
indefinitely unless terminated, and this new contract incorporated a general
release provision “as of the date of the execution.”115 In order to account for
minor alterations in sales specifications, addenda were executed by the parties
annually, including one in 1971.116 This happy arrangement ended in 1972
when Redel’s filed a lawsuit alleging price discrimination continuing through
the previous year, and impelled by the resultant losses, sold its business to
another franchisee.117 The district court, however, found all claims barred by
the release, which it thought to have been renewed by the annual addenda
through 1971, the last such supplement.118 The Fifth Circuit in the main
assigned “grave error” in finding the release renewed and its effective date
advanced with each effective renewal, which raised the question of whether
the original clause of 1969 could be read to operate prospectively.119 The
Fifth Circuit held it clearly could not,120 adding for good measure that if it
did, it would unmistakably run afoul of public policy and citing considerable
authority in her sister courts of appeals as well as some district courts,
including Westmoreland, which had said just that.121 This left the clause
barring Redel’s claims though 1969, for the general release was broad and

112. See infra Part III. 3. a-b.
113. See generally Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 97.
115. Id. at 97-98.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id.
118. Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 98.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 98-99.
121. Id. at 99 (citing Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Gaines v.
Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means,
221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955); Westmoreland Abestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117,
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff’d, 136 F.2d 844 (2d. Cir. 1943); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated
Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1972)); see supra text accompanying note 37
(quoting Westmoreland).
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unambiguous, showing the parties “apparently desired to settle all matters”
previously between them.122
Straying sharply from previous cases, however, the Fifth Circuit
cautioned that “it should not be concluded that this Court condones the use
of the general release as a device to immunize parties with superior economic
power from the penalties and restraints imposed by the enforcement of our
antitrust laws.”123 This was a far cry from the courts who despaired of
considering such economic inequities in earlier antitrust cases, fatalistically
observing that every contract involved parties of disparate means.124
Although not present in the instant case, the panel warned that an advantaged
draftsman who sought to surreptitiously divest a counterparty of rights
sounding in antitrust “may well set forth facts which require jury
consideration of claims that the release itself was an integral part of a scheme
to violate the antitrust laws,” citing a wide array of part-and-parcel cases from
Carter to Dobbins to make its cautionary threat abundantly clear.125
The panel also marked its mindfulness that the very problem of just such
a devious draftsman had been raised in the Fourth Circuit only recently, albeit
in dissent.126 In Virginia Impression Products Co. v. SCM Corp.,127 the
majority thought the language was clearly that of a general and capacious
release, and both parties had entered into it with eyes wide open, contrary to
the district court’s allowance of a jury trial on the parties’ intent.128 That the
release of antitrust claims might not have been pellucid, or even
misunderstood, was immaterial: “The law imposes no obligation on a party
to a general release, dealing at arms length, to reveal all the possible legal
theories that the other may possibly use against him,” and antitrust theories
enjoyed no rarefied aegis.129 Judge Harrison Winter dissented volubly.130 He
described the artful machinations at play succinctly: “SCM intended to obtain
a release of its antitrust liability. VIP did not know, and did not realize until
well after the release was executed, that SCM’s motive for terminating the
dealership contract was its desire to enforce territorial restrictions”—the very

122. Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 99-100.
123. Id. at 100.
124. See, e.g., Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F. 2d 196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950);
S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (quoted supra note
100).
125. Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 100-01 (citing Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d
Cir. 1961); Dobbins v. Kawaski Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or. 1973); S.E. Rondon
Co., 288 F. Supp. at 882; Cal. Concrete, 288 F. Supp. 823; Carter, 127 F. Supp. 675).
126. Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 100.
127. See generally Va. Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971).
128. Id. at 265.
129. Id. at 265-66.
130. Id. at 267-271 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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restrictions that formed the basis of VIP’s eventual antitrust suit.131 Beside
the fact that Judge Winter thought the contractual language rather more
equivocal than the majority,132 he saw a more potent reason to allow a jury to
consider the parties’ motivations: to prevent sharp tactics under state contract
law of releases from trammeling the federal public policy against antitrust
abuses.133 Allowing extrinsic evidence of the parties’ motivation before a
jury would thus permit the narrowing of purported general releases that are
in and of themselves “inimical to federal policy” for antitrust.134 His view,
of course, did not carry the day, whatever mindfulness Redel’s professed.135
b. 1980 to 1990 — The Late Bronze — Forging Solidity for
Contractants
The Fifth Circuit rejoined the question a decade later in 1983 in Ingram
Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.136, a magisterially sweeping survey of the
law that took a less sympathetic view of the doctrine than had Ridel’s briefer
examination a decade before.137 Ingram was initially a minnow in the marine
construction industry but quickly grew into a formidable player by the 1970s,
challenging “worldwide competitors” McDermott and Brown & Root.138
Threatened by the upstart, these incumbents conspired to allocate and rig bids
for jobs worldwide in an effort to drive Ingram out of business by forestalling
it from obtaining contracts for a price at which it could plausibly turn a
profit.139 In service of the conspiracy, McDermott and Brown & Root divided
jobs between them, opted not to compete with one another, and divided the
spoils of inflated bids they were able to command.140 In a familiar
denouement, Ingram was indeed forced out of the industry, and in 1971
sought to sell its assets and open contracts to McDermott.141 Numerous
131. Id. at 271. Judge Winter elaborated: “Hence, it could well be concluded that VIP had no
intention of releasing its antitrust claim because it was not aware that it had the claim at the time that it
executed the release . . . . [U]nknown claims for commissions or under warranties or even for parts sold
or repair work performed . . . it seems to me, are what were intended to be given up and not the antitrust
claim, unknown to VIP, which SCM feared, but artfully refrained from making explicit when its counsel
drafted the release.” Va. Impression Prod. Co., 448 F.2d at 271.
132. Va. Impression Prod. Co., 448 F.2d at 267-69.
133. Id. at 269-70.
134. Id. at 270.
135. Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’g 495 F. Supp.
1321 (E.D. La. 1980).
137. See generally Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d 1295. Including its incisive recapitulation of events in
the District Court, the sprawling opinion occupies nearly thirty pages of the official reporter.
138. Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1299.
139. Id. The text omits the usual hedge of “allegedly” or the like given the companies’ eventual
convictions. See id. at 1301.
140. Id. at 1299-1300.
141. Id. at 1300.
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picayune details of responsibility for warranties and subcontracting
arrangements led to protracted negotiations involving “a cadre of lawyers
from throughout the country,” concluding in 1973 when Ingram agreed to
give up $1.2 million in value and provide a general release of liability to
McDermott (who executed a reciprocal release) in exchange for settlement of
the outstanding issues and consummation of the larger sale.142
Five years later, Ingram’s suspicions were proven true when McDermott
and Brown & Root were convicted upon pleas of nolo contendere to an array
of antitrust violations.143 A year after these convictions, and six years after
the release was executed, Ingram nonetheless filed suit for like antitrust
injuries, in defense of which the defendants proffered the far-reaching general
release, seeking summary judgment.144 “Various pretrial machinations
ensued,” narrated the Fifth Circuit, resulting in four relevant holdings by the
district court.145 In the first decision of January 1980, the court rejected
Ingram’s claims of lack of intent to release antitrust claims as foreclosed by
circuit precedent; duress and coercion as failing in fact; and “very
significantly,” invocation of part-and-parcel because “Ingram had not alleged
a single thing in its complaint which would indicate the release ‘in any way
furthered the goals of the conspiracy,’” albeit allowing thirty days for Ingram
to develop its claims of defendants’ fraudulent concealment.146 Ingram
indeed presented various evidence that McDermott had been less than
transparent in their protracted negotiations, but the district court was
unconvinced in its second ruling, as these omissions “did not make “the
failure to disclose possible antitrust violations particularly significant.”147
Arguably, Ingram had even shown that McDermott had concealed its antitrust
violations, but these were “irrelevant to the validity of the releases,” which
remained uninfected by a claim of fraud that had to be alleged with
particularity—Ingram’s new submission really amounted only to a
reargument of its already-rejected part-and-parcel argument.148 Summary
judgment of dismissal was granted: “Mere fraudulent concealment of an
antitrust conspiracy, unrelated to the negotiations which brought about the
execution of the releases, did not, by itself, establish fraud to render such
broad releases ineffectual.”149

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1300-01.
Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1302.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1303-04 (quoting district court) (emphasis removed).
Id. at 1304-06.
Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1304-06.
Id. at 1306.
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Ingram urged reconsideration on grounds of the public policy in favor of
antitrust enforcement.150 In some ways echoing Redel’s, in its third ruling,
the district court reversed itself, holding that “the issue was really not one of
whether or not the releases were valid. Rather, the issue was whether or not
the public interest was served by enforcing a release against an antitrust
plaintiff who had no knowledge of an antitrust conspiracy before he entered
into a release agreement with an antitrust conspirator.”151 Following further
discovery after this setback, McDermott renewed its motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Ingram itself had engaged in bid rigging and
accordingly had not exercised due diligence in investigating its suspicions
before entering into the release, both of which Ingram hotly contested.152
Finding Ingram’s potentially unclean hands and diligence to be factual
disputes eminently suitable to jury resolution, “reiterated his prior ruling that
the releases would be void if Ingram could establish McDermott’s fraudulent
concealment.”153 Summary judgment was denied, and, with a trial looming,
McDermott took an interlocutory appeal.154
McDermott found a more receptive audience in the Fifth Circuit, which
reversed.155 Right off the bat, the panel confirmed that Redel’s “squarely
controls this case.”156 Accordingly, the court reiterated that antitrust claims
enjoyed no immunity from general releases like the instant one that covered
“every claim between the parties under the sun,”157 regardless of whether
“Ingram may have not known” of its antitrust injuries or even considered such
claims discretely in negotiations—especially given the phalanx of counsel
advising on the settlement.158 As for the district court’s elevation of antitrust
policy over the finality of settlements, the Fifth Circuit found this priority
“quite correct” but only “[i]n the abstract”:159 buttressed by an impressive list
150. Id. at 1306.
151. Id. at 1307.
152. Id. at 1308-09.
153. Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1309 (“I cannot conclude that an antitrust plaintiff who suspects he
has been injured by the defendant’s wrongful conduct yet executes a release in favor of the defendant has
failed, as a matter of law, to exercise due diligence. It is possible that he executed the release only after
satisfying himself that his suspicions were groundless. At that point, ignorant of the antitrust violations
that in fact have occurred, the plaintiff stands in the same shoes as the victim who never suspected
wrongdoing in the first place. His exercise of due diligence has not necessarily been diminished by the
decision to enter into the release, although certainly that is an inference a jury might draw.”) (quoting
District Court).
154. Id. at 1309.
155. Id. at 1323.
156. Id. at 1310.
157. Id. at 1310-11.
158. Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1312 (“Ingram, with its battery of executives and counsel, was not
impotent when pitted against McDermott. It is inconsequential and unavailing for Ingram to now assert,
years after negotiation and execution of its release contracts, that it did not intend to release antitrust
claims.”) (citing Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d 95, 100).
159. Id.
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of appellate precedents, “our view is that an adequately drawn and validly
executed release will bar antitrust claims.”160 Whilst the all-too-common
fraudulent concealment of an antitrust conspiracy may toll the statute of
limitations on public policy grounds, “that is all it does;” it does not ipso facto
vitiate an otherwise valid release of liability, even antitrust liability, as Ingram
had urged.161 As the district court had distinguished and previous cases had
stated, failure to disclose potential antitrust claims to a counterparty at arms’
length cannot be the basis for voiding a release, and despite many
opportunities, Ingram failed to prove anything more.162 This left only the
unvarnished part-and-parcel claims that the district court had rejected for lack
of any nexus between the release itself and the conspiracy.163 “Under
Redel’s,” recalled the panel, “we intimated that another case may someday
arise where ‘the release itself was an integral part of a scheme to violate
antitrust laws’ and therefore will not be construed to extinguish antitrust
claims. This case has not ushered in that day.”164 Declining the invitation to

160. Id. at 1313 (citing Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974); Richards Lumber
& Supply Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 545 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.1976); Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co., Inc.
v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.1976); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522
F.2d 885 (3d Cir.1975); Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir.1975); Va.
Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith
Consolidated Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.1953); and Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax
Consol., 185 F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950)).
161. Id. at 1314 (“It gives a plaintiff who has been injured by a defendant’s antitrust violations a
chance to bring his action outside of the ordinary four-year limitations period. It does not allow a plaintiff
the opportunity to escape the consequences of his bargain with a defendant to release antitrust claims. We
decline to read into the tolling doctrine of the antitrust laws any such curative provision.”).
162. Id. at 1314-15 (“McDermott’s silence as to possible antitrust claims is not the same thing as
fraudulent inducement. When given opportunities—and several were granted—to present evidence that
McDermott fraudulently induced it to enter into the releases, Ingram failed to do so.”).
163. Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1315.
164. Id. at 1315-16 (“Judge Sear explicitly recognized that McDermott’s procurement of the releases
was not part and parcel of a conspiracy. He observed that Ingram was out of the marine construction
business in 1973, the year the releases were executed. . . . The releases clearly were not designed to force
Ingram out of the business. It already was. Neither were the releases essential to McDermott acquiring
Ingram’s business. It had already accomplished this. The releases were an outgrowth—a result, not a
cause of the acquisition. Ingram made the offer to settle. McDermott accepted. Under these
circumstances—unlike those where a party with superior economic power forces unfounded provisions of
a release on the other party—Ingram should not be allowed to undermine the provisions of valid releases
to which it agreed.”) (emphasis added).
The emphasized language would animate a frequently quoted formulation of the test for integrality in the
context of another federal statute two years later in Northern Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (“plaintiffs contend that the release is void because it is
part of an integral scheme to violate federal law and to perpetuate that violation. They rely on Ingram
Corp., 698 F.2d 1295, an antitrust conspiracy case which discussed the possible application of such a
standard to a future case whose facts merited it. Even were we to assume that this language provided
another means in addition to a fraudulent inducement claim to attack the validity of a release, which we
do not, plaintiffs have not shown on the facts of this case that the release is part of any such scheme. As
the court noted in Ingram, if the release is merely an outgrowth, rather than a cause, of the violation, it
cannot be part of any such scheme”) (emphasis added).
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query the parol motivations of the parties à la the concerns of Redel’s and
SCM, the court concluded with an adamant flourish:
Finally, we find it important to stress again that at the time the
releases were negotiated the parties to this dispute were three major
forces within the marine construction industry. Their assets were
worth millions. Their counsel were among the finest the legal
profession could offer. They were corporations staffed by high level
executives whose knowledge about the nuts and bolts of the marine
construction industry was substantial. Neither was a novice. Neither
was so incompetent as to be without means of discovering possible
antitrust violations. Neither was, or if it was, it should not have been,
so convinced of the other’s business integrity to justify failure to
inquire as to the possibility that the releases would cover antitrust
claims. And from the looks of it, neither was above conspiring to
violate the antitrust laws. . . . Due to its unmistakably important
position in the marine construction business in 1971, Ingram cannot
look back on its undeniably protracted negotiations with McDermott,
which resulted in the execution of releases that extinguished all
claims “arising out of, based upon, or any way relating to” its
untriumphant exit from the marine construction business, and yell
“foul play, release me from the bane of the releases.” We cannot and
will not allow this result.165
4. 1990 to 2000 — The Iron Age — Refining an Analysis from
Diffuse Ores
Armed with a clearer understanding of the underpinnings, metes, and
bounds of the part-and-parcel doctrine by virtue of the Fifth Circuit’s
industrious work, district courts nationwide returned to the scrum in the
1990s to apply the doctrine in an expanding diversity of circumstances, with
a correspondingly expansive diversity of results.
The long-serving Judge Morey Sear of the Eastern District of Louisiana
(he of the Ingram district court) next had occasion to apply the Fifth Circuit’s
treatment of his earlier work a decade later in Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v.
Winston (Winston I).166 Judge Sear once again faced an antitrust defendant
interposing a release,167 this time against Traffic Scan Network, who had
165. Ingram Corp., 698 F.2d at 1322 (citations omitted).
166. See generally Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 9080
(E.D. La. Jan. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Winston I].
167. The similarity did not escape Judge Sears. Winston I, 1993 WL 9080, at *1 (“Defendants wish
to limit discovery to the issue of the release’s validity. I have previously utilized this type of discovery
limitation, and the Fifth Circuit approved of the limitation in Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.
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(wisely) complained of antitrust violations not only leading up to but in the
very transaction in which it sold its business and executed the release in
question.168 In considering motions anent the proper scope of discovery, the
court reconfirmed that the Fifth Circuit had accepted the part-and-parcel
doctrine asserted by the plaintiff, quoting both Ingram and Redel’s: that
“where ‘release itself was an integral part of a scheme to violate antitrust
laws’ it will not be construed to dismiss antitrust claims.”169 To avoid the
release under Fifth Circuit precedent, continued the court, a plaintiff must
show fraudulent concealment, coercion, or duress in service of the antitrust
conspiracy, not “merely allege that defendants failed to disclose possible
antitrust claims during the negotiations leading up to the execution of the
release.”170 Given these premises, the court held discovery should be limited
to grounds for fraud or duress in the formation of the contract, not a freewheeling fishing expedition seeking to uncover any wrongdoing whatsoever
on the basis of a “general, unsupported allegation.”171
Nine months later, with this limited discovery complete, Judge Sear had
denied invocation of the part-and-parcel theory, and defendants sought
reconsideration (Winston II).172 Parsing the plaintiff’s arguments, the court
clarified that fraudulent inducement, duress, and part-and-parcel were
separate and independently sufficient methods of attacking a release, looking
to Ingram and even as far back as Carter for the distinction.173 The defendant
contended that it was similarly situated to that in Ingram, but the court
disagreed: there, the release survived “because it was executed almost two
years after the alleged antitrust violations occurred and plaintiff sold its
business to the defendant. Therefore, the release could not be ‘part and
parcel’ of the scheme to violate the antitrust laws; the release was an
The issues before me in that case were similar in that the plaintiff had also charged the defendant with
antitrust violations, and the defendant had raised the affirmative defense that a release was executed by
the plaintiff.) (citation omitted).
168. Winston I, 1993 WL 9080, at *1.
169. Id. at *2 (“The examples cited by the Fifth Circuit as demonstrative of this type of invalid
release concern releases executed by parties of unequal bargaining power. The court has stated that it is
‘wary’ of situations in which an ‘unsuspecting victim’ signs a general release when the draftsman of the
release has failed to disclose either the factual predicate to an antitrust claim or the fact that antitrust claims
are even embraced in the release.”) (omitting citations to Redel’s and Ingram).
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id. (“Plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid an otherwise prudential limitation to discovery in
this case merely by making the general, unsupported allegation that the release is ‘part and parcel’ to
defendants’ alleged antitrust violation. Thus, discovery on plaintiff’s ‘part and parcel’ challenge to the
release’s validity should be limited to the issues of fraudulent concealment and economic coercion and
duress. . . .”).
172. See generally Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144
(E.D. La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II].
173. Id. at *1 (citing Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’g
495 F. Supp. 1321, 1323 (E.D. La. 1980); Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675,
680-81 (W.D. Mo. 1955)).
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outgrowth, not a cause of the acquisition.”174 By contrast, the instant plaintiff
maintained that the release was inserted into the transaction “at the ‘eleventh
hour’” as an adjunct to the sale—and accepted only because plaintiff had no
choice to demur or chance to negotiate.175 Finding these facts sufficient to
substantiate that the release “may be invalid as an integral part of the alleged
antitrust scheme,” the court denied summary judgment.176 Further, perhaps
mindful of the last interlocutory appeal he had allowed in Ingram, Judge Sear
denied leave under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, finding no exceptional circumstances
given that the “Ingram court has clearly established the law regarding the
determination of whether a release is ‘part and parcel.’”177
Next to the trough was the Middle District of Florida a year later in
G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc.178 The plaintiff, Joe
Englander, with and through various corporate entities, including G.E.E.N.,
had operated multiple Toyota dealerships in the Orlando area of Florida, with
the financial and logistical assistance of local distributor J.M. Family
Enterprises (JM).179 Englander’s enterprises had not been faring well,
however, and, in January 1990, he closed on the sale of one of the dealerships
to JM Family.180 Notwithstanding the change in management, in February
1990, contractual disputes led the regional distributor, Southeast Toyota
(SET), to file suit, eventually explained to a multiplicity of claims and
counterclaims against JM Family and other financiers that were (by the
standards of such things) settled fairly quickly with a mutual exchange of
general releases and a stipulated order of dismissal later that year.181 In large
part, this haste was driven by G.E.E.N.’s primary financier, WOFCO,
threatening to terminate their arrangements after an audit found the business
underfunded.182 Sadly, the rapprochement did not last, and, in 1993,
G.E.E.N. and the other Englander parties filed their own suit against SET and
its alleged conspirators on largely the same claims of antitrust and other
violations as counterclaimed in the 1990 suit.183
The defendants offered the release as a shield whilst G.E.E.N. argued it
was void under fraudulent concealment, coercion, and part-and-parcel
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Winston II, 1993 WL 390144, at *3 (“Moreover, at this point in the litigation I have not decided
that as a matter of law the release agreement executed by Traffic Scan is part and parcel to the alleged
antitrust violations; only, that presently there is a genuine factual dispute as to this issue.”).
178. See generally G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., No. 93–632–CIV–ORL–
19, 1994 WL 695364 (M.D. Fla. Aug 31, 1994).
179. Id. at *1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *1-2.
183. G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *2.
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principles.184 The court swiftly addressed the issue of fraud and held that it
was unreasonable for G.E.E.N. to rely on WOFCO’s misrepresentations
about termination of the contract, given the acrimonious dispute underway
and ample advice of counsel at hand.185 The duress claimed under WOFCO’s
same threat fared no better, as the right to terminate was contractually clear,186
and, in any case, Englander had tarried far too long to repudiate the release,
availing himself of the benefits of the bargain long after the alleged coercion
was manifest.187 This left only the part-and-parcel claims, which parroted
those for fraud: that defendants’ meddling with G.E.E.N.’s financing to
obtain the release “was part of a larger antitrust conspiracy to derive illegal
profits and drive Plaintiffs out of business.”188 The court once again conceded
the principle that “a release which was secured as part of an anticompetitive
attempt to drive the other party out of business can be voided on the ground
that it is ‘part and parcel’ of an antitrust conspiracy,” but found that Englander
had shown no nexus between the release and any conspiracy, notwithstanding
their “sweeping allegations.”189 Ironically, noted the court, “in fact, the
release allowed Plaintiffs to remain in business. There is no evidence to show
that the release was anything other than a bargained for settlement of the
parties’ claims, entered into knowingly and voluntarily.”190
Rounding out the pre-millennial cases was St. Louis Convention and
Visitors Commission v. National Football League,191 in the same state as the
antediluvian Carter forty years before.192 The then-Los-Angeles Rams had
agreed with St. Louis to relocate, and their pact contemplated the possibility
of a lawsuit should the NFL disallow the relocation.193 Happily, the NFL
agreed, subject to certain conditions, including the execution in June 1995 of
a release of claims arising theretofore in connection with the negotiated move,
184. Id.
185. Id. at *3 (“Both sides were represented by separate counsel. Englander and Englander Toyota
made many of the same factual allegations regarding Defendants’ illegal and unethical conduct in the
original case as they now make in the instant case. Under those circumstances it defies logic and the case
law for Plaintiffs to assert that they reasonably relied on Defendants’ assertions about WOFCO’s right to
terminate Trail’s floorplan.”).
186. Id. at *5-6.
187. Id. at *7 (“Additionally, a party who retains the benefits of a contract cannot escape the
obligations imposed by the contract. If a releasor retains the consideration after learning that the release
is voidable, the continued retention of the benefits constitutes a ratification of the release. . . . There is no
evidence that Englander promptly denied the release’s effect and followed a course of conduct manifesting
a disavowal of it. To the contrary, it appears that Englander remained silent while retaining the benefits
of the release for three years.”) (citations omitted).
188. G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *3.
189. Id. at *3-4.
190. Id. at *4.
191. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (E.D.
Mo. 1997).
192. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
193. St. Louis, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59.
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along with which $20 million was moved into an escrow account.194 By
December, however, the agreeable mood had soured, and when St. Louis sued
in December, the NFL raised the June letter in support of summary judgment
in its favor.195 Noting that “several courts have held that a plaintiff may use
a ‘part and parcel’ argument to avoid a release in an antitrust action ‘where it
is shown that the release was an object of the combination or conspiracy or
where it was an integral part of the scheme in restraint of trade,”196 the court
rejected defendants’ attempts to liken the factual posture to Ingram, where
the release was executed two years after the alleged violations, and therefore
an “outgrowth” rather than “part and parcel” of those violations.197 Rather,
the scheme at hand was more like Winston II (or Carter, for that matter):198 if
the plaintiffs’ claims were true, the “alleged release, executed simultaneously
with the relocation agreements, would be considered an integral part of the
scheme to violate the antitrust laws.”199 As the release “may be invalid as a
cause of the violation,” the court denied the NFL’s motion for summary
judgment.200
5. 2000 to 2020 — The Modern Era — Regathering the Lessons
of History
The continuing discussion of the part and parcel doctrine in the modern
era of the twenty-first century is bestridden by the colossal edifice201 of the
Second Circuit on the cusp of the century in 2001, VKK Corp. v. National
Football League.202 It was no coincidence that the National Football League
was reappearing in court on charges of collusion a second time in less than
five years after St. Louis if, as the plaintiffs had argued, the League was

194. Id. at 1059.
195. Id. at 1059-60.
196. Id. at 1060-61 (quoting Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D.
Or. 1973)) (citing Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1315 (5th Cir. 1983)).
197. Id. at 1061.
198. St. Louis, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (citing See generally Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston,
Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144, *2 (E.D. La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II]; Carter v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 680 (W.D. Mo. 1955)).
199. Id. at 1061.
200. Id.
201. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2,. 143-49 (Barbara
A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds., 2011) (“Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world / Like a Colossus,
and we petty men / Walk under his huge legs and peep about / To find ourselves dishonorable graves. /
Men at some time are masters of their fates. / The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, / But in ourselves,
that we are underlings.”).
202. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2001).
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nothing less than an unapologetic monopoly patrolling the allocation of its
territory.203
a. “Rarely Discussed and More Rarely Applied”
Victor Kiam II, through VKK Corp., had been the owner of the New
England Patriots for some time, but after attempts to purchase their stadium
fell through, he began to explore the possibility of moving the money-losing
team elsewhere, specifically to Jacksonville or Baltimore, which were
seeking to attract an NFL franchise.204 The NFL opposed any move and
worked with VKK to bolster the club’s finances as Kiam was forced to infuse
the team with funds to stay afloat.205 Impelled by the pay-out demanded by
a minority owner exercising a buy-out option, Kiam finally resolved to sell
the team in 1992 and found a buyer in one James Orthwein.206 The NFL
supplied the required approval in April, subject to Kiam and VKK granting a
liability release, which Kiam executed in May207—saliently, the release
explicitly stated that Kiam was releasing state and federal antitrust claims.208
Directly thereafter, Kiam confirmed the sale to Orthwein, exiting NFL
ownership on apparently good terms from a valedictory letter he wrote only
a couple months later.209 Over two years later, however, apparently more
rueful, VKK filed suit against the NFL, its member clubs, and the
Jacksonville Jaguars expansion team entity, alleging they had conspired in
violation of the antitrust laws to prevent his relocation from New England.210
The defendants pressed the release of 1992, but VKK claimed it vitiated by
duress; after a jury trial in the Southern District of New York, however, the
court directed a verdict against plaintiffs for lack of proffered evidence.211

203. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 244
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (holding
NFL teams to be separate economic actors capable of antitrust conspiracy).
204. VKK, 55 F. Supp. at 200-02 (undisputed facts).
205. Id. at 203-04 (undisputed facts).
206. Id. at 204 (undisputed facts).
207. Id. (undisputed facts).
208. Id at 204-05 (releasing all claims “occurring from the beginning of the world to the date of this
Release, future claims, demands, obligations, suits, damages, levies, executions, judgments, debts,
charges, actions, or causes of action, at law or in equity, whether arising by statute, common law, or
otherwise, both direct and indirect, of whatever kind or nature arising out of or in any way relating to the
Releasors’ ownership interest in KMS Patriots L.P., save and except therefrom only . . . claims, other than
claims under federal or state antitrust laws (which are hereby released), arising out of a League
decision to approve a relocation of the KMS Patriots L.P. NFL franchise or playing site to a location
outside of New England prior to January 1, 1995. . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
209. VKK, 55 F. Supp. at 205-06.
210. Id. at 197.
211. Id.
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With duress foreclosed, VKK raised the part-and-parcel theory to resist
the release and dismissal on summary judgment.212 The court reiterated the
general dictate that a general release given on advice of counsel is effective
even to release antitrust claims and expressed some doubt whether the partand-parcel theory was even viable.213 For the first time, a court traced its
“genesis” to Raytheon, even as it acknowledged that the relevant passage was
dictum, and the Supreme Court had refused to reach the part-and-parcel
question.214 Moving forward, the district court catalogued several of the
many appellate decisions (Taxin, Ingram, and Northern Oil) that had declined
to apply the doctrine.215 Disarmed of their duress claim, the plaintiffs had
themselves alit only on Winston II, which the court readily distinguished and
disregarded (questionably) as dictum.216
And even assuming the
sustainability of part-and-parcel along with some measure of duress, the court
found no evidence that the release was the “object” of or bore a “special and
unusual relation” to the conspiracy, as the established formulations of the
doctrine demanded.217 After reviewing the thorough evidentiary record
disproving plaintiffs’ argument, the district court summed up:
The plaintiffs argue that because the NFL has a policy of obtaining
releases in order to limit antitrust litigation, the Release is void
because it is an “integral part” of a larger conspiracy to prevent NFL
teams from relocating. However, every release is designed to prevent
litigation, and releases are often sought in order to limit particular
classes of liability. It goes too far to argue that a policy of obtaining
releases transforms an otherwise valid release into a legal nullity.
Even if the Court were to accept the part and parcel theory, it finds

212. Id. at 197-98.
213. Id. at 206.
214. VKK, 55 F. Supp. at 206 (“The genesis of the part and parcel theory appears to be dictum from
a 1935 decision in which the Supreme Court refused to reach the part and parcel issue. Radio Corp. v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 459 (1935). In that case, filed at law, the defendant sought to force the case
into a court of equity. The Supreme Court expressly refused to address plaintiffs’ argument that its release
‘was so connected with the unlawful combination and monopoly as to be inoperative at law.’ See id. at
462, 463. The Court held that ‘a court of equity must decline at this stage to adjudicate the validity of the
release . . . , leaving that issue along with others to adjudication at law.’ Id. at 463.”) (parallel citations
omitted).
215. Id. at 206-07 (discussing Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961);
Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1315 (5th Cir. 1983); Northern Oil Co. v.
Standard Oil Co. of California, 761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (quoted supra note 164)).
216. Id. at 207 (citing Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL
390144, *2 (E.D. La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II]).
217. Id. at 207. (quoting Dobbins v. Kawaski Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or.
1973); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961)) (citing Cal. Concrete Pipe Co.
v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1968)).
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no precedent supporting such a broad expansion of the theory’s
reach.
In short, the Release was not obtained until the sale transaction had
closed, after which Kiam was powerless to relocate the Patriots, not
because of any conspiracy, but rather because he no longer owned
the club. Therefore, the Release could not have been an “integral
part” of a conspiracy to keep the Patriots from relocating out of New
England. The Release was at most “merely an outgrowth, rather than
a cause,” of the alleged conspiracy. As in virtually every other case
to address the “part and parcel theory” in the last fifty years, summary
judgment for the defendants thereon will be granted.218
VKK appealed, but to little avail, as the Second Circuit hewed to much
the same path.219 The jury finding against duress was at length affirmed, in
large part because VKK failed to promptly renounce the ostensibly coerced
release and delayed so long to sue even after the facts underlying the alleged
conspiracy were apparent220—even if they were not at the time of the release,
which the Second Circuit also doubted.221 So too went analysis of part-andparcel: despite the rejection of reliance on Raytheon in California Concrete222
and Dobbins,223 and its notable absence from some of the earliest cases,224 the
Second Circuit first echoed its district court that “rarely discussed and more
rarely applied, ‘part and parcel’s’ roots are traced to Justice Cardozo’s
statement in Radio Corp. of Am. v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., that a release to an
antitrust claim may be invalid ‘when it is so much a part of an illegal
transaction as to be void in its inception.’”225 As in the district court, the
doctrine would apply only where the release was “an object of the
combination or conspiracy” or “an integral part of the scheme,” and not
“merely an outgrowth, rather than a cause of the violation.”226 But an
outgrowth was precisely what VKK had signed: “insofar as VKK is
218. Id. at 207-208.
219. VKK, 244 F.3d at 121.
220. Id. at 121-124.
221. Id. at 124-25.
222. Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 826 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
223. Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 57 (D. Or. 1973); see supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961); Suckow Borax
Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950); Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 680 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
225. VKK, 244 F.3d at 125 (quoting Radio Corp., 296 U.S. at 462) (citation omitted) (initial
majuscule reduced to minuscule).
226. Id. (quoting Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. at 58) Northern Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (quoted supra note 164)).
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concerned, the conspiracy was complete when it agreed to sell the Patriots to
Orthwein because VKK could not move the team. The Release therefore was
not part and parcel . . . . It only stopped VKK from bringing suit to recover
treble damages.”227
Undeterred, VKK maintained that the release did directly serve the
conspiracy by preventing his suit to provide precedent for future owners to
escape the NFL’s anticompetitive restraints on relocation, and the release
itself “[exposed] the member clubs to liability if they allowed Mr. Orthwein
to move.”228 In the first case, reasoned the panel, nothing stopped VKK from
lodging suit during the protracted period in which the NFL was allegedly
preventing it from relocating the team, prior to the Orthwein sale—the release
was of a right VKK had long held and never exercised nonetheless.229
Moreover, “VKK’s argument also proves too much,” for every release
prevents suit against a continuing conspiracy, and it would be overreaching
to think “the part and parcel doctrine can be read so broadly as thus to render
void all releases relating to conspiracies alleged to continue post-release.”230
As for the second argument, Orthwein was already separately forbidden from
moving the team, and so the release scarcely advanced any NFL scheme.231
Taken together, the district court was amply justified in finding that VKK had
failed to show the integrality of the release to any aspect of the alleged
conspiracy.232 The judgment of the district court as to the release’s
voidability was affirmed, as was summary judgment as to the NFL entities
whom the release protected.233
Bespeaking its oversize stature (and perhaps the hypertrophy of the
academic commentariat in modern times), VKK inspired somewhat more
commentary than its predecessors.234 Particularly incisive is Robert J.
Ritacco’s note in the Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law.235 By way of
227. Id. at 126.
228. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appellants’ Br. at 26.).
229. Id.
230. VKK, 244 F.3d at 126 (“It is not uncommon, we assume, for a release to prevent the releaser
from bringing suit against the releasee for engaging in a conspiracy that is later alleged to have continued
after the release’s execution. Such a release would seem always to protect the ongoing conspiracy because
it always prevents the releasor from beginning litigation that would establish the scheme’s illegality.”).
231. Id. at 126-27.
232. Id. at 127.
233. Plaintiffs did gain one substantial victory: in the alternative, the District Court had ruled for
summary judgement on the merits because plaintiffs had raised no reasonable inference of an antitrust
conspiracy in the main. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding the issue susceptible of competing
inferences and thus ripe for a jury, allowing the case to proceed against the unshielded Jacksonville entities.
Id. at 131-32.
234. See, e.g., Claudia G. Catalano, J.D., Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional
Sports, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, § 123 (2013); Ritacco, supra note 23; 2d Cir. Dismisses Patriots Owner’s
Claims Against NFL, 8 No. 10 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 5 (2001); NFL Eludes Antitrust Blitz
from Former Patriots Owner, 7 No. 2 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 3 (1999).
235. Ritacco, supra note 23.
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introduction, Ritacco lamented that VKK opted to protect the NFL’s “rights
under the release and chose not to offer safeguards for the injured party.”236
Acknowledging that the time that VKK delayed in the suit was substantial,
he thought the court was perhaps too harsh and deferential to the storied
benefits of hindsight: “it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances that a
plaintiff did not understand the consequences of signing a release of all claims
until much later. Often, when parties enter into a contract, they do not realize
that they have been placed in an inferior bargaining position.”237 Ritacco was
particularly critical of the court’s rejection of part-and-parcel, concluding
after his lengthy study that
under the part and parcel doctrine the release was integral to the
transaction. But for the signing of the release, the sale would not
have been consummated. The release was a major component to the
illegal conspiracy between the NFL and [the Jacksonville entity], for
it sanctioned their illicit behavior. The court questioned the vitality
of the doctrine as being suspect. The part and parcel doctrine has
found support, however, in situations similar to the present matter.
Therefore, the contract for release should have been voided.238
b. The Loyal Progeny of VKK
The next case followed even as such commentaries were being published,
when the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adjudicated a long-running dispute
in Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway Foods, Inc.239 A rather more humdrum
antitrust case than the high stakes of major-league football, Fresh Made and
Lifeway were competitors in the market for specialty dairy products such a
kefir, a fermented drink akin to yogurt.240 Fresh Made alleged that the larger
Lifeway had been engaging in a campaign to destroy its business by
threatening distributors with pulling its own orders if they supplied Fresh
Made and grocers with calling in lines of credit if they stocked Fresh Made
products.241 The situation was complicated by Lifeway’s parallel crusade of
vexatious litigation in various fora concerning trade dress and trademarks,
one of which was settled in 2000 for a modest payment and an exchange of
mutual global releases from liability.242 When Lifeway continued to threaten
236. Id. at 162.
237. Id. at 162-63.
238. Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
239. Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 01–4254, 2002 WL 31246922 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 9, 2002).
240. Id. at *1.
241. Id.
242. Id. at *1-2.
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Fresh Made with litigation, the latter finally filed suit for numerous violations
of the Sherman Act and other torts; Lifeway, of course, sought summary
judgment on the 2000 release.243 Precedent squarely foreclosed the argument
that the waiver of antitrust claims was itself against public policy, and so
Fresh Made pivoted to a part-and-parcel argument.244
The court looked to the recently-decided precedent of VKK for the rule
of decision, noting that a proper part-and-parcel claim cannot rest in a mere
“outgrowth” of the alleged conspiracy, and cannot be stretched to encompass
all continuing conspiracies.245 But, Fresh Made did “not explain how the
release was integral to the vexatious use of litigation or the attempts to
prevent Fresh Made from competing with Lifeway, nor d[id] the plaintiff
argue that the alleged conspiracy could not have proceeded without the
release.”246 Indeed, Fresh Made was simultaneously arguing that Lifeway
had continued its strategy of vexatious litigation in violation of that very
release, which ought to have put it a halt to the litany of lawsuits.247 The
court declined Fresh Made’s invitation to “go behind the language to
determine what the intent of the parties was,” finding the release clear and
retrospective.248 No part-and-parcel exemption from the release was found
available.249
In 2009, the Southern District of New York gave a thorough airing to the
view that antitrust releases might be voided for antitrust public policy in
243. Lifeway’s president evidently also warned direly that “in America, it was the destiny of a big
company to swallow up a little company like Fresh Made.” Id. at *2.
244. Fresh Made, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3.
245. Id. at *3 (citing VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2001)).
246. Id. (citing VKK, 244 F.3d at 126).
247. Id. at *4 (“Fresh Made also asserts that Lifeway’s filing of the May 2001 suit in Illinois
breached the terms of the settlement agreement, suspending Fresh Made’s obligations under the release.”).
248. See id. at *4 n.7 (“The caselaw relied on by Fresh Made, however, merely holds that when
parties enter into a release ‘purporting to exempt a party from liability for injuries which may occur in the
future’, the release covers only those claims which were ‘within the contemplation of the parties at the
time’ of execution. The release in this case does not seek to exempt either party from liability for future
conduct, but releases only past claims. Therefore, because the release language is clear and unambiguous
on its face, the Court need not look to extrinsic evidence to give meaning to its terms.”) (citations omitted).
249. Fresh Made, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3-4. Fresh Made did offer sufficient evidence to avoid
summary judgment based on its free-standing alternate theory that the release was voidable as fraudulently
induced. The case was later raised in a futile attempt to assail a release that barred claims of employment
discrimination in Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 F. Supp. 3d 271, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The court was
perplexed by the doctrine’s invocation, for [a]lthough “the part and parcel theory inexplicably remains
part of this case, it is abundantly obvious that this theory has no applicability” in the employment
discrimination realm. The court otherwise affirmed the part-and-parcel theory’s ongoing vitality in cases
where the release was “integral” to or the “object” of an antitrust scheme, noting the “clarity of the sparse
case law limiting this doctrine to an antitrust setting,” and observing that it “had its inception and sole
application in antitrust jurisprudence.” Romero, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 282 (citing VKK, 244 F.3d at 125;
Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1315 (5th Cir. 1983); Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1974); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or.
1973); Fresh Made, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3)).
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Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences, Inc.250 As usual, Media Sciences argued that
to bar its antitrust claims anent printer ink cartridges based on a release
embodied in a settlement with Xerox would traduce public policy.251 The
court first recited the widely held consensus that courts should refuse to
enforce a release of future antitrust liability252 but noted that “courts have
enforced even general releases to bar antitrust claims predicated on
continuing violations of pre-release conduct,” citing VKK,253 and the
compelling need to encourage amicable settlements even (or particularly) in
antitrust suits.254 The settlement clearly allowed and intended Xerox to issue
rebates and distribute warnings that Media Sciences’ ink replacements could
cause malfunctions in Xerox printers as long as such problems persisted, and
Media Sciences had agreed not to sue on that basis without first arbitrating
the question.255 “It is the substance of the conditional covenant-not-to-sue,”
thought the court, “that distinguishes this case from those in which courts
have refused to enforce releases in the antitrust context for public policy
reasons.”256 This was not a release “forever extinguish[ing]” recourse to
lawsuit or sanctioning future violations; it was a contingent clause that
targeted a specific issue, “nor d[id] it provide Xerox with ‘de facto immunity’
from suit.”257 The court granted Xerox’s motion for summary judgment on
the release in favor of the bargained-for arbitration.258
It is fitting that the most recent part-and-parcel case (as of this Article’s
writing) recurred once again to the court where it all began nearly a century
before in Westmoreland, the Southern District of New York in QS Holdco
Inc. v. Bank of America Corp.259 Offering a twist on the old release fact
250. Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
251. Id. at 325.
252. Id. at 325-26.
253. Id. at 326 (citing VKK, 244 F.3d at 126).
254. Id. at 326-27.
255. Xerox, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 327-28.
258. Id. at 328-29. Xerox followed and cited a case from the same court a year earlier in which the
judge had granted summary judgment on a release notwithstanding it blocked many of the antitrust claims
made by Madison Square Garden against the NHL. See id. at 326; Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l
Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2008 WL 4547518 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) (“MSG”). In MSG,
the court reasoned that only wholly prospective releases of such liability contravened public policy, and
retrospective releases were allowable in antitrust matters. MSG, 2008 WL 4547518, at *7. There was no
question to the court that the NHL was a legitimate joint and no fig leaf for a collusive cartel. Id. at *7.
And after MSG “concede[d] that the logical corollary of its position regarding the Release being
‘prospective’ in nature is that parties can never settle antitrust claims predicated on ‘ongoing violations’
even if they are based on ‘the same kind of acts repeated in the subsequent period,’” the court found that
approach squarely foreclosed by VKK. Id. at *8. As the NHL’s complained-of behavior was simply the
unchanged continuance of policies that existed long before the release was executed, no public policy
defense was available. Id. at *8-9. Summary judgment on the release was granted. Id. at *10.
259. QS Holdco Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-cv-824(RJS), 2019 WL 3716443 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2019).
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pattern, QS Holdco sued seven financial services companies over an alleged
group boycott of its stock lending platform, AQS.260 As an automated
matching program between borrowers and lenders, AQS threatened the
powerful and lucrative position the seven defendants held as intermediaries
for that business, and defendants allegedly “feigned interest” only to steer
their clients away from the platform and attempt to foreclose its use.261
Despite initial interest from consumers, AQS’s owners were eventually
compelled to sell at a loss to defendant EquiLend in 2016 after the most
logical acquirer inexplicably cut off negotiations, leaving QS Holdco holding
the bag in a “desperate situation.”262
The defendants jointly raised in defense the general assignment of all
claims that QS Holdco had executed as part of the sale to EquiLend, arguing
that QS Holdco no longer had any right to bring such a suit.263 Although
assuring itself of Article III standing (though noting the plaintiff was
“susceptible to a real-party-in-interest challenge”), the court found the
remarkably capacious transfer of claims language could only be read to
encompass antitrust claims as well.264 This left QS Holdco to argue that such
a transfer to be void under a somewhat novel application of the part-andparcel doctrine.265 The court, however, was dubious, finding the doctrine had
been seldom applied and that the facts to “closely resemble those in VKK,”
where the court held that the release was valid.266 “The same is true here,”
opined the court: the conspiracy’s goal was “boycott of the AQS platform
with the goal of driving AQS out of the market,” and by the time of the sale,
that goal had been achieved, and the accompanying release was itself only
“incidental to EquiLend’s purchase of AQS.”267 And just like in VKK, AQS’s
original owner was well aware of the boycott and had every opportunity to
sue before transferring its claims; it chose to take the sure money of a sale
instead.268 As in so many previous cases, the court was left with the clear
conviction that the plaintiff had simply “alleged no facts” to support its
contentions.269
260. Id. at *1
261. Id. at *1-2.
262. Id. at *2.
263. Id. Needless to say, as a named defendant in the conspiracy, EquiLend had little interest in
asserting antitrustclaims against itself or its fellow defendants.
264. See QS Holdco, 2019 WL 3716443, at *3-4.
265. Id. at *4-5.
266. Id. at *4.
267. Id. at *5.
268. Id. (“Furthermore, as in VKK Corp., nothing prevented Plaintiff—or Quadriserv, for that
matter—from pursuing its antitrust claims prior to the sale, particularly since Quadriserv, the original
owner of AQS, was on notice of the conspiracy as early as 2009.”)
269. QS Holdco, 2019 WL 3716443, at *5 (“In short, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support an
application of this rare doctrine—’whatever [its] status’ may be, —or any other basis to invalidate the
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Even after QS Holdco moved to amend the judgment in light of
supplementary submissions, the court was unmoved, believing the “‘new
facts’ are hardly dispositive” and represented only a futile attempt to “plead
its way around the Court’s decision regarding the part and parcel doctrine—
a rare doctrine, the viability of which has been questioned by the Second
Circuit.”270 QS Holdco’s final desperate gambit offered only “the conclusory
assertion that the release was ‘integral to the perpetuating of the conspiracy,’”
belated hand-waving that was “clearly not enough to justify application of
such a rare doctrine.”271
B. No Pygmalions: A Largely Lifeless Judicial Creation
It is natural that a sculpture of the law be only as skillful as its sculptor,
and, in this instance, the lower courts proved no Pygmalions.272 The courtfashioned part-and-parcel doctrine never fully came to life: despite all the
promising possibilities of relief one day from invidious antitrust releases in
“another case” that “may someday arise,”273 the Southern District of New
York rightly observed that “the majority of courts to address the part and
parcel theory have declined to apply it.”274 Going further on appeal, the
Second Circuit in VKK added mordantly that “no United States Court of
Appeals has ever applied the part and parcel theory to invalidate a release,”275
and seemingly toyed with declaring the doctrine a dead letter.276 This
appellate skepticism was nothing new; forty years earlier, the Third Circuit
in Taxin had “expressed grave doubt” whether the nascent doctrine was even
a serious concern in actual practice.277 The Supreme Court has since
cautioned against allowing a doctrine never applied in practice to stubbornly
legitimate transfer of claims reflected in agreements for which Plaintiff received consideration.”)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing VKK, 244 F.3d at 127).
270. QS Holdco Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-CV-824 (RJS), 2019 WL 10959922, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019).
271. Id.
272. See THOMAS BULFINCH, THE AGE OF FABLE 64-66 (The Heritage Press 1942) (narrating the
ancient Greek and later Roman tale of Pygmalion, a sculptor whose “art was so perfect” that Venus granted
his wish that his beloved masterpiece come to life as a real woman).
273. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1315-16 (5th Cir. 1983).
274. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (initial
majuscule reduced to minuscule).
275. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, at 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)
(initial majuscule reduced to minuscule).
276. Id. at 126 (“We see no reason, however, to decide for this Circuit whether the doctrine is viable.
If it is, it does not apply in this case.”); see supra note 270 and accompanying text (quoting QS Holdco,
2019 WL 10959922, at *2).
277. VKK, 244 F.3d at 126 (quoting Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir.
1961)) (“[W]e are not able to imagine any meaningful way in which the obtaining of a release could be,
in appellants’ own words, ‘part of and in furtherance of the continuing conspiracy among the defendants
about which plaintiffs complain.’”).
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persist in theory, squandering the time and hopes of litigants on a practically
foregone conclusion.278 Such concerns are not unjustified with the part-andparcel doctrine; in 1994, the Middle District of Florida in G.E.E.N. had
determined after an extensive survey that the long-ago “Carter[279] is the only
case the Court has been able to find in which a release has been invalidated
for being ‘part and parcel’ of an antitrust conspiracy, and it is obviously
distinguishable” because there “the release was one clause of a contract which
itself was the very restraint of trade complained of by the plaintiff.”280 A
quarter century later, the situation is little changed, as the 2019 QS Holdco
court still found that “courts have rarely applied this doctrine to invalidate
releases,”281 adding itself to that number.282 Table 1 illustrates and quantifies
this undeniable trend in dispositions:
TABLE 1 · CHRONOLOGY OF PART-AND-PARCEL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISPOSITIONS
Pg
243
247
249
248
250
251
252
254
257

Caption
Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am.
Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp.
Suckow Borax Mines Consol.
v. Borax Consol.
Carter v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp.
Michael Rose Productions,
Inc. v. Loew’s Inc.
Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.
Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am.
Pipe & Constr. Co.
S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.
Va. Impression Prod. Co. v.
SCM Corp.

Year
1935

Court
1st Cir.

Release
Undecided*

1943

S.D.N.Y.

Set Aside

1950

9th Cir.

Upheld

1955

W.D. Mo. Voided

1956

S.D.N.Y.

Upheld

1961
1968

3d Cir.
C.D. Cal.

Upheld
Upheld

1968

C.D. Cal.

Upheld

1971

4th Cir.

Upheld†

278. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021) (“Continuing to articulate a theoretical
exception that never actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads
judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.”).
279. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
280. G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 93–632–CIV–ORL–19, 1994 WL 695364, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. Aug 31, 1994).
281. QS Holdco, 2019 WL 3716443, at *4 (citing VKK, 244 F.3d at 125; Dobbins v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or. 1973)).
282. Id. at *5.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss2/2

38

Sunshine: The “Rarely Discussed and More Rarely Applied” Antitrust Implicat

2022] ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF ANTRITRUST RELEASES

255
256
258
261‡
262
264
265
266
271
273‡
273
272‡
273

Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors
Corp., U.S.A.
Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co.
Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co.
Northern Oil Co. v. Standard
Oil Co. of California
Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v.
Winston
G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Southeast
Toyota Distributors, Inc.
St. Louis Convention &
Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l
Football League
VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football
League
Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway
Foods, Inc.
Madison Square Garden, L.P.
v. Nat’l Hockey League
Xerox Corp. v. Media
Sciences, Inc.
Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co.
QS Holdco Inc. v. Bank of Am.
Corp.

*On grounds other than part and parcel
‡
Discussed only in footnote

277

1973

D. Or.

Upheld

1974
1983

5th Cir.
5th Cir.

Upheld
Upheld

1985
1993

Upheld^
Temp.
Emer. Ct.
App.
E.D. La. Set Aside

1994

M.D. Fla. Upheld

1997

E.D. Mo.

Set Aside

2001

2d Cir.

Upheld

2002

E.D. Pa.

Set Aside*

2008

S.D.N.Y.

Upheld

2009

S.D.N.Y.

Upheld

2015
2019

E.D. Pa.
S.D.N.Y.

Upheld^
Upheld

†
With noted dissent
^Not sounding in antitrust

It is true that this supposedly singular case, Carter, is palpably
egregious.283 The plaintiff was a widow who had (to put it mildly) been
treated rather shabbily by a national conglomerate, which sought first to bully
her into favorable terms and then resorted to allegedly anticompetitive tactics
to snatch away her livelihood when brute force failed;284 such a plight could
hardly fail to garner sympathy from even the most stoic jury or jurist.285 Like
283. Carter, 127 F. Supp. 675.
284. Id. at 677-78.
285. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 609 (1974) (observing of a widow seeking
duplicative damages for wrongful death that “[a]s anyone who has tried jury cases knows, jury sympathy
commonly overcomes a theoretical inability to recover”); see also Estate of Carter v. Comm’r, 453 F.2d
61 (2d Cir. 1971) (considering whether payment to a widow was a gift arising out of sympathy or
compensation); cf. Exodus 22:22 (King James) (“Ye shall not afflict any widow”); Psalms 146:9 (King
James) (“The LORD preserveth the strangers; he relieveth the fatherless and widow”); Isaiah 1:17 (King
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G.E.E.N., later cases strained to explain how Carter’s facts were so plainly
contrary to the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, so much so that they
had little persuasive power to counsel the more ambivalent fact postures faced
by those later courts.286 It is also true that Carter predates the emergence of
the more robustly defined part-and-parcel doctrine in the late 1960s and
thereafter,287 leaving an open question as to whether the case would yield the
same results in modern times. And G.E.E.N.’s search may not have been the
most painstaking possible: Judge Sear in Winston II surely thought that an
ample enough case for voidness to defeat summary judgment had been
made288 though the G.E.E.N. court can hardly be faulted for failing to
prophesize the result in the then-unfiled St. Louis case.289
In any case, the singularity of Carter (and its few close cohorts) is likely
due as much to the doctrine’s infrequent invocation as its failure to convince:
part-and-parcel is not a theory that has launched a thousand cases, but instead,
perhaps a mere dozen or two.290 It is not surprising that with so small a
sample size, most invocations by plaintiffs are brought to try any means to
evade a seemingly insuperable release simply failed by the facts on the
record.291 The Stone Age cases of S.E. Rondon, California Concrete, and
Dobbins all spoke damningly on the lack of a demonstrated “tie-in” between
the release and the underlying conspiracy: the keystone that would support
an inference that the release was not merely an outgrowth, collateral
convenience, or afterthought, but instead was an integral element in the
nefarious plan.292 Again and again, plaintiffs were taken to task for
suggesting a release ought to be presumed to be part-and-parcel of an antitrust
James) (“Learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the
widow.”); 1 Timothy 5:3 (King James) (“Honour widows that are widows indeed.”).
286. See, e.g., S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. at 57.
287. Carter, 127 F. Supp. at 675; see supra Parts III. A. 2-5.
288. Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144, at *2 (E.D.
La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II].
289. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (E.D.
Mo. 1997).
290. See supra Part III. A.; cf. supra note 16 and accompanying text. One doubts that Ilium would
have fallen nor the Iliad been written had so few ships hied to Helen’s ravishment.
291. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1983); QS Holdco
Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-CV-824 (RJS), 2019 WL 10959922, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019);
Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01–4254, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
9, 2002); VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); G.E.E.N.
Corp. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 93–632–CIV–ORL–19, 1994 WL 695364, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug
31, 1994); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or. 1973).; S.E. Rondon Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 829 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Michael Rose Productions, Inc v. Loew’s Inc., 19
F.R.D. 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see also, e.g., Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451-52 (3d
Cir. 1961).
292. Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. at 58 (quoted supra note 111); S.E. Rondon, 288 F. Supp. at 882;
California Concrete, 288 F. Supp. at 829.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss2/2

40

Sunshine: The “Rarely Discussed and More Rarely Applied” Antitrust Implicat

2022] ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF ANTRITRUST RELEASES

279

conspiracy afoot, without more.293 Courts also adverted often to the fact that
suspicions or even disputes were already in the air when the release was
negotiated294 and that the releasor was well-represented by knowledgeable
counsel.295 This assuaged any concern that the release had been extracted
unawares of its consequences for potential antitrust claims.296 Finally,
plaintiffs who all-too-often sat overlong on their claims received a hostile
reception, deriving from fears that the plaintiffs sought to have their cake and
eat it too: to sample the consideration for the putatively void release and to
later press for rescission only if the rewards of a lawsuit seemed preferable.297
All the same, there have been some signs of life astir amidst the
meandering monotony of summary dismissals. The decisions denying
summary judgment despite the proffered release in Carter, Winston II, and
St. Louis had significant force, even if the ultimate voidability remained an
open question pending demonstration of the alleged conspiracy itself.298
Realistically, the motivating force of the part-and-parcel doctrine is expended
when it is pled and proven sufficiently to escape summary judgment, for the
case will then typically proceed to the merits of the antitrust claim

293. E.g., Taxin, 287 F.2d at 451-52 (quoted supra note 81); G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *4;
California Concrete, 288 F. Supp. at 828 (quoted supra note 90).
294. E.g., Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1322 n.29 (“We find it noteworthy that the parties’ counsel had a
meeting in 1971 to discuss the implications of the antitrust laws on Ingram’s sale of assets to McDermott.
This meeting should have at least demonstrated to Ingram that antitrust was not a foreclosed topic[.]”);
VKK, 244 F.3d at 124 (“the undisputed facts make plain that Kiam had sufficient knowledge of the
conspiracy as a whole at the time he executed the Release”); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax
Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1950) (“Suckow and his attorneys had repeatedly accused certain
of appellees, both in and out of court, of violating the antitrust laws for the specific purpose of damaging
Suckow”); QS Holdco, 2019 WL 3716443, at *5 (“Quadriserv, the original owner of AQS, was on notice
of the conspiracy as early as 2009”); G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *3 (“At the time the settlement
agreement was signed, Englander and Englander Toyota were involved in a bitter lawsuit with Defendants
in which they accused Defendants of fraud, breach of contract, tortious interference with business
relationships, and antitrust violations.”).
295. E.g., Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1322 (“Their counsel were among the finest the legal profession
could offer.”); VKK, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (“experienced businessmen with sophisticated legal counsel”);
G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *3 (“Both sides were represented by separate counsel.”).
296. See Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1974); Va. Impression Prod. Co.
v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 269-70 (4th Cir. 1971) (Winter, J., dissenting).
297. E.g., VKK, 244 F.3d at 125 (“VKK was required to challenge its validity promptly after that
execution, or not at all. We hold that as a matter of law, thirty months was not ‘prompt.’ “); QS Holdco,
2019 WL 3716443, at *5 (quoted supra note 294); G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *7 (“To the contrary, it
appears that Englander remained silent while retaining the benefits of the release for three years. The
Court has not found an instance where a party’s claim for recision [sic] of a release or contract was upheld
after a delay of three years. In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ allegations of duress are simply too little, too
late.”).
298. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1058,
1061 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144,
at *2 (E.D. La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II]; Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127
F. Supp. 675, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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notwithstanding the release, whatever its ultimate fate.299 For that reason,
judicious courts have often granted limited discovery bifurcated from the
merits specifically to first address the validity of the release.300 Antitrust
defendants, after all, have amply shown the tremendous costs and rigors of
wholesale discovery in antitrust actions, costs that may drive them to settle in
terrorem rather than on the merits.301 The preliminary overriding of a release
thus deprives that shield of much, if not all, of its value.302
Nevertheless, for all the ink spilled over arguments pro and con, there are
only two passably reliable lessons from the extenuated line of part-and-parcel
cases: public policy will not tolerate prospective waivers of antitrust
liability,303 but retrospective releases may stand so long as they are not
embodied within the very instruments effecting the antitrust conspiracy, as
they were in Carter.304 Even this latter prong seems somewhat precarious,
given the instances in which releases nearly, if not wholly, concurrent with
the market exit alleged to be the conspiracy’s objective, were allowed to stand

299. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d 851; Estate of Carter v. Comm’r, 453 F.2d 61, 194
(2d Cir. 1971); aff’g 35 T.C. 326; see generally Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside, 194 F.2d
846 (8th Cir. 1952); Winston II, 1995 WL 317307.
300. See, e.g., Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1308 (“Resisting Ingram’s attempt to go on a ‘fishing expedition’,
the District Court restricted the scope of discovery to discern facts regarding Ingram’s knowledge of the
conspiracy”) (citations omitted); VKK, 244 F.3d at 121 (“The action was originally assigned to Judge John
E. Sprizzo, who stayed all merits discovery, allowing discovery to proceed only on the issues concerning
the validity of the Release, pending resolution of a motion for summary judgment made by the
defendants.”); Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 9080, at *3 (E.D.
La. Jan. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Winston I]; see also Michael Rose Productions, Inc v. Loew’s Inc., 19
F.R.D. 508, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (“It is well established that where release issues may be tried without
inevitably bringing in all the issues raised in the complaint, the Court may . . . grant a separate trial on the
issues raised by the release.”).
301. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (“Thus, it is one thing to be
cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.”).
302. See Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1308 n.22 (“Full blown discovery would thus have had two possible
effects: (i) forcing McDermott to a trial on the merits, or (ii) accumulation by Ingram of a vast amount of
information mainly pertinent to a trial on the merits, but would have meant, in the event of early resolution
of the suit on legal grounds, wasted time, resources, and efforts of all parties and the District Court.”); Id.
at 1304 n.13 (finding a “decision to prevent unnecessary discovery because the case could well be decided
on the parties’ motions is not, on its face, fundamentally unfair to a party desiring discovery.”); see also
Winston I, 1993 WL 9080, at *1 (discussing Ingram and the burdens on a defendant forced into merits
discovery).
303. See Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Fox Midwest
Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955) (“The prospective application of a general release
to bar private antitrust actions arising from subsequent violations is clearly against public policy. . . .
Releases may not be executed which absolve a party from liability for future violations of our antitrust
laws.”); Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Westmoreland
Abestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 37), aff’d, 136 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1943).
304. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1955); see also
cases cited supra notes 280 & 286 (distinguishing Carter on the basis of the contemporaneity of the release
and antitrust violation).
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as technically distinct.305 It remains difficult to square Carter with such
entries in the litany of later rejections.306 Conspicuously, however, whilst the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all passed on the
standards for public policy voidness of antitrust releases,307 Carter’s (and St.
Louis’s) own Eighth Circuit has not yet opined directly on part-and-parcel as
of 2020, leaving its district courts unconstrained in flying the flag of a freer
hand in overriding releases. Much seems to depend rather shakily not
necessarily on the facts but on the attitude and era of the court deciding the
case.
C. The Legal Archaeology of a Judicially-Created Antitrust Doctrine
Legal archaeology is not merely a felicitous metaphor for the
organization of these antiquarian cases; it is a full-fledged academic
discipline and methodology in analyzing those cases of yore, emphasizing
environment, detailed history, motivation, and secondary sources to limn a
more complete picture of a case.308 The discipline recognizes that although
our government is famously “a government of laws and not of men,”309 it is
swayable men and women who serve on courts, from the lowliest to the
highest.310 Legal (like physical) archaeology is intrinsically speculative,
305. See, e.g., QS Holdco Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-cv-824(RJS), 2019 WL 3716443, at
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019); VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
306. See Ritacco, supra note 23, at 163 & n.109 (noting of VKK that “[t]he part and parcel doctrine
has found support, however, in situations similar to the present matter”).
307. See Raytheon, 76 F.2d at 950; VKK, 244 F.3d 114; Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d
448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961); Va. Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971); Ingram
Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax
Consol., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950).
308. See William Twining, What Is the Point of Legal Archaeology, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY
166, 170-171 (2012) (Legal archaeology is “designed to set in context already familiar landmark cases”
because “[o]nly by looking at victims and defendants, counsel and judges themselves, is the history of any
legal matter properly understood.”); Paul A. Lombardo, Teaching Health Law - Legal Archaeology:
Recovering the Stories behind the Cases, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 589, 590 (2008) (“[Legal archaeology]
depends on using a more expanded set of source documents than those most commonly referenced in legal
scholarship, in an attempt to unearth details of events that resulted in important litigation and to move
beyond the appellate opinion. Doing legal archaeology helps us understand the context of seminal cases
more completely[.]”); Patricia D. White, Afterword and Response: What Digging Does and Does Not Do,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2000).
309. John Adams, Novanglus, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 226 (C. Bradley
Thompson ed., 2000); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX (“In the government of this commonwealth, the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive or judicial powers, or either of them; the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise
the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not
of men.”).
310. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 10 (2014) (“There is
thus the sense that it is the ‘law,’ not the justices, that is responsible for the Court’s decisions. This is
nonsense and always has been. The Court is made up of men, and now finally women, who inevitably
base their decisions on their own values, views, and prejudices.”).
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drawing inferences from a spotty historical record and the unknowable
workings of often long-dead actors’ minds.311 However, its contextualizing
approach is well-suited to inquiring into the salient question of why three
disparate district judges strewn across time and space favored (however
provisionally) part-and-parcel considerations, when so many of their peers
did not.312
By virtue of its relative antiquity and obscurity, the context and
motivations behind Carter are perhaps the hardest to unpack. The sympathy
likely to be aroused by the plaintiff and the circumstances of the case has
already been related.313 These tendencies may well have found purchase with
Judge Albert A. Ridge: only a few years before Carter, Judge Ridge had
penned a lengthy encomium to “time-tested moral values, taught throughout
5,000 years of Judaic-Christian philosophy” condemning “the shyster, the
barratiously inclined, the ambulance chaser” who spurn the “most sacred
duties and obligations” entrusted to the bar,314 along with a testimonial to pretrial conferences that could only lead to “efficient courts, swift and
inexpensive justice and a highly appreciated profession,”315 whilst cautioning
stridently against the coercive imposition of settlements upon the hesitant.316
Only a few years after, he published an article pleading the cause of indigent
defendants with considerable compassion for the archetypal little guy in
court.317 “The crux of the problem,” declared Judge Ridge, “appears to lie in
the midst of a head-on clash of the ideal with the practical. . . . Regardless,
too much heed to practicalities cannot be permitted to encroach upon the
declared right[.]”318 These bookends paint the picture of a jurist greatly
concerned with the morality of the law and the vicissitudes of the common
man over the looming institutions of state and profession, one to whom the
311. See Twining, supra note 308, at 172 (positing that “the subject-matters of our discipline involve
much more than litigation and that understanding such subject-matters requires multiple perspectives”);
Lombardo, supra note 308, at 589 (noting that many “question the value of what they characterize as
emotive, non-logical, personalized (and sometimes fictional) exposition as a vehicle for understanding the
law.”).
312. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061
(E.D. Mo. 1997); Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144, at *2
(E.D. La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II]; Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F.
Supp. 675, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1955). See also, Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F.
Supp. 823, 829 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (further exegesis of Westmoreland is omitted in the interest of brevity).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 283-89.
314. Albert A. Ridge, Legal Ethics: Missouri History and Current Diagnosis, 8 J. MO. B. 51, 53
(1952).
315. Albert A. Ridge, What Do Judges and Lawyers Want from the Mandatory Pre-Trial
Conference Practice, 17 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 83, 92 (1949)
316. Id. at 90-91 (“Without question, there is a great sentiment by the bar against the judge who
persists in trying to make the function a medium for coercion of settlements, and rightly so.”)
317. Albert A. Ridge, The Indigent Dilemma: A Procedural Dilemma for the Courts, 24 F.R.D. 241
(1959).
318. Id. at 254.
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faceless and voracious Fox conglomerate might have readily seemed the
oppressor of the industrious dowager Carter.319 Even after his elevation to
the Eighth Circuit, Judge Ridge comported himself self-consciously a man of
the people,320 having seen the “grim realities” of World War I serving under
that most plebeian of (future) presidents, Harry S. Truman.321 As Judge Ridge
wrote in 1962, eulogizing Justice Charles Evan Whittaker:
A good lawyer has a profound knowledge of jurisprudence; is
informed in a multitude of related sciences; has something of wisdom
that is not learned from books, and has love for the law. One does not
acquire those qualities when he becomes a lawyer or is elevated to
the bench. He brings them along with him. And it is love of law which
distinguishes a judge, as an administrator of justice, from a tyrant. . .
. [E]ach member of the judiciary must sift the facts and law (much
like placer mining) until the nuggets of gold (truth and stare decisis)
are found and deposited in the vault of sound judgment.322
Deciding in the early days of part-and-parcel reasoning, Judge Ridge had
the benefit of only the Supreme Court’s dictum and a handful of uncertain
precedents,323 with no sure guidance from his own court of appeals (to which
he would ascend six years later)324. The provincial doings of Sedalia,
Missouri inspired no throng of press. Only his own instincts for “sound
judgment” could thus be his cicerones in a novel backwater of the law, and
those led him inexorably to voiding the release to which Mrs. Carter had
“finally ‘capitulated.’”325

319. See Ridge, supra note 314, at 51 (“The free and unthinking tendency to criticize our profession
is as old as the profession itself, all because the venality of a few lawyers is always the favorite theme for
indicting all. . . . So the Literature of almost all the civilizations of history, past and present, is replete with
libels on the legal profession as a whole, and these continue to multiply. Thus the profession has been
pictured as a society of predatory creatures, plunderers, without any sense of moral values and sans all
intellectual honesty.”).
320. Board of Govs. of the Mo. Bar, Memorial to Judge Albert A. Ridge, 23 J. MO. B. 536 (1967)
(“Honored and respected as a gentleman, a, judge, a citizen and a patriot, he enriched the lives of those
whose privilege it was to know him. Cognizant of the imperfections of man, he tempered stern justice with
a kindly understanding.”).
321. Id.
322. Albert A. Ridge, Charles Evans Whittaker—A Personal Tribute, 40 TEX. L. REV. 749, 749-50
(1962).
323. See generally Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 76 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1935); Suckow
Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950); Westmoreland Abestos Co. v. JohnsManville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
324. Board of Govs. of the Mo. Bar, supra note 320, at 536.
325. Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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Some forty years later, one might have thought Judge Morey Sear in
Winston would feel chastened after his reversal in Ingram.326 To the contrary,
however, the judge seemed empowered by his previous experience with so
similar a case in managing the claims anent the release.327 In a mirror image
of the Carter court’s stance, he reveled in Redel’s and Ingram clear and direct
recent guidance from the governing court of appeals on the rule that he was
to apply, providing some surety that its application to the facts could
withstand appeal.328 (This time, it did.)329 Judge Sear, moreover, was
unusually “prominent and influential in the national affairs of the federal
judiciary,” serving for many years as a “confidante of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.”330 Revealing the independence that such stature grants, he had a
long-standing reputation as an inventive and forward-thinking jurist mindful
of concerns of public policy, particularly for his heralded work as the lone
judge assigned to manage the orderly wind-up of 800 cases pending in the
U.S. Panama Canal Zone court consequent to its transfer to Panama.331 By
1993, he was in the waning years of a career of over three decades in the
federal judiciary,332 experience that could have bolstered his confidence in
taking the road less traveled by,333 as compared to a novice in the office.334
326. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’g 495 F. Supp.
1321 (E.D. La. 1980).
327. Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 9080, at *1-2 (E.D. La.
Jan. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Winston I].
329. Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144, at *3 (E.D. La. May
24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II] (quoted supra text accompanying note 177).
329. Winston, 79 F.3d 1145, aff’g WL 1995 317307 (1995).
330. Morey L. Sear, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,
https://www.laed.uscourts. gov/court-history/judges/sear (last visited Feb. 01, 2022) [hereinafter E.D. La.
Morey Bio].
331. See 128 CONG. REC. 24,553 (Sept. 21, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Bob Livingston of La.) (“With
his characteristic dedication and enthusiasm, Judge Sear brought a structure and direction to the court in
its final years of authority that should be a model for Judges everywhere. . . . Equally important, Mr.
Speaker, Judge Sear was an outstanding representative of the United States during a rather difficult period.
His deep and sincere interest in the affairs of the Canal Zone and his ability to interact harmoniously with
Panamanian officials were important factors in maintaining smooth relations with our neighbors to the
south.”); see also Gustavo A. Gelpi, An Experiment in US Territorial Governance, 63 FED. LAW. 40, 41
(2016).
332. E.D. La. Morey Bio, supra note 330 (“In 1971, he became one of the first United States
Magistrate Judges in the Eastern District. A Republican, he served in that position until May 7, 1976,
when he became United States District Judge after nomination by President Gerald R. Ford. . . . Judge
Sear died on September 6, 2004[.]”).
333. Robert Frost, Mountain Interval, in COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE & PLAYS 103 (Richard Poirier
& Mark Richardson eds., 1995) (“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— / I took the one less traveled by,
/ And that has made all the difference.”).
334. See Irving L. Goldberg, U.S. Cir. J., Meanderings of a Judicial Novice, 30 TEX. B.J. 596, 596
(1967) (“Responding to my duties, I began the attempt to explore these areas of the law of which I had
been ignorant or uninformed, or worse, which I had known only by rote. I was of course, immediately
reminded of how much of the law is a learning process.”); id. at 597-98 (“I do not under-estimate for one
moment the necessity for legal and judicial predictability but simply submit that there is a small place and
a minute time for forsaking predictability. In some cases, intellectually dishonest distinctions should yield
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Around the time of Winston, Judge Morey described himself as a
“creature[] of practice and habit,” like all judges “who have been on the bench
for any length of time.”335 Substantively, the judge had considered at length
the details of public policy against the evasion of antitrust law in Ingram,
suggesting he was less likely to elide over such concerns in the future.336
Contrariwise, he was also historically wary of private settlements that
disserved the public interest,337 notably in rejecting several proposals in a
prominent Ford product liability case as “not sufficiently fair, reasonable and
adequate.”338 This earned him plaudits from the New Orleans TimesPicayune as “a shining example of how a no-nonsense judge can protect the
public even absent systemic reform,” and the newspaper further declared that
“the public interest was carefully served by Judge Sear.”339 Procedurally,
after emphasizing the importance of briefing in summary judgment motions
in trial practice,340 he had written that “conclusory allegations” and “a
scintilla of evidence” would not do to avoid dismissal.341 But the Winston
plaintiffs had been attentive, taking advantage of the limited discovery
afforded to marshal a considerable record to create a record deserving of
trial.342 That Judge Sear accepted the effort can seem almost predictable from
his predilections and publications.
to forthright repudication [sic]. . . . Dissent is difficult because any disharmony is unpleasant. It is
unsettling to be out of step.”); see also 112 CONG. REC. 10,246 (May 10, 1966) (remarks of Asst. Sec.
State Joseph J. Sisco) (“A generation or two ago most of the major problems of government could be
understood by almost every citizen. Today, even many well-informed people do not feel fully competent
to judge many public issues. Too many persons simply shy away from their consideration altogether. Let
the expert, the man with specialized knowledge, decide them. Yet these decisions, the complex no less
than the simple, determine the future of our Nation.”).
335. Morey L. Sear, Briefing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, 70 TUL. L. REV. 207, 208 (1995).
336. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1328-30 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’g 495
F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. La. 1980).
337. See, e.g., Associated Press, Around the Nation; Judge Rejects Quotas for New Orleans Police,
N.Y. TIMES, at 30 (Jun. 13, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/13/us/around-the-nation-judgerejects-quotas-for-new-orleans-police.html.
338. Milo Geyelin, Second Ford Pact to End Bronco Suit Is Thrown Out, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 1997),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB855198143303001500.
339. E.D. La. Morey Bio, supra note 330.
340. Sear, supra note 335, at 208. (“At least two types of trial court briefing—briefs in support of
dispositive motions and trial briefs—offer opportunities for swaying the trial judge, opportunities which
approach, if not equal, the central role of the appellate brief.”).
341. Id. at 216 (“Mere ‘legal conclusions’ and ‘conclusory allegations’ will not suffice, nor will a
‘scintilla of evidence’ in support of the plaintiff’s position serve to defeat a properly supported motion for
summary judgment.”).
342. Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 390144, at *2 (E.D.
La. May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Winston II] (“However, the affidavits and depositions presented by Traffic
Scan in this instance support a finding that it has sufficiently alleged a ‘part and parcel’ defense to the
release . . . . Defendant has simply claimed that Traffic Scan has failed to put forth any evidence that the
release agreement was ‘part and parcel’ to the alleged antitrust violations and, therefore, summary
judgment is proper. However, drawing on inferences from the underlying facts viewed in a light most
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Meanwhile, as St. Louis was being decided in 1997, the National Football
League was embroiled in a long-simmering legal debate over whether and to
what extent the league could be held accountable for collusive conspiracy
with and amongst its member clubs.343 Press coverage of the Rams’
impending move to St. Louis percolated robustly even as the case was
argued,344 including a “giddy” sixteen-page special edition of the hometown
St. Louis newspaper that envisioned how “kids may ask the parents and
grandparents to tell them all about how St. Louis got this football team. And
what a story it will be. Where do we start? This is a complex tale of heartbreak
and happiness. How will the story end? We have no idea.”345 Mondaymorning quarterbacks of the legal issues soon abounded.346
favorable to Traffic Scan, I disagree. Traffic Scan has set forth specific facts showing that this is a genuine
issue for trial.”) (citations omitted).
343. See, e.g., Warnock v. Nat’l Football League, 154 Fed. Appx. 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2005) (taxpayer
lacked standing to assert claims that NFL clubs had conspired to compel municipalities to finance and
construct football stadia); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (NFL
teams were capable of conspiring under the Sherman Act, notwithstanding argument they functioned as a
single economic entity); Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1994) (team owner lacked standing
to challenge NFL rule against sale of teams to entities not exclusive engaged in the business of professional
football); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986)
(both stadium and team had standing to sue the NFL for refusal to allow relocation); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (NFL was not a “single entity”
and substantial evidence supported jury finding that the rule requiring three-quarters vote of member clubs
to permit relocation was an unreasonable restraint of trade); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1260 (2d Cir. 1982) (NFL teams did not act as a “single economic entity” immune
to the Sherman Act in banning cross-ownership of football and soccer teams); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding NFL structure “as a single entity” authorized by Congress);
Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 97—5784, 1998 WL 419765, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
1998), aff’d on other grounds, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting single entity defense); McNeil v.
Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 881 (D. Minn. 1992) (same); see generally Claudia G. Catalano,
Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, § 38 (2013).
344. See, e.g., Vincent J. Schodolski, Yawning Memories If Raiders Leave L.A., CHI. TRIB. (June
22, 1995), https//www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1995-06-22-9506220080-story.html; T.J.
Simers, NFL Owners OK Rams’ Move to St. Louis, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 1995), https://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-1995-04-13-mn-54268-story.html; Thomas George, Rams Given Green Light for St.
Louis Move, N.Y. TIMES, at B11 (Apr. 13, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/13/sports/profootball-rams-given-green-light-for-st-louis-move.html; Leonard Shapiro, Rams Approved for St. Louis
Move, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 1995), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1995/04/13/ramsapproved-for-st-louis-move/e2167293-a69f-431e-aaca-cb57ec13296c/; Thomas George, N.F.L. Owners
Reject Rams’ Bid to Move to St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES, at B15 (Mar. 16, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/199
5/03/16/sports/pro-football-nfl-owners-reject-rams-bid-to-move-to-st-louis.html; Vito Stellino, Rams’
Moving Saga is a Matter of Money, Not Sense or Tradition, BALT. SUN (Mar. 12, 1995), https://www.balti
moresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-03-12-1995071141-story.html; Report: Rams Headed for St. Louis,
UNITED PRESS (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/01/14/Report-Rams-headed-for-St-L
ouis/3289790059600/?u3L=1
345. Editorial Board, Jan. 17, 1995: We Were All a Bit Giddy as the Rams Announced They Were
Coming to St. Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, https://www. stltoday.com/news/archives/jan-17-1995we-were-all-a-bit-giddy-as-the-rams-announced-they-were/collection_6ee0078b-25ac-55b5-9493103df3a86b31.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2021), reprinting Jim Thomas, Hollywood Hit Tries a Sequel in
St. Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at 2FB (Jan. 18, 1995).
346. See generally, Kristen E. Knauf, If You Build It, Will They Stay: An Examination of State-ofthe-Art Clauses in NFL Stadium Leases, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 479, 479-94 (2010); Bradley J.
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The judge presiding, Jean C. Hamilton, who in 2002 described a good
judge as “being patient, listening well with an open mind, and making
judicious decisions” whilst helping “people in society as a whole,” may well
have felt uncomfortable in allowing the NFL to preemptively escape scrutiny
under a questionable release when its eligibility as an antitrust conspirator
remained so unsettled, especially as a comparative newcomer to the federal
bench.347 As for why the VKK district court in the Southern District of New
York was less diffident only two years after St. Louis:348 akin to part-andparcel itself, the Second Circuit had reached the question of the NFL’s “single
entity” defense, whilst the Eighth Circuit remained silent.349 It was not until
American Needle in 2010 that the Supreme Court finally resolved once and
for all that the NFL enjoyed no overarching immunity from ordinary
principles of antitrust law and that its teams could indeed conspire with one
another.350 Indeed, Judge Hamilton’s circumspection was well-received: the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the eventual judgment as a matter of law for the NFL
after a full jury trial, as well as the district court’s refusal to adopt the “single
entity” defense to antitrust conspiracy, finally staking out a position on that
issue, even if not on part-and-parcel, which was by that point quite moot.351
Context surely matters and fills lacunae in the official reporters, but legal
archaeology unlocks no secret cipher to predicting or determining
outcomes.352 The holdings in all three cases averred that plaintiffs had
succeeded in developing facts sufficient to substantiate their claims, and it is
in such factual development that future plaintiffs must focus their faith and

Stein, How the Home Team Can Keep from Getting Sacked: A City’s Best Defense to Franchise Free
Agency in Professional Football, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 4-5 (2003); Franklin M. Fisher,
Christopher Maxwell & Evan Sue Schouten, The Economics of Sports Leagues and the Relocation of
Teams: The Case of the St. Louis Rams, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 193 (2000); Whitney Ricketts, Johnny
Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Company, St. Louis Rams Partnership, NFL Properties, Inc.,
188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999), 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 209 (1999); David Burke, The Stop
Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEGIS. 149, 149-51 (1997).
347. Nancy Belt, Serving Citizens Through the Legal System, WASH. U. IN ST. LOUIS MAGAZINE,
Fall 2002, https://magazine-archives.wustl.edu/Fall02/JeanHamilton.html.
348. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
349. Compare N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1256, with Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930
F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989) (reversing denial of summary judgment in favor of NFL and declining to
address antitrust claims because federal labor law precluded judicial intervention whilst negotiations were
underway); cf. supra note 307 and accompanying text (observing that by 2020, the Second but not Eighth
Circuit had opined on part-and-parcel).
350. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010).
351. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154 F.3d, 852 853 (1998);
see also supra text accompanying note 299 (mootness).
352. White, supra note 308, at 303 (Legal archaeology “teaches us about our institutional blind spots
and it gives us both diagnostic tools and suggestions for remediation. But that is all. I think it is very
important to understand that that is what we are doing when we are doing legal archaeology as scholars.”).
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efforts to achieve success, not the happenstance of zeitgeist, milieu, or
judicial proclivity.353
IV.
PUBLIC POLICIES IN CONFLICT, PRIVATE PACTS BETWEEN
COMPETITORS
Beyond the particularized facts of every case, a recurring theme
throughout the cases demurring from the part-and-parcel doctrine is a conflict
of priorities: between public policies against antitrust exploitation and in
favor of harmonious settlements and, more broadly, between governmental
imposition and private prerogatives.354 Before delving into this vexing
morass of a melee, however, it is crucial to fully comprehend the common
weal thought to derive from the values that have vied so vigorously with
antitrust law for primacy.
A. The Superlative Significance of Consensual Settlements to Courts
1. Settlement as an End unto Itself
Myriad courts have underscored the validity of consensual resolutions to
disputes and their vitality to the practice of law, even in the guarded realm of
antitrust355—including many of the part-and-parcel cases, dating back to its
Stone Age and beyond.356 S.E. Rondon proclaimed in 1968 (citing Suckow):
“It is the policy of the law to encourage the settlement of disputes both before
litigation has commenced and thereafter. This policy extends to the settlement
of antitrust litigation.”357 Thirty years later, G.E.E.N. confirmed that the
policy had only become more entrenched: “Federal courts have supported a
policy which encourages the amicable settlement and release of antitrust
claims. The Courts have repeatedly held that an adequately drawn and validly
353. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061
(E.D. Mo. 1997).; Winston II, 1993 WL 390144, at *6; Carter v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127
F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
354. See supra Part III.
355. E.g., Richard’s Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 545 F.2d 18, 21 (7th
Cir.1976) (“A general release, or a broad covenant not to sue, is not ordinarily contrary to public policy
simply because it involves antitrust claims.”), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Oskey Gasoline and Oil
Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1282 (8th Cir.1976); Three Rivers Motors, 522 F.2d at
891-92; Schott Enterprises, 520 F.2d at 1300 (“Releases of anti-trust claims are treated the same as releases
of other claims. There is no public policy against the release of any anti-trust claim.”); Fabert Motors, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 1966); Duffy Theatres, 208 F.2d at 324 (“A release of a
civil claim for damages for violation of the anti-trust laws is not invalid because of illegality. Such a
release violates no law and is not contrary to public policy.”).
356. E.g., Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1323 (5th Cir. 1983); Va.
Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1971); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v.
Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950); G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 93–
632–CIV–ORL–19, 1994 WL 695364, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug 31, 1994).; S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 881 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
357. S.E. Rondon, 288 F. Supp. at 881 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (citing Suckow, 185 F.2d at 208).
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executed release will bar antitrust claims,” citing half of the regional courts
of appeals.358 The Fifth Circuit in Ingram had already cited eight in 1983,
counting itself amongst them.359 A contemporaneous survey of the law of
antitrust settlements presented by Harry M. Reasoner and Scott J. Atlas at a
symposium on the subject endorsed such judicial restraint forcefully:
What standards should be applied in scrutinizing settlements under
the antitrust laws? Settlements are contracts—but contracts of a
peculiar kind highly favored by and essential to the administration of
justice. We should be loathe to adopt any principles that discourage
the settlement of good faith litigation. Even in the simplest case
where the parties make a private contractual settlement and the court
simply enters a pro forma judgment of dismissal, the parties’ conduct
should be judged in light of the great need to foster settlements.360
Whence comes this “great need to foster settlements” that has achieved
such broad judicial consensus?361 All too many courts, like those in the partand-parcel cases,362 have begged the question: “It hardly seems necessary to
point out that there is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting
litigation.”363 Others, albeit outside the realm of antitrust, have been more
forthcoming. First, there is the overarching principle of noninterference with
ordinary state principles of contract law, settlements or no.364 There too is
also the protection of individual prerogatives in contract, which would be
contravened by a public policy to void bargained-for consensual releases.365
In order to override the “essential freedoms of . . . the right to bargain and
contract,” those rights must be “clearly outweighed” by public policy.366 In
358. G.E.E.N., 1994 WL 695364, at *3.
359. Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1333 (cited supra note 158).
360. Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2, at 123 (hard line breaks omitted).
361. Id.
362. See cases cited supra note 356.
363. Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Williams v. First
Nat’l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910)); Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860,
863 (7th Cir. 1974); Cities Service Oil v. Coleman Oil Co., 470 F.2d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 967, (1972); Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969); and Richards
Construction Co. v. Air Conditioning Co. of Hawaii, 318 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1963)).
364. Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 891-92 (3d Cir.1975) (“Absent a
substantial reason for doing so, the law of private contracts should not be burdened with the complication
of a separate federal rule for releasing an antitrust cause of action.”) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (“Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests
. . . . They should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the
National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer
major damage if the state law is applied.”)).
365. Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th Cir.1975) (“The parties had
a right to settle whatever claims either had against the other and such settlement operates as a release.”).
366. Arline v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 431 P.3d 670 (Colo. App. 2018) (quoting Superior Oil Co.
v. W. Slope Gas Co., 549 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D. Colo. 1982), aff’d, 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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some arenas like employment discrimination, Congressional acts have
expressly made voluntary conciliation the preferred resolution.367 But even
where compromise is legislatively favored, settlements must still ostensibly
bow to other strictures of the law.368 Nevertheless, explaining the tenacity of
the generalized principle in courts favoring settlements, the Fifth Circuit was
uncommonly frank in 1977: after reaffirming that “it is often said that
litigants should be encouraged to determine their respective rights between
themselves” the panel admitted forthrightly that the “overriding public
interest in favor of settlement” arises because “in these days of increasing
congestion within the federal court system, settlements contribute greatly to
the efficient utilization of our scarce judicial resources.”369 Or, as the
Eleventh Circuit confessed more curtly: “Settlement is generally favored
because it conserves scarce judicial resources.”370
This preference can be seen vividly in the palpable discomfort with
attempted rescissions of long-established releases after a great length of time,
resurrecting hoary old disputes to harry the courts.371 It would defeat the
purpose of settlements in achieving litigation peace and preserving courts’
time to permit the accompanying releases to be challenged years after their
inception.372 Indeed, blithely allowing any collateral attacks on releases thus
inherently compromises the public benefit of an efficiently functioning
judiciary:
Any party who enters into a general release, thereby releasing all
claims, both known and unknown, takes a calculated risk, and it
cannot rely on the other party to save it from the consequences of its
act should it later find them more severe than anticipated. Indeed,
367. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1975).
368. Atl. Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1944) (“Though settlements in accord and
satisfaction are favored in law, they may not be sanctioned and enforced when they contravene and tend
to nullify the letter and spirit of an Act of Congress.”)
369. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1977) (initial majuscules reduced to
minuscule).
370. In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1029 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330).
371. Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consolidated Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir.1953)
(“Duffy could have brought this action, sought rescission of the release, and offered to credit on the
judgment that part of the consideration paid attributable to the release. He was free so to do at all times
after the contract was executed. . . . Duffy waited more than 13 years after the contract containing the
release was executed before commencing the instant action. Under such circumstances it must be held to
have ratified the release.”) (citations omitted).
372. G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 93–632–CIV–ORL–19, 1994 WL 695364, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Aug 31, 1994) (“The Court has not found an instance where a party’s claim for recision of
a release or contract was upheld after a delay of three years. In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ allegations of
duress are simply too little, too late. To allow Plaintiffs to rescind this settlement agreement would
undermine the well-established policy favoring settlement of disputes and would inject an element of
uncertainty into all settlement agreements.”).
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were the law otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the courts
ever to enforce a general release, a result which would greatly
undermine the public policy which encourages compromise of
differences.373
No negotiators could possibly have confidence in a settlement readily
rejected at a judge’s whim or a release “virtually impossible for the courts
ever to enforce,”374 reducing if not eliminating their incentives to even pursue,
let alone effect, real conciliation.375 Forestalling avoidable litigation before
it even begins can only be an even greater virtue under the judicial-resources
rationale.376 At base, if parties in dispute are amenable to a compromise that
saves the beleaguered courts work, judges should usually avoid looking a gift
horse in the mouth absent an insuperable defect, as the Fifth Circuit
admonished its district courts sharply: “A refusal to sign a consent decree
based on generalized notions of unfairness is unacceptable. . . . When the
remedy that is jointly proposed by these parties is within reasonable bounds
and is not illegal, unconstitutional, or against public policy, the courts should
give it a chance to work.”377
2. An Apt Analogue in the Supreme Court’s Apologetics for
Arbitration
Despite superficial appearances, courts upholding releases ought not be
seen as trying to shirk their duties to decide under some ignoble
institutionalized scheme of high-minded goldbricking. An apt analogue
recommends itself in the Supreme Court’s well-documented affection for and
defense of private arbitration agreements against arguments of public
policy.378 Indeed, “the Supreme Court has encouraged the use of arbitration
373. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1328 (5th Cir. 1983).
374. Id.
375. See S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (“To
hold a release void because of the releasee’s pre-existing wrong which resulted in financial hardship to the
releasor would be to invite an attempt to void almost every such settlement and release. It would greatly
impair the policy of encouraging private settlements. Parties negotiating such settlements need to have
confidence in the enforceability of the settlement they reach.”).
376. S.E. Rondon Co., 288 F. Supp. at 882 (“There is no precedent for such a distinction and there
is no logical basis for applying a different rule of law to a release signed before litigation starts than to a
release signed afterwards. Settlement of controversies before litigation commences is even more to be
encouraged.”).
377. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1980).
378. See generally, e.g., Imre S. Szalai, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used
a Jedi Mind Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 75, 95 (2017);
Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence: Empowering the
Already-Empowered, 17 NEV. L.J. 23, 25 (2016); Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the
Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (2014); Richard Frankel,
Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration
Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 225, 227 (2014); John R. Snyder, Supreme Court Stays Active in the
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of extremely complex disputes such as those arising under the antitrust
laws.”379 Read in this context, the federal judicial policy favoring voluntary
settlements serves the nobler purpose of allowing individuals to adjust their
own differences on mutually satisfactory terms without the heavy hand of the
compulsory system of state-sponsored justice, which should be the
disputants’ last resort rather than an initial redoubt.380
The Supreme Court’s warm embrace of arbitration began surprisingly
early. Although the touted Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) provided
that a written contract to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,”381 the Court initially found in Wilko v. Swan that
an integrated federal statutory regime not admitting of waivers trumped the
FAA’s mandate.382 By the 1970s, however, the Court began migrating
towards its modern defense of arbitration, reasoning that “agreement to
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forumselection clause” whose enforcement was inoffensive to the vindication of
clams, but whose disallowance “would not only allow the respondent to
repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a ‘parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . ,’”383
The remaining decades of the twentieth century saw the multiplication of
cases affirming that even complex statutory schemes could be compelled into
arbitration if the parties had agreed.384 Wilko’s reservation to the courts of
securities lawsuits was overruled.385 RICO was found not to foreclose
arbitration under public policy despite its design to rely upon private suits, on
the novel reasoning that “the special incentives necessary to encourage civil
enforcement actions against organized crime do not support nonarbitrability
of run-of-the-mill civil RICO claims brought against legitimate enterprises,”
Arbitration Arena, 130 BANKING L.J. 234 (2013); George A. Bermann, Arbitration in the Roberts Supreme
Court, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 893 (2012); James L. Stone & Jonathan Boonin, The Supreme Court’s
Emerging Endorsement of Arbitration, 30 COLO. LAW. 67 (2001); Franklin B. Snyder, What Has the
Supreme Court Done to Arbitration, 12 LAB. L.J. 93 (1961).
379. Timothy A. Carney, New Supreme Court Arbitration Rulings — Expanding Federal
Preemption and the Scope of Arbitrable Issues, 66 OKLA. B.J. 2939, 2943 (1995) (citation omitted) (initial
majuscule in minuscule).
380. Cf. infra notes 423-434 and accompanying text.
381. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
382. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953) (Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
383. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).
384. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (employment law);
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480 (Securities Act); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 240 (1987) (Securities Act and RICO); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985)
(holding state securities claims arbitrable and federal claims an open question); see also Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983) (contractual disputes).
385. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484-85.
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that there was no evidence that RICO claims could not be vindicated in an
arbitral forum or of contrary congressional intent, and thus that plaintiffs,
“‘having made the bargain to arbitrate,’ will be held to their bargain.”386
a. Antitrust and Arbitrations
And in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
court found that even antitrust claims must bow before arbitration.387
Although the courts of appeals theretofore “uniformly had held that the rights
conferred by the antitrust laws were ‘of a character inappropriate for
enforcement by arbitration,’” the Court disagreed.388 Allowing that Congress
may express its disfavor of arbitration in a statutory scheme,389 the Court held
that no such expression was manifest in antitrust law, rejecting the decadesold American Safety doctrine enunciated by the Second Circuit.390 That
doctrine had rested on four factors: that private litigation was necessary to
combat antitrust abuses, the likelihood of contracts of adhesion, the
complexity of antitrust analysis, and that antitrust matters were too grave to
be vested in the hands of private enterprise.391 The Court rejected each in
turn: it was presumptuous to infer every arbitration contract to be adhesive,
demeaning to imply arbitrators unequal to intricate cases, and insolent to
suggest an arbitration panel would improperly favor business interests.392
This left standing only “the core of the American Safety doctrine—the
fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of
the antitrust laws” and their private enforcement.393 The Court found “no
reason,” however, to assume that an arbitral forum could not afford antitrust
relief given it is “bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law
giving rise to the claim[],” even if it “owes no prior allegiance to the legal

386. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 241-42 (1987).
387. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); see also
Stone & Boonin, supra note 378, at 67 (citation omitted) (“[T]he Court reversed course and began taking
a pro-arbitration stance in cases involving statutory claims. . . . [including] pre-dispute arbitration
agreements between parties relating to claims arising under federal antitrust laws”).
388. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 621.
389. Id. at 627-28 (“Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the
congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any
category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable. . . . We must assume
that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative
history.”).
390. Id. at 632-33 (discussing American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 632-34.
393. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 634.
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norms of particular states[.]”394 As an added failsafe, the Court reasoned that
the national courts ultimately responsible for dispensing any award could
easily enough “ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust
claims and actually decided them.”395
In the 2000s, the Supreme Court established that the burden lies with the
party seeking to avoid contractual arbitration to establish that the alternative
forum would be unable to properly vindicate the claims at issue.396 Questions
of whether the forum could do so, moreover, were to be decided by the
arbitrators themselves, as, for example, whether the forum allowed for the
imposition of the treble damages called for by RICO violations.397 In the
2010s, the Court returned with renewed vigor to its rationale that “courts must
‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms” as freely
negotiated contracts.398 This soon meant that states’ public policy specifying
that contractual waivers of class actions were unconscionable was preempted
by the contrary policy in favor of the arbitration contract’s provisions.399 So
too was generally applicable state unconscionability doctrine overridden
when it had the effect of voiding arbitration contracts.400 Those resistant to
setting aside their traditional concerns anent unconscionable or ambiguous
terms were herded into line by the Supreme Court if not with reversal then
with GVR dispositions.401

394. Id. at 636-37.
395. Id. at 638.
396. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. V. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (“[T]he party resisting
arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration. We have held
that the party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of establishing that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration of the statutory claims at issue.”).
397. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003).
398. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013).
399. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010); see also Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct.
1612, 1619 (2018).
400. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 53 (2015).
401. Compare, e.g., Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 350 P.3d 995, 998 (Haw. 2015), cert.
granted, vacated, and remanded by Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co. v. Narayan, 577 U.S. 1056 (mem.) (2016), and
Am. Express Co., 559 U.S. 1103 (mem.) (2010) (GVRing), with Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d
594, 600 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding contract so “one-sided” as to ordinarily be unconscionable but denying
relief under the unconscionability precedent of Italian Colors), and Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 356
(3d Cir. 2012) (ordering arbitration even where the contractually specified arbitral forum was unavailable
under deference to FAA); see also, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Services (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
576 U.S. 1095 (2015), cert. dismissed by joint stipulation, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016); Malin, supra 378, at 61
(opining that “the Court’s grant of certiorari in Zaborowski suggested it was poised to hold that the FAA
mandates that courts reform unconscionable arbitration provisions rather than deny enforcement of
arbitration mandates.”). But see, e.g., Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 675 (4th Cir. 2016)
(reversing order to arbitrate as unconscionable); Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir.
2014) (voiding unconscionable arbitration clause); Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927
(9th Cir. 2013) (reversing order to arbitrate as unconscionable).
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Even where plaintiffs sought to show that the cost of arbitrating antitrust
claims individually rather than via class action practically foreclosed relief
contra the promise of Mitsubishi, the Court in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant found that the free choice to arbitrate (and to bar class
actions) prevailed under the FAA.402 The Court held that “the antitrust laws
do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every
claim[]” notwithstanding plaintiffs’ appeal to public policy; Congress had
carefully chosen a few specific tools (e.g. treble damages) to incentivize
antitrust lawsuits, not the entire toolbox.403 The Sherman and Clayton Acts,
enacted decades before the rules permitting class actions, intimated no
exception that forced an arbitration to allow that late-breaking procedural
mechanism.404 Nor must an arbitral forum offer “effective vindication” of
antitrust claims, as urged: Mitsubishi’s insinuation otherwise was dictum, and
the Court had never voided an arbitration agreement on that basis.405 Asking
courts to superimpose hypotheses of how effectively a case might be brought
trenched too far on the FAA’s dictate, especially given the legendary
complexity of antitrust practice.406
Plaintiffs in other arbitrations involving antitrust claims had fared no
better since Mitsubishi; in the granddaddy of them all, the Supreme Court had
straightforwardly ruled in 1948 that, however expedient, arbitration could not
be forced on non-consenting antitrust defendants by a court desirous of its
efficiencies.407 But by 1994, the courts recognized that one who had
consented to arbitration generally must bring any antitrust claims in the
chosen forum, for after Mistubishi, the American Safety doctrine was wholly
defunct.408 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit agreed, declining under Mitsubishi
to reach antitrust issues in an arbitration award favoring a licensee against a
licensor who had argued the antitrust laws forbade a ruling that it could not
compete with its own licensee.409 The plaintiff was aggrieved with the
402. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 239.
403. Id. at 233-34 (“In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain
respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade
practice. But to say that Congress must have intended whatever departures from those normal limits
advance antitrust goals is simply irrational. ‘[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.’”).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 235. It might be thought snarky to add that the Court has only disfavored arbitration
agreements twice on any basis in the last few decades. See Malin, supra note 378, at 25 & n.12 (“In only
two of the numerous cases concerning enforcement of arbitration agreements during this period has the
Court favored the party resisting arbitration.”) (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295
(2002), and Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989)).
406. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 237-39.
407. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 176-77 (1948).
408. Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We hold that Mitsubishi
effectively overruled American Safety and its progeny”).
409. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Mitsubishi did
not contemplate that, once arbitration was over, the federal courts would throw the result in the waste
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arbitral finding that there was no competitive harm, but the panel observed
that the government or other consumers were free to bring their own claims
if it felt the tribunal had erred.410 A dissent (and dissent from rehearing en
banc) highlighted that the panel had in fact expanded Mitsubishi significantly
in dodging any real judicial scrutiny despite Baxter’s complaint that the
arbitral forum had ordered the parties to engage in antitrust violations, calling
unsuccessfully on the full court to reexamine the case.411
The appellate courts were not alone in confronting the intersection of
antitrust and arbitration. More familiarly, in 1998, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled against the New England Patriots’ minority owner from
VKK, who had urged that the NFL’s mandatory arbitration policy itself
effected an “injury to competition” by inhibiting the relocation of teams by
its calculated protraction.412 The court, however, found that although
arbitration was indeed required, the NFL had in no way withheld the
opportunity to arbitrate and the delays complained of were the plaintiff’s own
doing.413 And only two years before Italian Colors in 2011, the defendants
in a class action antitrust suit were permitted to compel arbitration over
plaintiffs’ objection that they had waived their right through inaction.414 The
court saw no prejudice, and in any case, before Concepcion, plaintiffs could
not have been compelled into class-action arbitration absent clear language
allowing for it.415 After Concepcion was decided, the defendants had availed
basket and litigate the antitrust issues anew. That would just be another way of saying that antitrust matters
are not arbitrable. Yet this is Baxter’s position. It wants us to disregard the panel’s award and make our
own decision. The Supreme Court’s approach in Mitsubishi was different.”), reh’g en banc denied, 325
F.3d 954 (mem. en banc) (7th Cir. 2003).
410. Id. (“Treating Baxter as bound (vis-à-vis Abbott) by the tribunal’s conclusion that the license
(as construed to provide strong exclusivity) is lawful does not condemn the public to tolerate a monopoly.
If the three-corner arrangement among Baxter, Maruishi, and Abbott really does offend the Sherman Act,
then the United States, the FTC, or any purchaser of sevoflurane is free to sue and obtain relief. None of
them would be bound by the award. As far as we can see, however, only Baxter is distressed by the
award—and Baxter, as a producer, is a poor champion of consumers.”).
411. Id. at 833-36 (Cudahy, J. dissenting) (“It is not my role to critique the arbitration decision—
however flawed—except in this case to object to its anticompetitive outcome, which orders the parties to
violate the antitrust laws. The interest of consumers was not represented on the arbitration panel and the
panel’s decision ignored consumer interests. Defense of public interests is sometimes better fulfilled by
courts than by arbitration panels.”); reh’g en banc denied, 325 F.3d 954, 955 (en banc) (7th Cir. 2003)
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (“Now, the majority has taken the process one giant step further and has found that
Mitsubishi not only allows submission of statutory and antitrust claims to arbitration, but denies our
prerogative to refuse to enforce awards that command unlawful conduct.”).
412. Murray v. National Football League, No. Civ. A. 94–5971, 1998 WL 205596, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 28, 1998).
413. Id. at *8.
414. In re California Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 08-1341-JSW, 2011 WL 2566449, at *1
(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011).
415. Id. at *3 (“Therefore, prior to the ruling in Concepcion, in the absence of class-wide arbitration
provision, class arbitration would not have been available. It therefore would indeed have been futile for
Defendants in this matter to have moved to compel arbitration prior to the decision in Concepcion.
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themselves of their new option with due diligence.416 Also in 2011, faced
with a plaintiff claiming that an arbitrators award of fees to the defendant
undercut antitrust public policy, the district court found that the rules of the
arbitral forum controlled.417 Just as instructed, courts had ensured that
arbitration was unmistakably the favored result.
b. Rationales and Rationalizations
As originally formulated, the congressional purpose in enacting the FAA
was “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts.”418 With time, however, arbitration agreements were to be upheld
in the face of general public policies that had the incidental effect of deterring
or disfavoring arbitration, suggesting that—like settlements419—agreements
to arbitrate were some sort of most-favored-contract.420 The Tenth Circuit
explained that any ambiguities, rather than being neutrally evaluated or
construed against the drafter, were to be resolved in favor of arbitration.421
This was putatively a directive of the FAA itself, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court two decades before: “The Arbitration Act establishes that, as
a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”422

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that Defendants
had an existing—and therefore waivable—right to compel arbitration.”).
416. Id.
417. ESCO Corp. v. Bradken Res. Pty Ltd., No. CIV. 10-788-AC, 2011 WL 1625815, at *12 (D.
Or. Jan. 31, 2011) (“Although, as Bradken asserts, the Deutscher court commented that an award of
attorney fees to a successful defendant in antitrust would be contrary to the policies underlying federal
antitrust laws . . . [t]he court concludes that the public policy favoring enforcement of arbitration awards
must prevail in this case. There is an absence of an identifiable, explicit public policy prohibiting that
would prohibit an award of attorney fees to ESCO under the circumstances of the current case. In contrast,
there is clearly established countervailing public policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.”),
report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 10-788-AC, 2011 WL 1630355 (D. Or. Apr. 27, 2011).
418. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 220 n.6 (1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510
n.4 (1974).
419. See Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2, at 123 (quoted supra note 360).
420. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013) (Graves, J., dissenting);
Szalai, supra note 378, at 99; Malin, supra note 378, at 38 (“The newly found purpose of enforcing
arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms places them on a different footing from other
contracts by making them immune to being struck or reformed under generally applicable contract
doctrine.”).
421. Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC, 762 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We need not decide
this difficult question, for we have stated that ‘to acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue,
because all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of arbitrability.’”) (quoting Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995)).
422. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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Stated more imperiously by the Court, “our cases place it beyond dispute
that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”423 The “general mandate”
was accordingly “the requirement to construe arbitration clauses broadly
where possible.”424 Unlike with settlements, however, the disconcerting
emphasis on judicial resources was absent; in its place was naked solicitude
for the private right to contract for the salutary option of arbitration given
congressional imprimatur by the FAA.425 “The choice is one to be made by
the parties themselves,” wrote an arbitrator back in 1961: “Having made their
choice and having reflected it in suitable contract language, the parties have
a right to the fulfillment of their joint expectations from arbitration. Neither
arbitrators nor courts should fail to respect the choice.”426
Other interests were undoubtedly in play, along with a certain degree of
question-begging.427 Of course, legislators could not have been blind to the
feature that more removals to arbitration meant fewer cases in court.428
Neither were judges, nor pundits.429 No doubt, courts and commentators have
both expressed optimism that arbitration will provide more tailored and

423. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011).
424. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 799.
425. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (“The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” (quoting Volt)); Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 22 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act
was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate. . . . By compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district
court successfully protects the contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act.”).
426. Harold W. Davey, Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 138 (1961).
427. See Agnieszka Ason, Antitrust Arbitration and Public Policy, 3 QUEEN MARY L.J. 1, 4 (2013)
(“First of all, it should be emphasized that there is no such notion as an absolute finality of arbitral awards.
This principle is subject to a limited number of exceptions, one of these being public policy. Therefore,
‘[t]o start with the argument that the principle of finality forbids any detailed public policy review of the
award is nothing but petitio principii.’”) (citations omitted).
428. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (quoted infra note 432); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 (“This is
not to say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of
disputes.”).
429. See Ason, supra note 427, at 8 (“At one point, for various reasons, with a heavy backlog of
cases, the courts decided to grant trust to the antitrust arbitration. They are able to rethink this position at
any time and to take back what they gave up in favour of arbitral tribunals, ie the exclusive jurisdiction
over antitrust disputes.”); Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1072, 1072 (1969) (“Finally, the opportunity to remove from our already over-burdened federal judiciary
a class of litigation that sometimes threatens to swamp the system with protracted multiple litigations
would surely be a welcome development.”).
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efficient resolution of disputes.430 But, to borrow a distinction,431 these
benefits were not the chief object of the policy in favor of arbitration but
instead a fortuitous outgrowth of respecting the right of private contract.432
What has elevated arbitration (and perhaps settlements-cum-releases too433)
above the mine run of contracts is that the means of adjudication lies at the
very core of contractual self-determination, a fundament to be left
untrammeled by judges jealous of the power.434 The public policy enunciated
by other laws, unless explicitly forbidding arbitration, does “not mean that
individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.”435
B. Beyond Releases: Settlements qua Collusion by Once-Warring
Competitors
Analogy to arbitration aside, courts quite properly defer only so far to
parties’ asseverations of mutual satisfaction: sometimes the parties are too
satisfied. “In determining whether to approve a proposed settlement,” the
430. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-45 (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can
be specified, for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings
be kept confidential to protect trade secrets. And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable,
reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”) (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556
U.S. 247, 269 (2009)); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 (quoted infra note 432); Malin, supra note
378, at 26 (observing that cultivation might “allow arbitration to develop into a faster and more accessible
option for claimants”); id. at 59 (describing the “vision that judicially policed arbitration mandates could
provide a win-win for all parties to the arbitration agreement” and “would insulate the stronger party—
imposing the agreement from the risk of outlier jury awards—while providing the weaker party on whom
the agreement was imposed with a speedy, efficient, and less formal forum that would be more accessible
than litigation, particularly for low-dollar-value claims.”); Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1072 (“[I]f
arbitration can lead to a more efficient and economical disposition of antitrust litigation, that too would be
an important improvement over current enforcement.”)
431. Cf. VKK, 244 F.3d at 125 (distinguishing between invalid releases that are the “object” of a
conspiracy and valid releases that are merely an “outgrowth”).
432. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-45 (quoted supra note 430); Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (“While
Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage the expeditious resolution of disputes, its
passage ‘was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which
parties had entered.’”); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-20 (“The legislative history of the Act
establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act
was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims. The Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitration
of all claims, but merely the enforcement. . . . we must not overlook this principal objective when
construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to
overshadow the underlying motivation.”)
433. See supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
434. See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“Just as judicial antagonism
toward arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment ‘manifested itself in a great variety of devices
and formulas declaring arbitration against public policy,’ Concepcion teaches that we must be alert to new
devices and formulas that would achieve much the same result today.”) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
342); Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-20).
435. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 237 (2013) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)).
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Fifth Circuit has instructed, notwithstanding the vaunted public good of
judicial efficiency, “the cardinal rule is that the District Court must find that
the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of
collusion between the parties.”436 This last concern is obviously not at issue
where a plaintiff is seeking to circumvent a release (or arbitration) agreement
over the defendant’s objections, the stance thus far seen in the part-and-parcel
(and arbitration) cases.437 In other circumstances, however, when repairing
their differences, some competitors have collaborated too far to their mutual
benefit for antitrust law to tolerate.
Forty years ago, Texas practitioners Harry Reasoner and Scott Atlas
expatiated on the reasoning behind the Fifth Circuit’s final condition, offering
a wide-ranging atlas of such outright collusion between parties to a settlement
in antitrust cases.438 In the main, the authors are skeptical of training the
powerful microscope of antitrust scrutiny to settlements, for fear of
dissuading such conciliation, without which no justice system could
survive.439 Their well-collated roll call of contrary cases, however, provides
its own compelling argument,440 despite patent cases predominating, which
the authors warn must be read as precedent “with caution,” given “the fact
that not merely the parties’ ‘private ends’ are at issue, but also the public
interest in limiting the grant of patent monopolies to ‘novel and useful
invention[s].’”441
By all accounts, the leading case on the subject remains United States v.
Singer Manufacturing Co.442 The district court had dismissed an action in
antitrust, and the Supreme Court accepted a direct appeal.443 Singer was
active in the then-vibrant market for sewing machines and their patented inner
436. In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1028-29 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Cotton v.
Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977) and citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 (11th
Cir. 1985), and United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980)); see C. Scott
Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 685, 700 n.63 (2010) (“In an antitrust class action, a judge is obliged under Rule 23(e) to worry about
a collusive settlement that sells out the antitrust plaintiffs by failing to do anything about the asserted
antitrust harm. But that evaluation is entirely consistent with a focus on the parties’ interests in an antitrust
case.”).
437. See supra Part III.
438. Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying note 360 (quoting same).
This author gratefully acknowledges his debt to these authors and begs forgiveness for any recapitulation
that strays too near to duplication in this Section. As with most things, the original is surely the best.
439. Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2 (“The notion that the settlement of litigation—a practice so
favored in the administration of justice—is in itself a ground of antitrust liability rings strange to the ear.
If the administration of justice is to survive, we must encourage litigants to settle everything, good cases,
bad cases, indifferent cases.”).
440. Id. at 117-23.
441. Id. at 116. (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963) (White, J.,
concurring)).
442. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. at 174.
443. Id. at 175.
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workings.444 As part of its international machinations to protect its models,
Singer agreed with a Italian manufacturer, Vigorelli, to a settlement granting
cross-licenses and mutually withdrawing their claims of infringement and
agreeing to support one another in defending their designs.445 An overlapping
Swiss patent held by Gegauf, however, threatened to ruin this carefully
orchestrated plan, and so at Vigorelli’s suggestion, Singer moved swiftly to
incorporate Gegauf into the settlement.446 With these agreements in place,
the three companies agreed to cooperate to defend their cross-licensed patents
against all comers.447 In 1959, as the American member of the impromptu
triumvirate, Singer brought claims to exclude a Japanese model as infringing
upon the Gegauf patent, alleging that “tremendous” number of Japanese
imports threatened to extirpate the domestic market for such machines.448 In
response, the United States itself sued that the settlement consortium’s
concerted use of the interlocking patents and licenses restrained the
competition of the Japanese manufacturers.449
The Court reasoned that “by entwining itself with Gegauf and Vigorelli
in such a program Singer went far beyond its claimed purpose of merely
protecting its own 401 machine—it was protecting Gegauf and Vigorelli, the
sole licensees under the patent at the time, under the same umbrella. This the
Sherman Act will not permit.”450 What mattered was the trio’s “concerted
action” to “destroy the Japanese sale of infringing machines”; that this was
accomplished by a settlement of their own differences was of no moment.451
The Court shooed away Singer’s jingoistic pleas for the protection of
American industry as a political matter,452 finding it “well settled” that the
patent monopoly in no wise insulates against the Sherman Act beyond the
patent monopoly itself.453 “That Act imposes strict limitations on the
concerted activities in which patent owners may lawfully engage,” the Court
444. Id. at 176-77.
445. Id. at 177-78.
446. Id. at 178-79.
447. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. at 181, 191. Much more detail is to be found in the official reporter,
which devotes almost idolatrous attentions to the intricacies of the sewing machine market and the various
players’ maneuvering. Id. at 180-88.
448. Id. at 187-88.
449. Id. at 189.
450. Id. at 194.
451. Id. at 195.
452. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. at 196 (“It is strongly urged upon us that application of the antitrust
laws in this case will have a significantly deleterious effect on Singer’s position as the sole remaining
domestic producer of zigzag sewing machines for household use, the market for which has been
increasingly preempted by foreign manufacturers. Whether economic consequences of this character
warrant relaxation of the scope of enforcement of the antitrust laws, however, is a policy matter committed
to congressional or executive resolution. It is not within the province of the courts, whose function is to
apply the existing law.”)
453. Id. at 196-97.
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concluded, “and those limitations have been exceeded in this case.”454 Justice
Byron White concurred to observe that the conspiracy reached both to
exclusion of the Japanese competitors and attempted coopting of the patent
office to expand the jointly-defended patents as widely as possible to debar
competition.455 The settlement of their mutual patent claims was, therefore,
not simply a resolution of a private dispute:
In itself the desire to secure broad claims in a patent may well be
unexceptionable—when purely unilateral action is involved. . . .
There is a public interest here, which the parties have subordinated
to their private ends—the public interest in granting patent
monopolies only when the progress of the useful arts and of science
will be furthered because as the consideration for its grant the public
is given a novel and useful invention. When there is no novelty and
the public parts with the monopoly grant for no return, the public has
been imposed upon and the patent clause subverted. Whatever may
be the duty of a single party to draw the prior art to the Office’s
attention, clearly collusion among applicants to prevent prior art from
coming to or being drawn to the Office’s attention is an inequitable
imposition on the Office and on the public. In my view, such
collusion to secure a monopoly grant runs afoul of the Sherman Act’s
prohibitions against conspiracies in restraint of trade—if not bad per
se, then such agreements are at least presumptively bad. The patent
laws do not authorize, and the Sherman Act does not permit, such
agreements between business rivals to encroach upon the public
domain and usurp it to themselves.456
Justice White relied upon a cavalcade of cases, prescribing that the
methodology of an antitrust offense “cannot screen such agreements from
court scrutiny, and that federal courts must, in the public interest, keep the
way open for the challenge of patents which are utilized for price-fixing of
interstate goods.”457
These precepts were revisited in the years that followed. In Duplan v.
Deering Millikin Inc., the Fourth Circuit first affirmed in an interlocutory
454. Id. at 197.
455. Id. (White, J., concurring).
456. Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
457. See, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 399 (1947) (cited in
Singer, 374 U.S. at 200; Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 17 Otto 192, 200 (1883) (holding that
“an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It
creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of
improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy
tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.”).
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appeal to the trial court’s denial of discovery of documents pertaining to the
defendants’ motivations.458 In 1964, the holders of patents in yarn throwing,
each fearful its might be found infringing, agreed to a settlement of their
ongoing claims.459 Much later, the plaintiff sublicensees of the patents
resisted contractual and infringement claims on ground the settlement
violated antitrust law.460 Considering Singer, the panel thought that the mere
confidence by one litigant of success could not make out a prima facie case
for collusion warranting discovery; it was the intent of the parties to a
settlement to violate the antitrust laws that controlled, lest the courts
“discourage settlement in future patent litigation and thereby increase both
the number and complexity of these already massive proceedings even where
the parties preferred not to litigate.”461 On remand for the merits, the district
court recounted that the settlement had initially contained provisions that
would tie the royalty rate charged by one patent-holder to the other before it
was deleted “in view of its antitrust implications.”462 Reciting the maxim that
“settlements of patent litigation are normally as desirable as settlements of
other types of litigation,” the court reminded that “settlements of such
litigation are not sanctioned by the courts when they are attended by anticompetitive results.”463 Under that rule, the court held that the patent-holders
had conspired as to royalties and monopolized the market by means of the
settlement, which violated the antitrust laws.464 Rather than dispute whose
patent would survive, they had agreed to avoid the perils of an
unmonopolized market that could harm them both.465

458. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1216 (4th Cir. 1976)
459. Id. at 1217.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1221 (“If an attorney were to advise a litigant at any point during the course of patent
litigation that he might successfully prosecute his action, under the theory contended for by [plaintiffs],
settlement should, prima facie, expose that party to criminal prosecution and treble damages under the
antitrust laws. To unnecessarily place the parties involved in patent litigation in such a position would be
contrary to sound judicial policy which requires that settlements be encouraged, not discouraged.”).
462. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 680 (D.S.C. 1977), aff’d, 594 F.2d
979 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
463. Id. at 683 (citing United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v.
Line Material Company, 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283 U.S. 163
(1931); Duplan Corp., 540 F.2d 1215; and Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Bulldog Electric
Products Company, 179 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1950)).
464. Duplan Corp., 444 F. Supp. at 685-86 (“The conduct of the parties following the settlement
showed their cooperation in adhering to the program of fixed and stabilized royalty rates and their
cooperation in keeping out competition. That they intended the settlement to have this effect is manifest
on this record. The court has also concluded that the settlement agreement of March 31, 1964, resulted in
monopolization of the market in the sale and licensing of false twist texturing machinery, processes and
technology by [defendants] in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”).
465. Id. at 687 (“As the case wore on it became more and more apparent to both sides that the results
of victory might well be outweighed by the possibility of facing unlicensed competition in the false twist
machinery market, a thought epitomized in Leeson’s statement to Armitage: “If you win you lose, and if
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As Singer and Duplan noted, the misuse of settlements to circumvent
antitrust law was nothing new.466 The Supreme Court had already held in
1952 that a joint venture organized by the disputants in settlement of a suit
over patent priority facially violated the Sherman Act in pooling patents and
fixing prices for all.467 Only a few years earlier, in similar circumstances, the
Court had held it “well settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents
does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the Sherman
Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly. By aggregating patents in one
control, the holder of the patents cannot escape the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act.”468 Justice Harold Burton, joined by Chief Justice Fred Vinson
and Justice Felix Frankfurter, offered a spirited dissent hearkening back to
Justice Cardozo’s opinion in the already-legendary Standard Oil case, but
they did not carry the day, then or thereafter.469 In an opinion issued the same
day, the Court also held that a settlement of patent claims by gypsum board
manufacturers had improperly included an agreement to set prices pursuant
to their patents.470
Nor did all precedent sound in patent law: in 1973, a district court refused
to approve a class settlement for restaurant franchisees that would install by
judicial fiat the very franchising framework claimed to be anticompetitive.471
A second settlement offer reduced the mandatory purchasing agreements
(allegedly at a non-competitive mark-up), and although mindful of the axiom
that “a court cannot lend its approval to any contract or agreement that
you lose, you lose because if the patent is broken, there will be no royalty.’ This thinking finally prevailed,
and the settlement of March 31, 1964 with its trade-restraining, anti-competitive results soon followed.”)
466. See supra note 463.
467. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. at 380 (“An arrangement was made between patent holders to pool their
patents and fix prices on the products for themselves and their licensees. The purpose and result plainly
violate the Sherman Act. The judgment below must be reversed.”).
468. United States v. Line Material Company, 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948).
469. Line Material Company, 333 U.S. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting, joined by Vinson, C.J., and
Frankfurter, J.) (“Such provisions for the division of royalties are not in themselves conclusive evidence
of illegality. Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by
agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded by the Act. . . . An interchange of patent rights and a
division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims is
frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation.”) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170, 171 (1931) (Cardozo, J.)).
470. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388-89 (1948). Justice Frankfurter, tartly
commenting that “the Court confessedly deals with an issue that ‘need not be decided to dispose of this
case,’” and that “[d]eliberate dicta, I had supposed, should be deliberately avoided,” concurred only in
certain portions of the judgment. Id. at 402 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
471. In re Int’l House of Pancakes Franchise Litig., No. M.D.L. 77, 1973 WL 839, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
July 12) (“If this Court approved this proposed settlement, it would give judicial approval to the exact
provisions of these franchise agreements, which plaintiffs have vigorously contended violated the antitrust laws, and which were, unquestionably, the only provisions of the franchises which involved sufficient
sums of money to inspire anticipation of a large monetary recovery in the cases. In addition, the members
of this class would be bound, by judicial decree, to continue making those payments for the balance of a
twenty-year lease (in most cases at least fifteen years).”), aff’d, 487 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1973).
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violates the antitrust laws,” both the district court and Eighth Circuit found
no per se antitrust violation in its terms.472 In 1984, the district court gave
considerable credence to some class litigants’ concerns that a proposed
settlement prescribing the natural gas utility defendants’ consolidation would
only catalyze further antitrust transgressions.473 After weighing and mostly
accounting for the antitrust hazards, however, the court found that the overall
benefits outweighed what were in the end speculative risks susceptible of
future correction if they materialized.474 Perhaps with some premonition,
Reasoner and Atlas had commented at an early stage of the long-running
series of lawsuits that “if a contrary notion prevailed, then the policy toward
encouragement of settlements would be dealt a severe blow.”475 Similarly, a
district court scrutinized and rejected a preliminary proposed settlement in
Microsoft product tying class action antitrust litigation on grounds that the
proposed foundation might accentuate competitive concerns and entrench
Microsoft’s market power.476
In the twenty-first century, the proliferation of so-called “pay-for-delay”
(or “reverse payment”) settlements between pharmaceutical patent-holders
and potential generic market entrants yielded widespread critical censure for
violating antitrust law, denying consumers the benefit of more robust
competition in vital drugs.477 The courts of appeals were initially slow to
interdict such collusion478 on the notion that “settlements are desirable, while
litigation is not,”479 though some saw the latent antitrust implications.480 In
472. Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1975) (“‘In examining a
proposed compromise for approval or disapproval . . . the court does not try the case. The very purpose
of compromise is to avoid the delay and expense of such a trial.’ Thus, unless the terms of the agreement
are per se violations of antitrust law, we must apply a ‘reasonableness under the totality of the
circumstances’ standard to the court’s approval. Based on the record before us, we cannot say as a matter
of law that the settlement agreement included any such violations.”) (citations omitted).
473. In re New Mexico Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 607 F. Supp. 1491, 1508 (D. Colo. 1984) (“The
objectors have presented one argument against approval that, at first glance, has some facial appeal.
Several objectors argue that, by allowing the acquisition of Southern Union’s gas utility by PNM, the
settlement creates the potential for further anticompetitive conduct by an entity with substantial monopoly
power over gas and electricity supply in New Mexico.”).
474. Id. at 1508-09.
475. Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2, at 122 (initial majuscule reduced to minuscule).
476. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528-30 (2002); id. at 520-21 (“I
have also concluded, as a substantive matter, that the record as it now exists demonstrates that the
charitable foundation contemplated by the agreement is not sufficiently funded both to fulfill the
eleemosynary purposes justifying a cy pres remedy and to assure that effectuation of the agreement would
not have anti-competitive effects.”).
477. See C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property Litigation,
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 685, 703-05.
478. See id. at 705-06 & n.74 (citing Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604
F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam), and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d
1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
479. Id. at 707.
480. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012).
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2013, however, the Supreme Court declared in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. that
“patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of
the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is
conferred by a patent.”481 “In light of the public policy favoring settlement
of disputes (among other considerations),” recounted the Court, the Eleventh
Circuit had “held that the courts could not require the parties to continue to
litigate in order to avoid antitrust liability.”482 Citing Singer and its ilk, the
Court reminded that its “precedents make clear that patent-related settlement
agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”483 Finally, whilst
acknowledging the “general legal policy favoring the settlement of
disputes,”484 Justice Stephen Breyer nonetheless held for a 6-3 majority (over
a dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts485) that the blatant risk of competitive
harm overcame “the single strong consideration—the desirability of
settlements—that led the Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust
immunity to reverse payment settlements.”486
C. Public Policy for Competition and Its Conscripted Private
Prosecutors
Manifestly, despite the avowed value of affording parties free agency in
their private contractual relations and the minimization of unneeded exertions
via settlements,487 courts have long recognized the countervailing purpose of
public policy in the adherence to antitrust law and promotion of fair
competition.488 Unlike the storied judicial solicitude for settlements (though

481. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013).
482. Id. at 146.
483. Id. at 150 (“Similarly, both within the settlement context and without, the Court has struck
down overly restrictive patent licensing agreements—irrespective of whether those agreements produced
supra-patent-permitted revenues.”).
484. Id. at 153, 154 (“The Circuit’s related underlying practical concern consists of its fear that
antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to litigate the validity of the
patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened to competition in the absence of the settlement.
Any such litigation will prove time consuming, complex, and expensive. The antitrust game, the Circuit
may believe, would not be worth that litigation candle. We recognize the value of settlements and the
patent litigation problem.”).
485. Id. at 160 (“A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws. The correct
approach should therefore be to ask whether the settlement gives Solvay monopoly power beyond what
the patent already gave it. The Court, however, departs from this approach, and would instead use antitrust
law’s amorphous rule of reason to inquire into the anticompetitive effects of such settlements.”) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
486. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. at 158 (majority). Justice Breyer did, however, resist the FTC’s
suggestion that any payments to a competitor to delay market entry were per se antitrust violations,
adverting to the complexity and diversity of markets and competitors. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159.
487. See supra Part IV. A. 1.
488. See supra Part IV. B.
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like that for arbitration489), this public policy is rooted firmly in congressional
acts, beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.490
1. American Aggrandizement of Antitrust
The United States was the first country to promulgate a national public
policy to regulate economic competition, following the lead of its several
states who had pioneered the practice.491 In 1890, the Sherman Act provided
as federal policy that “every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal,” and that “every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.”492 In 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act
and Clayton Antitrust Act followed suit,493 as did the Robinson-Patman Act
in 1936,494 all intended to supplement and strengthen the fundamental edicts
of the Sherman Act.495 Half a century and more would pass before other
nations began to heed this example and formulate their own statutes in
defense of fair competition.496 Even then, these foreign laws were often
responses to legislative and judicial innovations in the United States and their
extraterritorial application.497
As a term of art, public policy describes the regime of principles, often
subscribed into statute, or emanating from the common law tradition inherited
489. See supra Part IV. A. 2.
490. Pub. L. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018).
491. See Jared S. Sunshine, Observations at the Quinceañero of Intel Corp. v. Amd, Inc. on
International Comity in Domestic Discovery for Foreign Antitrust Matters, 69 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 29899 (2021).
492. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2018) (initial majuscules reduced to minuscule).
493. Pub. L. 63-202, 38 Stat. 717, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2018) (Federal Trade Commission
Act); id. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”); Pub. L. 63–212, 38 Stat. 730,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2018) (Clayton Act); id. § 13(a) (“It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality.”);
494. Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13.
495. See The Antitrust Laws, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.
496. Sunshine, supra note 491, at 299 & n.16 (“But whatever the reason, ‘[u]ntil the mid-twentieth
century, the United States was virtually the only nation in the world with an antitrust regime.’”) (quoting
Russell W. Damtoft & Ronan Flanagan, The Development of International Networks in Antitrust, 43 INT’L
LAW. 137, 138 (2009)).
497. Id. at 308 (“Ironically, the welcome efflorescence of antitrust laws around the world in the
latter part of the twentieth century “is considered to be a direct rebuttal to the United States’ extraterritorial
enforcement. Indeed, a primary function of these counter legislations is to frustrate or resist foreign
enforcement actions in their territories.”).
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from England, that the government has recognized as supportive of the
common weal: philosophies meant to pervade and supersede other
considerations.498 As an imprecise agglomeration of philosophies, however,
the contours of public policy are essentially amorphous, perhaps by design:499
You cannot lay down any definition of the term ‘public policy,’ or
say it comprises such and such a proposition, and does not comprise
such and such another,” says the same learned Judge. “Public
policy,” he continues, “must be, to a certain extent, a matter of
individual opinion, because what one man, or one Judge, and perhaps
I ought to say one woman also in this case, might think against public
policy, another might think altogether excellent public policy.
Consequently it is impossible to say what the opinion of a man or a
Judge might be as to what public policy is.500
498. Public Policy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The collective rules, principles,
or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth or (esp.) promote the general good; specif.,
principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to
the state and the whole of society”); see Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., v. Societe Generale
De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); Irish v. CNA Ins. Co., No. 20 CV
904, 2020 WL 6273483, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2020) (“Illinois courts adhere to ‘a narrow definition of
public policy.’ A public policy ‘is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions’ and ‘must strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.’”) (citations omitted); Bondcote Corp. v. Ayers, No. 7:05CV-00705, 2006 WL 938734, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 11, 2006) (“[W]hatever ‘tends to injustice or
oppression . . . or to the violation of a statute’ is against public policy. The courts have also approved of
the definition of public policy as the principle ‘which declares that no one can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public welfare.’”) (citations omitted); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Moore,
3 F.2d 652, 653 (D. Or. 1925) (Public policy “is said to be that principle of law which holds that no citizen
can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good, as
declared by the law and decisions of the courts.”); see generally William Stanley Macbean Knight, Public
Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207 (1922).
499. Peregoy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 5:06-CV-107-F, 2007 WL 9718536, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2007) (“The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined public policy ‘as the principle
of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public
or against the public good.’ Recognizing the imprecision of this definition, . . . [t]he North Carolina
Supreme Court has specifically declined to set forth a more specific definition of public policy, choosing
instead to ‘allow this still evolving area of the law to mature slowly, deciding each case on the facts. . .
.’”) (citations omitted); accord Buser v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564-65 (M.D.N.C. 1999);
see Edmundson v. Cont’l Pipeline Co., No. 90–3089, 1991 WL 149508, at *2 (7th Cir. July 17, 1991)
(“There is no precise definition of public policy.”); Bondcote, 2006 WL 938734, at *4 (“‘Public policy
has its place in the law of contracts, yet that will-o’-wisp of the law varies and changes with the interests,
habits, need, sentiments, and fashions of the day.’ Courts are averse to holding contracts against public
policy unless their illegality is clear and certain. The meaning of the phrase ‘public policy’ is vague and
variable . . .”) (citations omitted); Moore, 3 F.2d at 653 (“It is not easy to give a precise definition of public
policy.”); see Ason, supra note 427, at 9 (“An essential characteristic of public policy control is
unpredictability. This is the reason why public policy is most often described as a ‘very unruly horse,
which once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.’”) (quoting Richardson v. Mellish,
[1824] 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (CP)).
500. Knight, supra note 498, at 213. Knight continued: “And this position, so reminiscent of the
‘unruly horse’ of Burrough J., is afterwards adopted by Kekewich J.: ‘Public policy does not admit of
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Notwithstanding such intrinsic indeterminacy, American courts have
often accorded antitrust law the highest degree of deference in the legal
firmament; in the uncertain hierarchy of public policy, it is habitually seen as
a primus inter pares.501 Indeed, antitrust seems to have acquired the status of
a “universal” public policy, venerated in some form worldwide.502 General
principles of law and equity have, therefore, tended to yield to the precepts of
antitrust when conflict arise.503 This was particularly so in the courts’
uniform rejection of the much-tried defense that an antitrust plaintiff came to
the lawsuit “with unclean hands” or in pari delicto, an ordinary concern of
public policy wholly overridden by the importance of punishing antitrust
violators and eliminating competitive restraints.504 To allow a violator to
definition and is not easily explained. . . One thing I take to be clear, and it is this—that public policy is a
variable quantity; that it must vary and does—vary with the habits, capacities and opportunities of the
public. And in the same case, on appeal, in the words of Fry L.J., “the law with regard to public policy is
one of a very different description from the law which is laid down in absolute terms for all time.”‘” Id. at
213-14.
501. See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425, 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (Markey,
C.J., dissenting) (opining that the majority “would so exalt important public policy underlying our antitrust
laws as to require what I believe to be the effective nullification of a constitutional provision”); Brintley
v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., No. 2:09-CV-14014, 2010 WL 11492414, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2010)
(“Taking into account the compelling public policy favoring such antitrust actions, the court found that
the privilege should not be recognized when it would prevent the plaintiff from asserting his claim
altogether.”) (citing Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1981)
(“strong public interest in open and fair competition”)); Carpenters Loc. Union No. 1846 of United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 80-2763, 1981 WL
2221, at *2 (E.D. La. May 28, 1981) (“Courts have consistently instructed that in antitrust cases where
public policy is so vitally involved and the factual issues complex, courts must liberally construe a
plaintiff’s pleadings.”) (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, (1962)).
502. Ason, supra note 427, at 1 (“The notion of public policy (ordre public) encompasses
fundamental values and principles, pertaining to justice and morality that states wish to protect. It is
universally acknowledged that competition rules, designed to serve essential political, social and economic
interests, are part of public policy.”). But see id. at 7 (noting that as a planned economy, Switzerland has
rejected antitrust law as public policy or part of the “universal valeurs essentielles”).
503. See, e.g., United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 374 F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (N.D. Ohio
1974) (“[I]t remains clear, however, that principles of equity may not be applied to the United States in
such a manner as to frustrate the purpose of its laws or to thwart its public policy” in enforcing the Sherman
Act) (citations omitted); Purex Corp., Ltd. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 318 F. Supp. 322, 324 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
(“Whether such a defense is valid in private contract litigation is irrelevant to the question of whether it is
permissible in an antitrust action. . . . Also, as discussed above, it establishes quite clearly that the relative
equities between private litigants must yield to public policy considerations when antitrust suits are
concerned.”); United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (“The public policy
underlying the anti-trust laws is not to be frustrated so easily. Since ‘it is the unlawful agreement, whether
it is executed or not, which violates the anti-trust laws’, the Court is justified in enjoining any action to
realize the proceeds of the tainted agreement, particularly so where the action serves to keep the agreement
alive and to encourage future violations.”); United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(“‘Those defenses [estoppel, ratification or laches] do not apply to actions brought by the United States in
its sovereign capacity where they would frustrate the purpose of its laws or thwart its public policy’” in
Sherman Act case).
504. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968), overruled
on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984); Ring v. Spina,
148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Considerations of public policy demand court intervention in behalf
of such a person, even if technically he could be considered in pari delicto. . . . Any other conclusion
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escape liability and correction by claiming that his accuser was somehow
complicit would ignore the powerful public interest in eliminating antisocial
behavior, whatever the societal ills (if any) occasioned by recompensing an
individually imperfect plaintiff.505
As with settlements,506 the superlative significance of antitrust public
policy has sometimes been treated as so self-evident that it needed no
explanation: quoting the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit
commented that one can “discern the relevant public policy from the antitrust
laws. The notion that it is the purpose of those laws to protect the public
interest in free and unrestrained competition is too well-established to require
citation.”507 In 1976, however, a perspicacious district court had explained
the underpinnings more explicitly:
The strong public policies underlying the enactment of the antitrust
laws and the public interest to be protected by their vigorous
enforcement through private suits demark the guidelines within
which antitrust procedure is to be established. For example, the
important public concern in combatting an antitrust violation in the
courts is the damage that such a violation wreaks upon the
competitive market system. Private enforcement is thus premised, in
the first instance, on a theory of protecting the desired market status
and thereby vindicating the public interest.508
would mean that for many, perhaps most, victims of restraint of trade, private remedies under the Sherman
Act would be illusory, if not quite non-existent.”); Frost v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., No.
72-2123 GBH, 1974 WL 888, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 1974) (“Regardless of the rubric of ‘unclean hands’
or ‘illegality,’ the countervailing specific public policy favoring private antitrust actions outweighs the
general public policy sometimes invoked to withhold relief from a litigant guilty of misconduct.”) (quoting
Waldron v. Brit. Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)); Trebuhs Realty Co v. News
Syndicate Co, 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“More specifically, public policy may preclude an
application of the doctrine of ‘unclean hands.’ Whatever equities may be present as between private
litigants, they must yield to the overall public policy of the antitrust laws to prevent monopolies and
restraint of trade.”).
505. See Chrysler Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 596 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D.D.C. 1984) (“[C]ourts
considering actions under the antitrust laws must be concerned with protection of the public interest as
well as redressing private injury. The claim that the plaintiff has himself violated the law cannot be
allowed to overshadow plaintiff’s cause of action and the potential vindication of the public interest. . . .
As in the case with actions at law, actions in equity must yield to the overall public policy of enforcing
antitrust laws.”); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Tex.
1976).
506. See Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Williams, 216
U.S. at 595); Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 1974); Cities
Service Oil v. Coleman Oil Co., 470 F.2d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967, (1972);
Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969); and Richards Construction Co. v. Air
Conditioning Co. of Hawaii, 318 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1963)).
507. E.g., Franklin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 90–16118, 1991 WL 270787, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov.
8,1991) (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 652 (Haw. 1982).
508. Pearl Brewing, 415 F. Supp. at 1130.
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Put more briefly recently, the raison d’être of the Sherman Act and all
that followed is the cultivation of competition for the benefit of consumers,
not the protection of competitors: “the purpose of [antitrust law] is not to
protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public
from the failure of the market.”509 This closely parallels the Supreme Court’s
famous observation that “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed
for ‘protection of competition, not competitors.’”510 The high court has more
recently specified the priority of antitrust as “interbrand competition,” even
though “‘[l]ow prices . . . benefit consumers regardless of how those prices
are set.’”511 To this end, “a core purpose of the antitrust law is to scrutinize
mergers,” on the theory that fewer companies means fewer brands, less
competition, reduced output of products, inflated profit margins, and thus
higher prices.512 As early as 1937, the Seventh Circuit thought it “clear[]”
that “the purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to secure equality of
opportunity and to prohibit abnormal contracts and combinations which tend
directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called competition.”513 Malice
of the heart is beside the point, for the Sherman Act does not proscribe a
moralistic peccadillo or mortal sin but rather prescribes a basal “economic
policy, violation of which is deemed detrimental to common welfare,
irrespective of motive or other wrongful intent.”514 With the “economic
wellbeing of the American people” at stake, it is perfectly pellucid how this
particular principle, conduced by Congress, merited such a privileged place
in the pantheon of public policies.515
509. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing
Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999); Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)), aff’d, 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016).
510. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
511. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (“Our analysis is also guided by our general view
that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition. . . . Our interpretation
of the Sherman Act also incorporates the notion that condemnation of practices resulting in lower prices
to consumers is ‘especially costly’ because ‘cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition.’”) (quoting Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340
(1990) and Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
512. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d 187, 208 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Colo.
Interstate Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1460-61 (D. Wyo. 1987) (“Congress
intended to preserve competition by enacting the antitrust laws. Preserving competition in turn promotes
maximum consumer economic welfare through efficient use and allocation of scarce resources.”) (citations
omitted), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989).
513. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co. v. Indiana Farmer’s Guide Pub. Co., 88 F.2d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1937).
514. Id. at 982 (“And an act which might be done lawfully by one, may, when done by many acting
in concert, take on the form of a conspiracy and become a public wrong, violative of the legislative policy
and thus prohibited by law, if the result be hurtful to the public or to individuals against whom such
concerted action is directed.”).
515. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991) (“[T]he most probable
consequences of such entry by the Regional Companies into the sensitive information services market will
be the elimination of competition from that market and the concentration of the sources of information of
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2. The Peculiar Parts Played by “Private Attorneys General”
In the eternal existential struggle for a maximally efficient marketplace,
Congress expressly contemplated a robust role for private parties deputized
in the Clayton Act to bring civil enforcement actions that would vindicate
free and fair competition.516 The perspicacious district court, quoted earlier,
evidently embraced the importance of these self-sponsored suits,517 as had
many others that the reader has already encountered.518 The conscientious
citizens prosecuting the common cause of vigorous competition have long
been labelled (with some élan) as “private attorneys general” to reflect their
abnormal amalgamation of a calculatedly public purpose with their own very
individualistic aims of personal compensation.519 Exactly what animated this
amateur volunteer corps, however, exists in an uneasy superposition of two
overlapping theories.
a. Cosseted Creatures of Congressional Command?
The D.C. district court has elaborated further on these peculiar creatures
of statute: “Private parties filing suit under the antitrust laws function as
‘private attorneys general’ representing the public interest. Congress
established the private right of action for the very purpose of insuring
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. The public interest in preventing
anticompetitive injury would be dampened tremendously” if such quasi-

the American people in just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates, with the captive local telephone
monopolies as their base. Such a development would be inimical to the objective of a competitive market,
the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic wellbeing of the American people.”), aff’d, 993 F.2d
1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter W. Elec. Co. II]; see Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 340
U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as the Robinson-Patman Act, ‘Congress was
dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’”); Colo.
Interstate Gas, 661 F. Supp. at 1460-61 (quoted supra note 512); United States v. W. Elec. Co., No. 820025 (PI), 1983 WL 1864, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1983) (advising that “direct Supreme Court consideration
is appropriate where the underlying antitrust judgment involves matters of great and general importance
to the public interest because of their ‘impact on the economic welfare of this nation’”) (citation omitted)
[hereinafter W. Elec. Co. I]; see also Washington v. CLA Est. Servs., Inc., No. C18-480 MJP, 2018 WL
2057903, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2018) (“There is also widespread legal support for the State’s position
that its suit to enforce its quasi-sovereign interest in guaranteeing an honest marketplace and the economic
welfare of its citizenry bestows ‘real party in interest’ status upon it.”).
516. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
. . .”); id. at § 26.
517. See supra note 508 and accompanying text.
518. See supra cases cited notes 503-05.
519. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.,
No. CIV. A. 98-5055, 2004 WL 1221350, at *17 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004), amended, 2004 WL 1240775
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 2004); Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534-35 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
Chrysler Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 596 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D.D.C. 1984).
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prosecutors could be evaded through artful contractual preemption.520
Amongst courts, it was “well recognized that enforcement of the antitrust
laws by the state and federal governments is not adequate at this time, mainly
due to shortage of staff and especially of trained staff.”521 Public records tell
the same tale.522 Recognition of government inadequacy to the task had thus
impelled Congress to recruit private attorneys general, via the incentive of
treble damages and the promise of attorneys’ fees, to provide a nigh-limitless
auxiliary force to uphold the laws.523 Only by installing “an ever-present
threat” of private actions could the public good be fully served, even at the
risk of enlisting champions for the free market less immaculate than the white
knights of the (overmatched) government regulators.524 With ever greater
demands on the regulators, private attorneys general had already begun to
swell in importance by the 1960s and accounted for many seminal decisions
in antitrust.525
Unlike those selfless white knights, private interests require a strong
incentive to spur them to sue, and courts generally viewed the statutory
promise of treble damages as providing the requisite enticement.526 But
accounting for attorneys’ fees and costs was also vital, to ensure that
520. Chrysler Corp., 596 F. Supp. at 419 (citing Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 280
(9th Cir.1976), and Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F.Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)).
521. In re Arizona Escrow Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 80-840A PHX CAM, 1983 WL 1784, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 2, 1983) (“Neither federal nor state governments, nor any combination of them, have enough
attorneys or investigators to ferret out and to litigate all the cases that could be prosecuted in the courts.”)
[hereinafter In re Arizona Escrow Fee Antitrust Litig. II].
522. See Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1074-75 (“The resources of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and of the Federal Trade Commission are simply inadequate to enforce those laws
with anything like the thoroughness consistent with the commitment of Congress and the Supreme Court
to a free, competitive system. For example, in 1968, the entire appropriation for the Antitrust Division
amounted to about eight million dollars, which supported a staff of about 300 lawyers in its Washington
office.”).
523. Id.; In re Arizona Escrow Fee II, 1983 WL 1784, at *3 (“Therefore, Congress has expressed a
public policy that the antitrust laws be enforced by private action and has evidenced this policy by
providing for treble damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees for successful plaintiffs.”).
524. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purposes of
the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter
anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the
reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages
his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A more fastidious regard for the
relative moral worth of the parties could only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private
action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. And permitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall gain does
not encourage continued violations by those in his position since they remain fully subject to civil and
criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct.”) see cases cited supra note 504 and accompanying text
(finding the public good of antitrust to outweigh the use of private plaintiffs who file suit with “unclean
hands”).
525. Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1075-77 & nn.20-25.
526. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987) (quoted infra text
accompanying note 541); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); In re Arizona Escrow Fee II, 1983 WL
1784, at *3 (quoted supra note 523).
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motivated plaintiffs enjoyed (and could afford) equally motivated counsel.527
Another case narrated a highly revealing tale of Congress’s intentions for
private antitrust litigants:
In 1976 Congress, reacting to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 241
(1975), amended section 16 of the Clayton Act to authorize an award
of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who “substantially prevails” in a suit
for injunctive relief. Noting that Alyeska created “a significant
deterrent to potential plaintiffs bringing and maintaining lawsuits to
enjoin antitrust violations,” Congress recognized “a compelling
public policy to justify the award of attorney fees . . . .” The House
Report noted: “Indeed, the need for the awarding of attorneys’ fees
in § 16 injunction cases is greater than the need in § 4 treble damage
cases. In damage cases, a prevailing plaintiff recovers compensation,
at least. In injunction cases, however, without the shifting of
attorneys’ fees, a plaintiff with a deserving case would personally
have to pay the very high price of obtaining judicial enforcement of
the law and of the important national policies the antitrust laws
reflect. A prevailing plaintiff should not have to bear such an
expense. Section 3(3) of H. R. 8532, therefore, is intended to
reiterate congressional encouragement for private parties to bring and
maintain meritorious antitrust injunction cases.”528
As noted, Congress swiftly responded to Alyeska’s holding that the
traditional “American rule” demanded that each party bear its own costs of
counsel, refusing to override that long-standing public policy without
legislative direction.529 In providing just that direction, Congress once again
527. See Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 52 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[N]o statute or public
policy denying an antitrust plaintiff the privilege enjoyed by plaintiffs in other cases, that of making an
assignment [of the right to fees] to his attorneys in order to secure their services in the prosecution of his
case. To deny counsel the fees awarded, and to do so at the instance of an antitrust defendant, would, we
think, be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute in allowing, if not encouraging, private enforcement
of the antitrust laws.”); accord Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 682 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1982); see In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350, at *17 (“Providing sufficient incentive to attorneys to
undertake class actions . . . is particularly important in antitrust cases. As the Second Circuit has explained,
the incentive for ‘the private attorney general’ is particularly important in the area of antitrust enforcement
because public policy relies so heavily on such private action for enforcement of the antitrust laws.”)
(quoting Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir.)), amended,
2004 WL 1240775 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2004).
528. In re Arizona Escrow Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 80-840A PHX CAM, 1982 WL 1938, at *7 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 22, 1982) (citations omitted) [hereinafter In re Arizona Escrow Fee Antitrust Litig. I].
529. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“In the United
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.
We are asked to fashion a far-reaching exception to this ‘American Rule’; but having considered its origin
and development, we are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative
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reaffirmed both the rarefied position of the antitrust laws and the importance
of private attorneys general to their practical application.530 Seldom is
congressional intent for public policy so superabundantly clear.531
At least in the abstract, the Supreme Court agreed heartily.532 In 1963,
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.
acknowledged that “Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust
litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws,” and construed tolling provisions in light of “congressional
policy objectives” so as to “lend considerable impetus to that policy.”533
Congress strove to place its thumb on the scale as heavily as possible in favor
of private litigation: “to minimize the burdens of litigation for injured private
suitors” and provide “as large an advantage as the estoppel doctrine would
afford.”534 Nearly a decade later, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc. found public policy little changed, quoting Minnesota Mining with
approval.535 For good measure, Zenith also confirmed that to wholly
foreclose private recovery by a statute or repose would “be contrary to the
congressional purpose that private actions serve ‘as a bulwark of antitrust
enforcement,’ and that the antitrust laws fully ‘protect the victims of the
forbidden practices as well as the public,’” quoting yet another pair of past
cases in support.536 Even Mitsubishi had favorably quoted the pro-antitrust
American Security whilst discarding its misgivings: “A claim under the
antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to
promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff
asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-

guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner and to the extent urged by respondents and
approved by the Court of Appeals.”).
530. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–435, title III, § 302(3),
90 Stat. 1396, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2018) (“In any action under this section in which the plaintiff
substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, to such
plaintiff.”).
531. E.g., Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 501 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (“The Court need not wade too deeply into the murky waters of Congressional intent.”), aff’d, 503
F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2007); see Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common
Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155 (1995) (“The fact of the matter is that
congressional intent is seldom clear.”); see also supra notes 499-500 and accompanying text (discussing
the essential inscrutability of public policy).
532. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977) (acknowledging the “the
longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws” and “legislative
purpose in creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce the antitrust laws”).
533. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965).
534. Id. at 317 (“Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull
from government antitrust actions.”).
535. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 336 (1971).
536. Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
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general who protects the public’s interest.”537 It could hardly do otherwise,
for the Court had previously explained further quite cogently:
Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise
system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong
competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends,
in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these
laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators.
It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal,
state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their
respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was
not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to
recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured
in their business or property by an antitrust violation. By offering
potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount
of their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as
“private attorneys general.”538
b. Convenient But Not Critical to Securing Competition?
Despite such congenial verbiage historically, however, the contemporary
Supreme Court at least has not conceived of private antitrust enforcement as
a mechanism to be exalted over all comers—helpful, even important, but
hardly indispensable.539 As Italian Colors put it, “to say that Congress must
have intended whatever departures from those normal limits advance antitrust
goals is simply irrational. ‘[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all
costs.’”540 In holding that claims under RICO were arbitrable, the Court
offered a short paean to the role of private enforcement in antitrust—a far
more vital role, it thought, than even combatting racketeering and corrupt
organizations:541 “Antitrust violations generally have a widespread impact
on national markets as a whole, and the antitrust treble-damages provision
gives private parties an incentive to bring civil suits that serve to advance the

537. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (quoting
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
538. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (citations omitted).
539. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013) (quoted supra note 403 and
accompanying text).
540. Id. at 233-34.
541. McMahon, 482 U.S. 241-42 (1987) (“Not only does Mitsubishi support the arbitrability of
RICO claims, but there is even more reason to suppose that arbitration will adequately serve the purposes
of RICO than that it will adequately protect private enforcement of the antitrust laws. . . . The private
attorney general role for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply less plausible than it is for the typical antitrust
plaintiff, and does not support a finding that there is an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and
enforcement of the RICO statute.”).
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national interest in a competitive economy.”542 All the same, the Court
reminded, it had still held antitrust claims to be subservient to a valid contract
to arbitrate two years before, notwithstanding the vaunted role of treble
damages and private attorneys general.543 “Without doubt, the private cause
of action plays a central role in enforcing this regime,” the Court admitted,
and “[t]he treble-damages provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief
tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to
potential violators.”544 But all the benefits of private enforcement, it had
thought then, could be realized well enough (for government work?) in an
arbitral forum, ostensibly overseen by watchful Article III judges.545
“Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function,” the Court
summarized, “the treble-damages cause of action conferred on private parties
by § 4 of the Clayton Act . . . seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor
to gain compensation for that injury.”546 Once again, the conscripted army of
private attorneys general, however handy, was thought only collateral to the
free market economy enforced by the antitrust laws.547 Ultimately, the
Sherman Act’s “primary purpose was to prevent undue restraints of interstate
commerce in the public interest, and to afford protection of the public from
the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic efforts. The right
granted to individual suitors to seek reparation was secondary and
subordinate in purpose.”548
Undoubtedly, not all plaintiffs have the best interests of the economy at
heart.549 Some may be trying to use the powerful cudgel of the antitrust laws
to entrench rather than uproot inefficiency in the market when the

542. Id. at 241.
543. Id. at 238-40.
544. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
545. Id. at 637-38 (quoted supra text accompanying notes 387-88).
546. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
547. Cf. supra text accompanying note 539.
548. Feddersen Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1950) (citations omitted to Shotkin
v. General Electric Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948); Appalachian Coals, Inc., v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 359 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
763 (1984); Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934)); Feddersen Motors,180
F.2d at 521 (“It extended the inhibition to any combination or conspiracy, whatever its form, having
injurious effects of that kind upon the competitive system, and it provided both public and private,
remedies for the injuries flowing from the restraints.”).
549. Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1076 n.15 (“I do not want to slight the fact that there can be an
unsavory side to some of these private treble damage actions. Most certainly, there have been instances
where they were instituted to harass competitors and undermine the competitive process, and occasionally
they have been motivated mainly by a desire to reap windfall profits or avoid honest obligations.”); see
also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 (1977) (“Intermeshing a statutory
prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms with a damages action intended to
remedy those harms is not without difficulty.”).

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2022

79

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 2

318

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

inefficiency is their own.550 Courts wisely rebuffed plaintiffs whose
disingenuousness was clear in claiming antitrust violations whilst
simultaneously seeking to benefit from them, as was often claimed by
unwilling merger targets.551 Moreover, “tag-along” plaintiffs seeking to
intervene in a governmental suit may solely be seeking payouts that would
not advance the exposure of malefactors but would rather impede the swift
resolution of those select cases so significant that the government has initiated
a prosecution—to vindicate the public’s interest, not to collect damages.552
Private plaintiffs also raise the specter of cowing potential witnesses in the
same industry whose disclosures would typically include highly sensitive
competitive information.553 Taking these concerns into account, the doctrine
of antitrust standing was necessitated to weed out plaintiffs bringing a case
where they had not suffered the sort of harm that antitrust law meant to
deter.554 Indeed, such standing is intended to guard against plaintiffs seeking
“windfall profits,” as the Supreme Court explained in promulgating the
doctrine:
But the antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed
here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing
centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving
respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages
respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits
they would have realized had competition been reduced. . . . It is
inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages for the type
of injury claimed here. Of course, Congress is free, if it desires, to
550. E.g., Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534-35 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (The target
of an acquisition attempt “is a poor private attorney general because it is not a ‘“victim’” of the alleged
violation. The suit must be understood in its true sense, an attempt by the incumbent management to
defend their own positions, not as an attempt to vindicate any public interest. Understanding that premise
demonstrates the evils of permitting target companies to make use of the antitrust laws as defensive
weapons.”).
551. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805-06 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (“Finally, the
court notes that policy considerations also support denying a target company standing to contest a hostile
takeover. As Judge Friendly has noted, targets of tender offers routinely seek shelter under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Accordingly, a court should not interfere with a tender offer unless the target company
dispels the inference of disingenuousness by showing that the alleged antitrust violation would expose it
to readily identifiable harm.”), aff’d, No. 87-1622(L), 1987 WL 91498 (4th Cir. June 22, 1987); see, e.g.,
Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986);
Central National Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1983); Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.
v. The Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
552. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 140, 144-45 (D. Del. 1999)
(discussing H.R. Rep. No. 90–1130, at 5, 8, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1902, 1905).
553. See, e.g., Dentsply, 190 F.R.D. at 146 (“Moreover, it is possible that third party witnesses who
are also competitors of Dentsply might not object to Government discovery of their proprietary
information. However, they would strenuously fight to avoid disclosure of that information to rivals,
causing delay that would necessitate lengthening the discovery schedule.”).
554. See Burlington, 666 F. Supp. at 804-05 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).
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mandate damages awards for all dislocations caused by unlawful
mergers despite the peculiar consequences of so doing. But because
of these consequences, “we should insist upon a clear expression of
a congressional purpose,” before attributing such an intent to
Congress.555
But perhaps the most serious refutation to the premise that private
attorneys general are strictly necessary to effective antitrust enforcement is
the most self-evident, enunciated as such by the Supreme Court in
Mistubishi—”of course, the antitrust cause of action remains at all times
under the control of the individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation
to bring an antitrust suit, and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive
or judicial approval before settling one.”556 A volunteer who freely sets his
own terms of participation can scarcely be a stable rock upon which to build
the secular church of economic welfare.557
V.
THE CRUDE AND STILL INCHOATE CONTOURS OF THE CURRENT
COMPROMISE
The preceding discussion of public policies in conflict thus comes full
circle back to the specific subject of private antitrust plaintiffs who have
ostensibly settled and released their claims. Despite the Supreme Court’s
comment that individual actors (for they are not really attorneys general, after
all) need no judicial imprimatur to settle,558 it is unsurprising that the courts
assumed the burden of devising a reasoned approach to these private releases
of antitrust liability.559 The core antitrust statutes are aspirational, generalist,
and have required long decades of judicial exegesis to make sense of their
laconic commands in light of evolving economic theory.560 Even for the far
555. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264
(1972)).
556. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985) (citation
omitted).
557. But cf. Matthew 16:18 (King James) “And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon
this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”).
558. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 636.
559. See supra Part III. A.
560. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 461 (2015) (“Congress, we have explained,
intended that law’s reference to ‘restraint of trade’ to have ‘changing content,’ and authorized courts to
oversee the term’s ‘dynamic potential.’ We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis
as economic understanding evolves and (just as Kimble notes) to reverse antitrust precedents that
misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”) (citations omitted to State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997), and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732
(1988)); Sanger Ins. Agency v. HUB Int’l, Ltd., 802 F.3d 732, 742 (5th Cir. 2015) (“As with the
notoriously terse language in the Sherman Act itself, the McCarran-Ferguson Act necessarily leaves many
questions to be answered through the development of case law.”); Sunshine, supra note 491, at 299 (“The
United States first had to put its own house in order, which presented difficulties given the terse dictates
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less contentious truism that prospective releases are void, “there is no
statutory counterpart in the antitrust laws to the provision that invalidates
advance releases of potential securities law claims[,]” and therefore, “the
courts have developed and applied a corresponding public policy in the
antitrust field as a matter of case law.”561
A. Reductionist Rationalizations in the Part-and-Parcel Cases
It is likewise unsurprising that the resultant judicially-created part-andparcel doctrine for retrospective releases, however well-intentioned, may
seem somewhat crude or inconsistent at times. The courts of appeals
addressing the potential conflict between private pacts and public policy in
the part-and-parcel cases have avoided a direct clash for primacy in
postulating that antitrust releases pose no special impediment to the
Congressional scheme of antitrust policy and enforcement.562 “In the
abstract, of course,” lectured the Fifth Circuit, “Ingram is quite correct that
national antitrust policy favors private enforcement of antitrust claims,”
acknowledging (“as we must”) the Supreme Court’s decisions to that
effect.563 But, anticipating the Court’s further movement in Mitsubishi and
beyond,564 “the existence of the Clayton Act alone and its related devices to
assist an antitrust plaintiff prosecute his claims do not determine the issue of
whether an antitrust plaintiff ha” sufficiently disproven the defense of a
release.565 After all, appellate courts had quite properly found that private
plaintiffs had no affirmative responsibility to the common weal to bring their
cases and incur all the costs and burdens.566
Others framed their evasion by highlighting the other avenues by which
the antitrust laws might be vindicated.567 The Fifth Circuit added this
rationalization to its thorough airing in Ingram.568 So too, the Second Circuit
of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court thus adopted a policy of broad judicial exegesis of congressional
purpose to give sinew to the statutory skeleton.”).
561. Oberweis Dairy, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 n.6 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (initial majuscule reduced to minuscule and citation omitted).
562. See VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1983); Va. Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448
F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1971); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208 (9th
Cir. 1950); see also Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1974).
563. Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1312.
564. See supra Part IV. C. 2. b.
565. Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1313.
566. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985)
(quoted supra text accompanying note 556); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885,
892 (3d Cir.1975); Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 1966); Duffy
Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consolidated Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir.1953).
567. See, e.g., Ingram, 698 F.2d at 1316.
568. Id. (“Enforcement of a release which covers antitrust claims does not implicate or derogate
from the remedial provisions of the federal antitrust laws. Indeed, they remain unaffected by our decision.
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reasoned that a private release hardly traduces the government’s interest in
investigating or prosecuting an antitrust violation.569 The Ninth Circuit found
that “settlements in no wise obstruct possible criminal prosecutions which
might be instituted by the Government, nor do they defeat the Congressional
purpose of allowing private claimants in this class of actions the right of
redress of their grievances in our courts,” as most private plaintiffs, after all,
have not entered into a voluntary “peace pact” with their putative tormentors,
and the courts should not lightly set aside the clear wishes of those who
had.570
There were yet more resourceful formulations.571 One district court
facing up to the clash of concerns emphasized the particularly strong interest
in the negotiated repose of antitrust disputes, ingeniously turning antitrust
policy against itself with the well-placed invocation of the revered
competition scholars Philip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp.572 And, there
was no shortage of cases baldly expounding the austere rule that antitrust
claims are not exempted from a general release on public policy grounds,
whether or not a part-and-parcel objection had been raised.573 One of these
from the Third Circuit synthesized the full argument uncommonly well:
Applying state law [of releases] to interpret private antitrust causes
of action will not frustrate the federal enforcement of antitrust
violations. The private antitrust cause of action provided by 15
U.S.C.A. § 15 allows a person injured as the result of an antitrust
violation to bring a private suit for treble damages against the
violator. Congress enacted this private cause of action as a
supplemental means for the enforcement of the antitrust laws,
paralleling the public cause of action enforceable by the Government.
Although there is an unquestioned public interest in the “vigilant
The government has convicted McDermott for its antitrust violations. Our decision does not in any way
affect those convictions. It has nothing whatsoever to do with future violations or future prosecutions.
We preempt no government prosecution under the antitrust laws. Moreover, there is a significant public
policy interest in permitting parties to enter into negotiations to settle their differences, even when these
include possible antitrust claims.”) (citations omitted).
569. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Although a release
from a private antitrust action forecloses that action, it does not immunize the released party from liability
under federal antitrust laws for its acts—government enforcement of those laws remains possible.”).
570. Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950) (quoted in
part supra text accompanying note 63).
571. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
572. Id. (“Further, the Court is also cognizant of the competing policies favoring settlement and the
enforcement of arbitration clauses. In general, public policy favors the settlement of disputes. This fact
has been specifically noted by a leading antitrust treatise: “Repose is especially valuable in antitrust, where
tests of legality are often rather vague, where many business practices can be simultaneously efficient and
beneficial to consumers but also challengeable as antitrust violations . . . .” II Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 320a, at 282 (3d ed. 2007).” (case citations omitted)).
573. See cases cited supra notes 355-59.
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enforcement of the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the
private treble-damage action,” this public interest does not prevent
the injured party from releasing his claim and foregoing the burden
of litigation. Since release of the private cause of action in no way
dilutes the government’s remedies against the antitrust violator,
federal policy would not seem to require the condemnation of
releases which are otherwise valid under the various state laws.574
The Fifth Circuit’s contrary reasoning in Redel’s is something like the
proverbial exception that proves the rule.575 The panel there recognized
clearly the possibility for clashes between public policies: “There are two
policies which must be accommodated. The first requires the greatest respect
for private enforcement as the hallmark of the federal antitrust regulatory
system. The second policy requires us to respect the amicable settlement and
release of antitrust claims by the parties themselves.”576 But, as the Fifth
Circuit had foreshadowed in according to antitrust the “greatest respect,” it
was not settlement that was the stronger policy: “Where these policies are
brought into conflict, the first must prevail.”577 The court also expressed
disapproval of schemes to hoodwink a weaker counterpart into unwittingly
signing away the right to bring suit in antitrust, and encouraged the clear
enunciation of any such waiver.578 This suggestion found some support in
SCM, which had quoted a district court for the proposition that the knowing
intent to waive antitrust claim was highly germane:
While the federal policy of jealously regarding the rights of private
antitrust claimants should not as a matter of law preclude their being
able to release claim—even unknown claims—nor protect them,
after-the-fact, from their conscious though unwise action, we think it
does allow—and is supported by—a rule which requires the court to
determine that they knew and intended that the release cover all that
it is being held to cover.579
So too did the dissent in SCM advert to the “Congressional policy to rely
heavily upon the private attorney general concept for enforcement of the
574. Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 891-92 (3d Cir.1975) (citations
omitted).
575. Cf. NIGEL WARBURTON, THINKING FROM A TO Z 66 (2007) (explaining how the adage in fact
refers to the unusual example that tests or challenges the general rule rather than corroborates it, as it is
commonly misinterpreted).
576. Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1974).
577. Id.
578. Id. at 100-01.
579. Va. Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting Novak v.
General Electric Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1967)) (emphasis in original).
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antitrust laws” and “some authority indicating that in view of this federal
policy, federal law should wholly displace state law governing release of
antitrust claims,” citing to Zenith.580 By the logic of the Redel’s and SCM
holdings, antitrust considerations are at least sufficiently significant enough
that the court must at least ensure there is an actual conflict—that the release
in fact functions by design to block private antitrust claims.581 And Redel’s
(and the SCM dissent, if not the majority) thought that if there were truly a
conflict, the antitrust policy must triumph.582 That prioritization, however,
must be read in the context that neither court of appeals found any such lack
of intent to waive antitrust claims in the releases under dispute and upheld
them.583 One must also observe that the Fifth Circuit’s supposed solicitude
for the private enforcement of antitrust professed in Redel’s did not overcome
the release presented a decade thence in Ingram.584
Redel’s aside, the part-and-parcel courts’ overall posture of studied
evasion is much bolstered by the contemporary inclination in appellate courts
(including the Supreme Court) to find private enforcement “incidental,”
“subordinate,” “supplemental,” or “secondary” to the “primary” public policy
for antitrust, paving the way for another aspect of public policy—respecting
consensual resolution of disputes—to carry the day.585 If private attorneys
general are (to borrow some terminology) an unquantifiable plus factor rather
than a mandatory quota in sustaining antitrust law, their more nebulous
impact can be more easily waved away.586 As with the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi, it is easier to presume that private attorneys general could pursue
their purpose notwithstanding the strictures of their contracts587 than to
confront a case like Italian Colors arguing directly that they most certainly
could not.588 But when squarely faced with that long-reserved dilemma, the
Court ruled just as squarely: private prerogative would prevail over the
unalloyed public pursuit of antitrust.589 The verdict of the highest court was

580. Id. at 269-70 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
581. Id. at 262; Redel’s, 498 F.3d at 95.
582. Redel’s, 498 F.3d at 95.
583. Id. at 100; SCM, 448 F.2d at 266.
584. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1983).
585. See supra cases cited 546-48 & 574 and accompanying text.
586. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious
admissions program cannot use a quota system . . . Instead, a university may consider race or ethnicity
only as a “‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file.”); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
317-18 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
587. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635-38 (1985).
588. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231-33 (2013).
589. Id. at 234.
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in: Ingram had the analysis right, and Redel’s ordering of priorities was
wrong.590
B. The Perplexity of a Settlement Between Public Good and Private
Prerogative
Inevitably, the defense of private prerogatives in contract would make
strange bedfellows with the public good of a healthy economic system (not
to mention a healthy judicial branch) guarded by the diligent sentinels of
antitrust.591 The first order of the Sherman Act, after all, was to forbid “every
contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce.”592 Even with the early judicial
gloss that only unreasonable restraints were forbidden,593 that private
objectives in contracts would be sharply scrutinized and sometimes set aside
was the entire point of the sprawling apparatus of antitrust law.594 Were
private parties’ preferences or pacts to reflexively prevail over the common
weal, the overweening conglomerate of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil
and the pertly-named Whiskey Trust, Sugar Trust, Lead Trust, Cotton-Oil
Trust, and Linseed-Oil Trust at which the Sherman Act had aimed its
crosshairs might still be pleasantly plying their monopolies today, alongside
many more.595 Only, as did the part-and-parcel courts, following the lead of
the Supreme Court, by presuming (or pretending) that these strange
bedfellows were not tugging at the same blanket could overt conflict be
avoided, alongst with the resulting difficult decisions.596
Then again, Standard Oil was brought down not by plucky privateers but
by governmental trust-busters, as were countless other early cartels.597
590. Compare Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoted supra text
accompanying notes 576-77, with Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312-13 (5th
Cir. 1983) (quoted supra text accompanying notes 565 & 567).
591. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 2.
592. Pub. L. 51-647 § 1, 26 Stat. 209, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
593. Jared S. Sunshine, Antitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamilton
College, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV. 59, 69 (2017) (“Despite the sweeping language, the courts quickly
concluded that only unreasonable restraints on trade were illegal, lest the most picayune (or
procompetitive) agreement give rise to liability.”) (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911), and Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1918)); Jeffrey C. Sun &
Philip T.K. Daniel, The Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and Collegiate Action: Should There Be a
Continued Exception for the Business of the University?, 25 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 451, 455 (1998).
594. See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2279, 2334-42 (2013); Sun & Daniel, supra note 593, at 453-54.
595. See Collins, supra note 594, at 2317; see also Sun & Daniel, supra note 593, at 453-54.
596. See supra Part III. B. and Table 1.
597. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil
Co., 262 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1923); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 142 (1911); Standard
Oil, 221 U.S. 1; Nat’l Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 127 (1905); Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S.
375 (1905); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 213 (1904) (Morgan Railway Trust). But see
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (holding the Sugar Trust beyond the Sherman Act
because it was a manufacturing rather than distribution monopoly), abrogated by Swift, 196 U.S. at 375;
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Storied modern monopolies too have bowed before the antitrust watchdogs
of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission:598 the United
States has not one but two agencies charged with overseeing fair
competition.599 Is this not proof positive of what the Supreme Court has been
espousing of late—that there is more than enough blanket to cover both
bedfellows once realizing that private prosecutions are only one fickle means
to an end and that the government has reserved itself ample authority to
protect the public?600 Nor is the Supreme Court’s caution against blithely
exegesizing exceptions to contract out of antitrust law a precipitous modern
development:
As a defense to an action based on contract, the plea of illegality
based on violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor
in this Court. This has been notably the case where the plea has been
made by a purchaser in an action to recover from him the agreed price
of goods sold. In Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540,
one who had purchased merchandise from a firm allegedly a
combination in restraint of trade was not allowed to set up that fact
as a defense to an action for the purchase price. In D. R. Wilder Mfg.
Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, Corn Products sold
merchandise to Wilder with a standing offer, of which the latter
apparently had sought to take some advantage, to give Wilder a
rebate if it bought exclusively from it. Again, in an action by the
seller, Corn Products, to recover the agreed price, the purchaser,
Wilder, was denied any defense of illegality based on the Sherman
Act. The Court observed that the Sherman Act’s express remedies
could not be added to judicially by including the avoidance of private
contracts as a sanction. Obviously, state law governs in general the
rights and duties of sellers and purchasers of goods, and, while the
effect of illegality under a federal statute is a matter of federal law,
even in diversity actions in the federal courts after Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, still the federal courts should not be quick to
see also Werner Troesken, Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 755,
756 (1998) (arguing that the Whiskey Trust failed of its own accord because of economic pressures rather
than regulation).
598. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2000), direct
appeal denied, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (Sept. 26, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2001), cert. denied, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 534 U.S.
952 (Oct. 9, 2001), on remand, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 166 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2002), aff’d, Massachusetts v.
United States, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2004); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982).
599. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Appropriate Role of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1277, 1277-78 (1988).
600. See supra Part IV. C. 2. b.
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create a policy of nonenforcement of contracts beyond that which is
clearly the requirement of the Sherman Act.601
Part-and-parcel arguments have been mostly rebuffed for most of a
century, and antitrust enforcement has continued apace.602 Arbitration
contracts involving antitrust claims were allowed in 1985, and for all the
asseverations then and since that the sky was falling, the American economy
has hardly atrophied in the interim.603 The shrillness of those most fearful of
private arrangements for dispute resolution has not proven persuasive: “The
assessment should remain unbiased by a perspective either in favour of
arbitration and competition law. This is precisely the weakness of the current
debate, which is marked by irreconcilable differences between arbitration and
competition law practitioners. As such, they render the tension between
[contractual] finality and [competitive] fairness inescapable.”604 Not every
disbelieved doomsayer has the God-given gift of prophecy granted
Cassandra:605 Most are just hysterically hawking false forecasts of
apocalypse; most overhyped tensions are susceptible of escape in more
measured hands.
Cooler heads, however, have shared some of the trepidations of the more
overwrought.606 The same British author who decried the modern Cassandras
also noted that in privately ordained arbitral awards, the “initial impression
of conformity is precisely the product that the parties wishing to evade
antitrust rules expect the arbitrators to deliver (not to mention the fact that the
parties still sharing that wish are least likely ever to seek the intervention of
national courts).”607 Another commentator has observed that private
arbitrators are likely to take a “minimalist” approach that condemns only
obvious restraints of trade and overlooks those that regulators might have
discerned.608 Meanwhile, judges have doubted whether national regulators,
601. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1959) (most citations omitted); see also Cont’l Wall
Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 258-59 (1909).
602. See supra Part III. B & Table 1.
603. See supra Part IV. A. 2. a.
604. Ason, supra note 427, at 4.
605. Cf. 3 PUBLIUS VERGILIUS MARO, AENEID 43, ll. 182-87 & n.186-87 (“Apollo had punished
Cassandra for betraying him by ordaining that her prophecies would be true, but never believed.”)
(Christine Perkell & Randall T. Ganiban eds., 2009).
606. See, e.g., Ason, supra note 427, at 6.
607. Id.
608. Carlos Ragazzo & Mariana Binder, Antitrust and International Arbitration, 15 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 173, 189 (2015). (“[O]ne can say that the minimalist approach prevails. In more practical terms,
in order for an antitrust violation to be deemed a transgression of public policy, it must be blatant and
jeopardize the objectives of the competition policy. As a rule, an [arbitral] award that does not condemn
horizontal agreements which lead to more severe competition restrictions, such as price fixing, output
restriction and market division amongst competitors will almost certainly be a violation of public policy.
The violation of public policy will be less evident, however, in decisions related to vertical restraints, such
as exclusivity agreements, where the illegality is less obvious and more subject to an effects test.”); see id.
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even duplicated between plural agencies, would actually rather than
hypothetically be ready and able to intervene whenever private contracts went
awry or ran amok.609 Moreover, unlike more entrepreneurial private parties,
antitrust agents “may properly use their powers to investigate only if there is
a reasonable basis to believe that the investigation will uncover violations of
the laws the agencies are authorized to enforce, and the scope and burdens of
the investigation should be limited,” leaving regulators more reactive rather
than proactive.610 And most saliently, the SCM dissent observed that if a
state’s contract law were “antagonistic to the effective enforcement of private
antitrust claims,” then federal courts may be needed to displace inimical local
law in favor of the nationwide policy,611 following the path charted by
Zenith.612 Some measure of contractual avoidance clearly is a “requirement
of the Sherman Act”; the great debate is over the proper measure, and who is
best situated to make those decisions.613 Perhaps this is an unavoidable
tension after all, as Professor Robert Pitofsky announced in a speech on
antitrust arbitration to the New York City Bar in 1969:

at 193 (“Arbitrators have as their main goal the resolution of the controversy between the parties, being
the decision on the competition issue necessary for the achievement of this goal. On the other hand, the
purpose of the competition authority is to ensure and monitor the application of, and compliance with,
competition rules. This distinction, even though theoretical, may have practical effects on the performance
of each of these bodies.”).
609. See, e.g., Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“Nor am I much reassured by the substitute antitrust enforcement possibilities
mentioned by the majority. It is conceivable that the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Department
might attack Abbott’s monopoly conferred by the arbitrators or that another competitor might surface to
provide competition from a generic sevoflurane manufactured by some process yet to be invented, but
these possible sources of law enforcement or of competition are all hypothetical. I know of no authority
for the theory that the existence of hypothetical sources of antitrust enforcement or of competition can be
a defense to an agreement violative of the antitrust laws or to an arbitration award imposing such an
agreement.”); accord Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1073 (private enforcement “will insure some minimal
deterrent against local and not too flagrant violations of law which the public enforcement agencies,
because of limited resources, would almost certainly ignore”).
610. Frank Pasquale & Jacqueline Green, Two Politicizations of U.S. Antitrust Law, 15 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 106-07 (2020) (quoting Ryan Goodman, 11 Top Antitrust Experts Alarmed by
Whistleblower Complaint Against A.G. Barr and Office of Professional Responsibility’s Opinion, JUST
SECURITY (June 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71059/top-antitrust-lawyers-assess-john-elias-w
histleblower-complaint-against-a-g-ban-including-office-of-professional-responsibilitys-letter/); see
Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1073.
611. SCM, 448 F.2d at 270 (Winters, J., dissenting) (“However, none of the authorities holds that
federal law must be applied to govern the applicability of an antitrust release to the parties to the release
where, as here, the parties contracted with reference to state law. But even if state law is not wholly
displaced, federal policy has some bearing on the question. If the state law governing releases were
antagonistic to the effective enforcement of private antitrust claims, for example, the interposition of a
federal rule might be appropriate.” (citation omitted)).
612. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
613. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1959); see supra sources cited note 595 and accompanying
text.
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The problem is that there is a second policy consideration that must
be taken into account with respect to arbitration of antitrust claims,
and that involves the increasingly apparent determination of
Congress and the courts to facilitate private antitrust enforcement as
a complement and supplement to enforcement by public agencies. In
several recent cases where private plaintiffs resisted reference of their
antitrust claims to the arbitration process, the courts in effect were
asked to decide whether Congress’ sympathetic support of private
antitrust claimants would be completely or substantially undermined
by requiring those claimants to dispose of those claims . . . .614
But for all these persistent misgivings at deference to private contract and
qualms about reliance upon executive law enforcers, there is ample evidence
and opportunity for private abusive assertion of antitrust principles to
advance antisocial aims.615 The plaintiffs urging courts to set aside their
releases of liability were not likely motivated by the gallant impulse to uphold
economic virtue but because those releases stood athwart them and the oodles
of (trebled) compensation they craved.616 That antitrust policy might provide
a mechanism to advance their avarice was no doubt as “incidental” as the
Supreme Court elsewhere deemed it.617 Most such pleas have heaped piles
of arguments at common law and equity upon the courts in hopes that one
would survive, with part and parcel only one frail stick in a hefty bundle:
these private attorneys general are not, in the main, particularly principled
champions of antitrust, it seems.618 The observed ubiquitous failure to
substantiate part-and-parcel claims is the predictable result.619 Undoing
settlements has a tangible cost.620 Allowing the invocation of antitrust policy
to automatically imply victory for the questionable claimant of that pallium
in the face of a clear and consensual contract would not vindicate that policy
but reward regretful contractants who had happily made peace long ago but
happened to qualify for an unexpected and undeserved windfall:621 “Too great
a willingness to find antitrust violations in settlement arrangements would
614. Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1073.
615. See id. at 1076 n.15 (quoted supra note 549); see supra cases cited notes 550-55 and
accompanying text.
616. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (describing
plaintiff’s goal as “windfall profits”) (quoted supra note 555).
617. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
618. See, e.g., Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01–4254, 2002 WL 31246922,
at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2002) (rejecting part-and-parcel argument as a belated and unfounded litigation
tactic, although allowing challenge to release to go forward on a separate fraudulent inducement theory);
Michael Rose Productions, Inc v. Loew’s Inc., 19 F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (quoted supra note
71).
619. See supra cases cited note 291.
620. See supra Part IV. A. 1.
621. See Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1950).
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significantly inhibit settlements of many types of cases at real cost to the
administration of justice, with little likelihood of any contervailing benefit to
the public interest.”622
C. Back to the Future: Why the Proscription Against Prospective
Releases?
Examining the underpinnings of the broad consensus condemning
releases of future antitrust violations is instructive: why are parties’ deliberate
agreements to forgive future competitive harms reflexively considered
unenforceable on antitrust public policy grounds even though they manifestly
minimize litigation, evincing the same disrespect of private prerogative and
potentially rewarding opportunistic Johnny-come-lately proponents?623 The
part-and-parcel cases themselves holding as much are not overly helpful:
Westmoreland, one may recall, thought the rule for prospective releases so
obvious as to need no explanation.624 The reasoning of Redel’s, at first blush,
would imply that antitrust claims could never be released—prospectively or
retrospectively—if it can be believed that the “right conferred on a private
party by federal statute, but granted in the public interest to effectuate
legislative policy, may not be released if the legislative policy would be
contravened thereby,” a formulation that may have something to do with its

622. Reasoner & Atlas, supra note 2, at 126.
623. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 n.27 (3d Cir.1975)
(agreeing with the temporal distinction); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757,
759 (6th Cir. 1967) (“Further, it seems clear as a matter of law that such an agreement, if executed in a
fashion calculated to waive damages arising from future violations of the antitrust laws, would be invalid
on public policy grounds.”); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955) (quoted
infra note 627); Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1477 (D.N.J.)
(“Both parties are in agreement that a release purporting to extinguish any and all future claims for
violations of the federal antitrust laws is void or voidable as against public policy.”), on reconsideration,
603 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1984); Filtrator Apparatus Co. v. Food Enterprises, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 566, 569
n.2 (D.N.J. 1980); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 72-217, 1977 WL 1517, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19,
1977); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 27 n. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mktg. Assistance Plan, Inc.
v. Assoc’d Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1972); see also Sanjuan v. Am. Bd.
of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh’g (Jan.
11, 1995).
624. Westmoreland Abestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(quoted supra text accompanying note 37). Then again, the Westmoreland court did not offer much
explanation about anything. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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guarded skepticism of such releases in general.625 But the Eighth Circuit case
that Redel’s went on to quote had explained the difference more clearly:626
Any contractual provision which could be argued to absolve one
party from liability for future violations of the antitrust statutes
against another would to that extent be void as against public policy.
This is because the effect of such a release could be to permit a
restraint of trade to be engaged in, which would have impact not
simply between the parties but upon the public as well. Such a
release, if recognized as having any validity of that nature, could
therefore itself operatively serve as a contract ‘in restraint of trade.’
Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, of course,
brands all contracts in restraint of trade as ‘illegal.’627
The broad consensus agrees with this etiology: that prospective releases
do not merely quiet a dispute between parties already in the history books but
proactively license or encourage the commission of violations.628 A potential
antitrust “victim” who agrees to look the other way in exchange for cash,
allowing the future competitive harm to befall consumers, looks a good deal
like a fellow conspirator sharing in the proceeds of the scheme.629 (That said,
there is something the faintest bit perverse about this neat assignment of
blame, as the First Circuit once said in upbraiding the government for its
creative argument that the victim had “participated” in his own extortion.630).
625. Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1974). The court was rather
transparently begging the question, though, for it introduced its rationale with the premise that “prospective
application of a general release to bar private antitrust actions arising from subsequent violations is clearly
against public policy” and concluded: “Releases may not be executed which absolve a party from liability
for future violations of our antitrust laws.” Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 99.
626. See Innovation Data, 585 F. Supp. at 1477 (“The rationale for this rule was clearly articulated
in Fox Midwest Theatres . . .”).
627. Fox Midwest Theatres, 221 F.2d at 180.
628. See Mktg. Assistance Plan, Inc., 338 F. Supp. at 1022 (“It did not and could not settle disputes
which had not yet arisen or serve as a license to engage in unlawful monopoly activities against the
releasors. Such an absolution would violate public policy.”).
629. See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1994), as
amended on denial of reh’g (Jan. 11, 1995) (“Antitrust is a different matter. It is designed to regulate how
private parties arrange their affairs—to protect the public from how private producers regulate their affairs.
A bylaw of the Hardwood Manufacturers’ Association committing the members to resolve all differences
by appeal to the board of governors would not be effective in antitrust law, which is based on a suspicion
that agreements among producers undermine the interests of consumers. A no-suit agreement may be one
of the devices for shoring up a cartel. Consumers, strangers to such agreements, gain by turning producers
against one another, the better to expose violations.”) (citations omitted) (describing American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)).
630. See United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Yet, on the government’s own
version of events, the Rakeses were not participants in the extortion in any capacity other than that of
victim. The Rakeses were participants only in the very specialized sense that the victim of a robbery
‘participates’ by handing over his wallet under threat of violence, or the victim of a rape ‘participates’ by
offering no further resistance when resistance appears futile or dangerous.”).
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Only when a release threatens to immunize future conduct does it directly
present this pitfall.631 This is precisely why arbitration clauses have caused
such angina, for they contemplate the preemptive contractual resolution of
future disputes, unlike a settlement of past offenses.632 The identical logic
may be found echoed in the part-and-parcel courts who questioned how a
retrospective release could possibly further or catalyze an antitrust
conspiracy, given that by definition all that it pardoned or even affected had
already happened.633
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely answered the question,
dicta in Mitsubishi did promise that if a contract’s clauses “operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies
for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.”634 The Court had intimated this result in
refusing to grant ill-defined antitrust immunity based on res judicata to
conspirators, of whom some were previously sued on one theory of harm:
“Particularly is this so in view of the public interest in vigilant enforcement
of the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage
action. Acceptance of the respondents’ novel contention would in effect
confer on them a partial immunity from civil liability for future violations.”635
Even after Zenith resolved that the federal policy promoting antitrust
631. Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(“The release is also too broad because it bars later claims based on future conduct. Although the law
permits a release to bar future claims based on the past conduct of the defendant, Main Line, 298 F.2d at
803, this release would bar later claims based not only on past conduct but also future conduct. For
example, while the release properly bars future claims regarding the bundling of NFL games on satellite
television, which forms the basis of this litigation, it also bars future claims for conduct such as the future
bundling of games on cable television and the Internet. As discussed above, the legality of these practices
under the antitrust laws was not litigated in the present suit. Because public policy prohibits a release from
waiving claims for future violations of antitrust laws, and given that under the proposed release class
members would be releasing unlitigated future claims, the releases are too broad.”); see also, e.g.,
Innovation Data, 585 F. Supp. at 1477, on reconsideration, 603 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1984)
632. Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1079 (“It might be argued that parties are always free to settle a
litigation on whatever terms they see fit, and therefore it follows they can do the lesser thing (less in the
sense of undermining the public interest by essentially private disposition) and thus agree to submit a case
to arbitration. However, the emphasis on the ‘settlement’ analogy is misplaced when used to uphold
application of broad arbitration clauses to antitrust disputes that have not yet arisen. With respect to
settlement, the events leading up to the controversy have already occurred; hence there is no problem (as
there often would be with arbitration clauses) of a party, because of unequal bargaining power, agreeing
to a waiver of future rights without knowing exactly what those rights will be.”).
633. See, e.g., Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961); Cal. Concrete Pipe
Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 829 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (quoted supra text accompanying
note 93).
634. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)
(citing Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco
Board of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 173,
180 (8th Cir. 1955)).
635. Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (invoking the comparison of Lawlor to releases).
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enforcement would supersede the ordinary contract law of releases in favor
of the parties’ expressed intent,636 it was still held that all the mutual intent in
the world could not overcome the public policy against prospective
releases.637 Nevertheless, the part-and-parcel cases have not read this wideranging hostility to have any bearing on the validity of retrospective
releases.638
VI.
A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING THE ANTITRUST RELEASES
OF POOR PEOPLE FROM BEING A BURTHEN TO THEIR PARTIES OR
COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLICK639
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky’s scathing 2014 appraisal of the Supreme
Court tells a harrowing tale of a bygone era when the freedom of contract was
constitutionally privileged above seemingly compelling matters of public
welfare, leading to federal and state laws salutary to modern eyes (e.g.
banning child labor) being struck down by the courts in favor of incumbent
commercial concerns.640 Legal history knows this period from the late
nineteenth century to 1936 as the Lochner era,641 and it is almost dogmatically
held as a credo that the Court strayed for nearly half a century before selfcorrecting.642 From this and other examples, Chemerinsky argued that the
business of the Court should be to protect disadvantaged minorities against
oppressive majoritarianism and privileged parties: powerful business
interests ought not be judicially favored, and upholding the rights of the
636. Mktg. Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Assoc’d Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (discussing Zenith).
637. Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 72-217, 1977 WL 1517, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 1977)
(“Regardless of whether the parties intended this release to extend to any actions upon future anti-trust
violations, such an agreement would be found void as against public policy.”).
638. E.g., Redel’s Inc., 498 F.2d at 99-100; Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 319,
325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP),
2008 WL 4547518, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008).
639. With apologies to Jonathan Swift. Cf. JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR
PREVENTING THE CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE FROM BEING A BURTHEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR COUNTRY,
AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLICK (1729).
640. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 310, at 90-119.
641. Id. at 95-101.
642. Id. at 94-95. (“Both liberals and conservatives—later Supreme Court justices and academics
alike—agree that these decisions were terribly misguided. How did this happen? By the late nineteenth
century, scholars and judges increasingly espoused a belief in a laissez-faire, unregulated economy.”);
Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 2-3 (2004)
(“The Lochner era exerts a powerful hold over the American constitutional imagination as an example of
the dangers of judicial review. As Ronald Dworkin colorfully puts it, Lochner is the ‘whipping boy’ of
American constitutional law. Indeed, much of the edifice of the last fifty years of American constitutional
jurisprudence is a reaction to, a rejection of, and an attempt to avoid a repetition of, the Lochner era.”)
(quoting RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
82 (1996)). But see Barry Cushman, Teaching the Lochner Era, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 537, 540-43 & n.9
(2018) (arguing contra Chemerinsky that laissez-faire freedom of contract was not at the core of the
Lochner Era’s jurisprudence).
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economically or socially weaker party must be the overriding concern.643 But
with all due respect to Dean Chemerinsky, this maxim cannot be fully formed,
for sometimes the powerful are right, and sometimes the weak are wrong; it
is the business of the law to decide which is which as a neutral arbiter, without
putting a thumb on the scale.644
The Fifth Circuit panel in Redel’s had intimated this philosophy of
skepticism towards dominant economic interests, even if it stopped well short
of holding as much in favor of virtue-signaling dicta.645 So, too, Redel’s
gestured at an answer without mandating it: “While not an absolute
requirement, antitrust policy certainly encourages the parties to a general
release to evidence their intention to release antitrust claims.”646 In antitrust
matters, after all, Zenith had held that it was the parties’ intent that would
control the breadth of a (retrospective) release.647 Perhaps, however, the Fifth
Circuit did not see a requirement as needed because of the inherent incentive
to do so for the party seeking the release, as the district court quoted by SCM
had concluded, “[t]he question of the parties’ intent as to the scope of the
release is one of fact not readily ascertained on a motion for summary
judgment; but which should be determined by the trier of fact after a full
hearing.”648 If the beneficiary wishes to avoid such a full hearing in hopes of
a summary dismissal on the release, ensuring that the antitrust claims being
released are abundantly clear to all parties should be essential.649 With a nod
to Chemerinsky by way of Pitofsky, doing so protects against “a party,
643. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 310, at 8-9; id. at 6 (proposing that “the Supreme Court usually
sides with big business and government power and fails to protect people’s rights” and that “throughout
American history, the Court has been far more likely to rule in favor of corporations than workers or
consumers”).
644. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 438, (2015) (“As an initial matter,
Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree
benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements. That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract
law. And it distorts the attempt ‘to ascertain the intention of the parties.’”).
645. Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 123).
646. Id. at 101.
647. Id. at 98 n.2; Mktg. Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Assoc’d Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019,
1022 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971), involved the application of a release in an antitrust
action. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal law the release of several joint tortfeasors did
not operate to release another joint tortfeasor who was not a party to the suit. Instead, the Court ruled ‘that
a party releases only those other parties whom he intends to release.’ 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28
L.Ed.2d at 97 (emphasis added). The Court’s ruling indicates that in the area of federal antitrust law
mechanical, common law rules governing releases will be discarded in favor of the intent evidenced by
the release itself.”).
648. Novak v. General Electric Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (quoted in Va.
Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1971); supra text accompanying note
579).
649. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoted
supra note 208).
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because of unequal bargaining power, agreeing to a waiver of future rights
without knowing exactly what those rights will be.”650
Such an expectation would not wreak too seismic an upheaval in the law.
Many part-and-parcel courts already made hay (sometimes hilariously) of
purportedly bamboozled plaintiffs painting a self-portrait of babes-in-thewood, when in fact they had had the benefit of sagacious counsel, experienced
executives, and, most determinatively, a pretty good idea of what
anticompetitive shenanigans were afoot when the release was signed.651
These are presumably not the plaintiffs that Chemerinsky or Redel’s would
have the bench protect through special solicitude.652 The philosophically
sympathetic Redel’s, after all, found that the plangent plaintiff there had all
the benefits of size, counsel, and deliberation, and only unconvincingly
presented itself as an unwitting dupe; thus that the contractual language was
so “unmistakably clear” that it warranted no special hearing.653 VKK
addressed a sophisticated billionaire who had battled over the right to relocate
for years before entering into a contract that made the release of antitrust
claims explicit.654 Even California Concrete, the first case to give a name to
the doctrine, made clear that the plaintiff was no sap in the hands of a vicious
manipulator:
The idea of the release did not originate with American’s officers.
Kearns had the same thought as did American’s attorneys. The
release was not surreptitiously inserted among the documents to be
signed in closing the escrow . . . It was not put in as part of a
deliberate financial squeeze play by American. . . . ‘The release was
the brainchild of American’s attorneys, advised as a normal legal
defensive action. It was not a nauseous potion pressed upon CCP,
which a calculating American knew CCP must drink if its financial
thirst was to be assuaged. There is no evidence that American was
attempting to take any unfair advantage of the situation brought about
by Hooker’s financial plight or his health.’655
Perhaps mindful of these ersatz naifs, judges have been chary of allowing
a free-wheeling comparison of economic circumstance to color their
650. Pitofsky, supra note 429, at 1079 (quoted supra note 632); see also id. at 1083 (disclaiming
concern where an arbitral contract is “not imposed on either party as a result of coercive economic pressure
generated by the disparate size of the parties.”).
651. See cases cited supra notes 294-96.
652. Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100, n.6 (5th Cir. 1974).
653. Id. at 99-100 & n.6 (citing Novak).
654. VKK, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 201-05.
655. Cal. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 827 (C.D. Cal. 1968)
(quoting itself in Decision on Validity of Release, dated June 29, 1967).
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adjudication of contracts—especially the part-and-parcel courts—and rightly
so.656 Were courts to accept an invitation to serve as a board of estimate
equalizing the fortunes of disparate parties under a fig leaf of antitrust law,
state-sponsored socialism (that venerable old bogeyman) might be only a few
steps away. Antitrust law exists to promote full-throated competitive
capitalism, not to cosset certain industrialists.657 Contract law exists to allow
people to document and depend upon their agreements.658 Disavowing the
commitments made by a disadvantaged party would only entrench its
disadvantage, infantilizing its self-determination and effectively deeming it
less than a natural person.659 Where an element of duress is truly
reprehensible, the common law already allows the defense of economic
coercion to renounce a contract, a claim often (and not coincidentally) seen
raised alongside part and parcel in the cases.660 Part and parcel, however,
should not become only an antitrust-specific end-run around the contours of
an existing canon of settled contract law.
But time and again, part-and-parcel courts have turned a blind eye to
whether the beneficiary of a release had engineered the releasor’s desperation
and disadvantage through anticompetitive means,661 or the releasor’s oblivion
656. See, e.g., Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 206-09 (9th Cir. 1950);
S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
657. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 806 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (“In addition,
the courts should not allow the antitrust laws to become a weapon to protect particular competitors since,
as the courts often state, the antitrust laws were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not
competitors.’”) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
658. See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Int. Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Contract
law is designed to protect the expectations of the contracting parties. When a contract is breached, an
injured party can look to the legal system for help in achieving the position he or she would have occupied
upon the performance of the promise.”) (citation omitted); Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d
295, 296, (N.Y. 1987) (“[O]nce a party to a contract has made a promise, that party must perform or
respond in damages for its failure, even when unforeseen circumstances make performance burdensome.
. . . [T]he purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that might affect performance and that performance
should be excused only in extreme circumstances.”); see also Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast
Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 522 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Under general principles of contract law, ‘the purpose of
interpretation is to become aware of the ‘intention of the parties.’”) (quoting 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS, § 538, at 55 (1960)).
659. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2) (1981) (“A natural person who manifests
assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties thereby unless he is (a) under
guardianship, or (b) an infant, or (c) mentally ill or defective, or (d) intoxicated.”).
660. E.g., Suckow, 185 F.2d at 206-09; G.E.E.N. Corp. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., No. 93–632–
CIV–ORL–19, 1994 WL 695364, at *4-7 (M.D. Fla. Aug 31, 1994); Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v.
Winston, Civ. A. No. 92–2243, 1993 WL 9080, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Winston I]; S.E.
Rondon, 288 F. Supp. at 881; Carter, 127 F. Supp. at 678.
661. See, e.g., Suckow, 185 F.2d at 206-09; QS Holdco Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 18-cv824(RJS), 2019 WL 3716443, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (noting that the “conspiracy alleged in the
Complaint was a boycott of the AQS platform with the goal of driving AQS out of the market” and “the
eventual transfer of claims was incidental to EquiLend’s purchase of AQS” even if not the scheme’s goal);
S.E. Rondon, 288 F. Supp. at 881 (“Even if the release was demanded and obtained, as Plaintiffs’ counsel
urged in argument, with the specific intent and purpose of preventing Plaintiffs from filing an antitrust
action, that fact would not invalidate the release as I read the applicable law.”).
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to a concealed antitrust conspiracy afoot.662 It would not be difficult to cast
off that willful ignorance by adjusting the part-and-parcel doctrine to
condemn not only releases that are the object of an anticompetitive
conspiracy, but are its outgrowth as well. This distinction between the two is
a relatively recent innovation by VKK that has strayed from its genesis, for in
either case, an antitrust conspiracy has (allegedly) been effected.663 Indeed,
VKK itself acknowledged that the part-and-parcel doctrine seemingly should
cover releases that served to “protect the ongoing conspiracy,” but simply
refused to read the law “so broadly as thus to render void all releases relating
to conspiracies alleged to continue post-release.”664
Ironically, the originator of the “outgrowth” terminology and test in
which VKK sought a paper shield for its refusal was Northern Oil,665 a case
whose part-and-parcel argument was likely doomed ab initio,666 given the
attempt to wield it outside the antitrust context.667 Why should this be the
dispositive distinction when the “outgrowth” test bluntly means that the
enterprise, having accrued economic power through antitrust violations, is
backed by the courts in wielding that power to minimize its liability and
perpetuate its existence?668 True, it is only a minimization rather than a scot662. See, e.g., Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983) (“It
does not matter that Ingram may not have known of or articulately considered all the possible claims it
was relinquishing against McDermott. Nor is this situation altered because the record is equivocal as to
whether antitrust claims were ever a primary consideration during either the negotiations to sell Ingram’s
marine construction business or settlement of the parties’ outstanding controversies. . . . Ingram cannot
escape the validity of the releases by merely asserting ignorance of its antitrust claim. Indeed, it may be
unaware of many claims existing in its favor.”). Compare, e.g., Va. Impression Prod. Co. v. SCM Corp.,
448 F.2d 262, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1971) (“VIP points to Sexton’s desire, which was not expressed to Redman,
that a general release be obtained to avoid possible antitrust litigation. The law imposes no obligation on
a party to a general release, dealing at arms length, to reveal all the possible legal theories that the other
may possibly use against him. The law merely requires one to reveal material facts if they are unknown
to the others. . . . Neither VIP’s failure to appreciate the significance of the known facts, nor Redman’s
lack of expertise in the antitrust laws is sufficient to excuse VIP’s compliance with the terms of the
release.”); Virginia Impression Products, 448 F.2d at 271. (Winter, J. dissenting) (“SCM intended to
obtain a release of its antitrust liability. VIP did not know, and did not realize until well after the release
was executed, that SCM’s motive for terminating the dealership contract was its desire to enforce territorial
restrictions. Hence, it could well be concluded that VIP had no intention of releasing its antitrust claim
because it was not aware that it had the claim at the time that it executed the release.”).
663. See VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 126 (2d Cir. 2001); Fresh Made, Inc.
v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01–4254, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2002) (quoting
VKK).
664. VKK, 244 F.3d at 126.
665. Id. at 125.
666. Northern Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985).
667. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 F. Supp. 3d 271, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
668. See, e.g., VKK, 244 F.3d at 124-25 (“He knew or should have known that the fact that they had
stopped him from relocating had caused him to sell the team at a depressed price. He knew that NFL
officials would not permit the owners to approve Orthwein’s purchase without his written agreement not
to attempt to relocate the team. Kiam knew that the NFL had refused to compromise on obtaining a release
from him of all antitrust claims relating to relocation before his sale of the team could close.”).
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free escape, for the government cannot be so easily bought off.669 But why
sculpt a judicially-created doctrine that permits such malefactors any fruits of
their wicked labors?670 Is a release extracted by means of supracompetitive
profits that insulates against the discovery and interdiction of the conspiracy
(even an ongoing conspiracy!671) and replevin of those profits any less “in
restraint of trade” than those that indemnify future acts?672
Private litigants who convincingly show that they were indeed misled or
simply ignorant of the antitrust conspiracy that it had contractually
forgiven—or of waiving antitrust claims at all via a misleadingly broad
release—should have a strong case for retaining the right to sue if it is alleged
that its ignorance was the result of the conspiracy’s concealment or devious
drafting. In Suckow, even as it upheld the release at hand, the Ninth Circuit
conceded that “it may well be that if appellants had originally possessed all
of the evidentiary proof which they now claim to have they would not have
sold out or made the release agreements, but would have brought this action
long ago.”673 Condoning antitrust harm to plaintiffs hoodwinked by furtive
antitrust offenders should not be the result so casually conduced by the courts.
The Ingram district court reached just such a conclusion in reliance on the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning about statutes of limitations:
While there are some obvious differences between statutes of
limitations and releases, they do have one major attribute in common.
A statute of limitations accomplishes through operation of positive
law the same thing that private parties accomplish on their own
through a release—peace through extinction of an otherwise valid
claim. For that reason the policy considerations which the Eighth
Circuit discussed in Kansas City regarding fraudulent concealment
also apply to releases. The policy supporting peaceful settlement of
differences is little, if any, advanced by rewarding those antitrust
violators who are able to cloak their unlawful activities.674
669. See cases cited supra notes 568-69.
670. One early case provides its answer, which accords no special deference to antitrust policy,
denoting the alleged violation as any old peccadillo and exalting settlements instead: “To hold a release
void because of the releasee’s pre-existing wrong which resulted in financial hardship to the releasor would
be to invite an attempt to void almost every such settlement and release. It would greatly impair the policy
of encouraging private settlements.” S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882
(C.D. Cal. 1968).
671. See infra cases cited notes 676 & 677.
672. See supra Part V. C.
673. Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1950) (initial
majuscule reduced to minuscule).
674. Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1329 (5th Cir. 1983) (“We are not
persuaded that Congress meant to proscribe and outlaw conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade,
only to reverse itself by enacting a statute of limitations that would reward successful conspirators. When

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2022

99

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 2

338

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Of course, the Fifth Circuit did not think so.675 Some also might object
that such considerations muddle the bright line between forbidden future
releases and permissible past releases. But much muddling is already evident
in the current regime championed by VKK, in which courts have puzzled over
the continuing sequelae of past injuries with little clarity before allowing such
releases.676 As Xerox stated openly, under VKK’s new regime, “courts have
enforced even general releases to bar antitrust claims predicated on
continuing violations of pre-release conduct, such as ‘conspiracies alleged to
continue post-release.’”677 Rejecting releases pertaining to an ongoing but
hidden antitrust scheme seems to comport with rather than contort the
rationale for proscribing prospective releases: to ensure a release does not
have the effect of allowing conspirators to wreak continuing harm on
consumers.678 If anything, removing the artificially rigid construct of objects
and outgrowths might lay to rest some of the difficulties that courts face in
accounting for the future effects of past wrongs.679
Others might say such an adjustment does not go far enough. It would
leave giant conglomerates free to propose (or, they would say, impose)
adhesive contracts that cement their existing advantages by insulating them
from privately-brought antitrust scrutiny. Such proponents might wish that
an economically disadvantaged party could never enter into a release of
antitrust liability, just as with its prospective subset. But, if those
conglomerates have not already demonstrably violated the rules of fair
the antitrust laws are violated, the wrongdoers who are successful in cloaking their unlawful activities with
secrecy through cunning, deceptive and clandestine practices should not, when their machinations are
discovered, be permitted to use the shield of the statute of limitations to bar redress by those whom they
have victimized.”) (quoting Kansas City, Missouri v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 310 F.2d 271, 284 (8th
Cir. 1962)), rev’d, 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983); Ingram, 495 F. Supp. at 1329; see also Ingram, 698
F.2d at 1306-07 (“[T]he Judge opined that the primacy of private enforcement of the antitrust statutes led
him to the definite conclusion that ‘peaceful settlement of differences is little, if any, advanced by
rewarding those antitrust violators who are able to cloak their unlawful activities.’ He held that a party to
a release ‘cannot affirmatively act to deprive those with whom [it] negotiate[s] of material information
they would otherwise receive.’ Thus fraudulent concealment of an antitrust conspiracy from a party with
whom a conspirator has negotiated a release was fraud sufficient to void any such release.”)
(Characterizing the district court’s reasoning before ultimately reversing it).
675. Ingram, 495 F. Supp. at 1329.
676. E.g., VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the
part and parcel doctrine [cannot] be read so broadly as . . . to render void all releases relating to conspiracies
alleged to continue post-release.”); Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325-26
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2008
WL 4547518, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008); Fresh Made, Inc. v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01–
4254, 2002 WL 31246922, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2002) (quoting VKK).
677. Xerox, 609 F. Supp. at 326.
678. Cf. supra notes 627-31 and accompanying text.
679. See Madison Square Garden, L.P., 2008 WL 4547518, at *8 (“find[ing] considerable support
in the caselaw for the distinction relied upon here, namely that the public policy considerations differ when
the only ‘prospective’ application of the release in question is the continued adherence to a pre-release
restraint.”).
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competition, neither is it fair to deny them the same rights (no more, no less)
to express their choices through contract because of their success. The
dangers requiring a categorical rule for prospective release are different in
kind and function.680 Unshackling the part-and-parcel exception from an
antitrust injury would tread too close to the rightly feared transformation of
courts from sentinels of equity to enforcers of equalization. More poignantly,
such a rule would also add insult to injury for the disadvantaged parties who
are theoretically to be protected (from themselves?), denying them free will
and foreclosing opportunities for which they might be very eager to transform
misfortune into money—theoretical benefits to the public’s generalized
interest in antitrust be damned! The political body has no entitlement to
literally conscript unwilling players in the private market into forgoing
rewards to do the hard work its own regulators have not: private attorneys
general are and must remain an all-volunteer army.681
VII.

CONCLUSION

In 2015, Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Clarence Thomas, criticized the cryonic preservation of abstruse law that
serves to unsettle contractual expectations in the fraught realm of antitrust,682
just as Justice Brett Kavanaugh would more sharply in later years, albeit in a
more generalized sense.683 Justice Alito’s description of the dispute at bar
might apply to any of the cases where part-and-parcel was belatedly or halfheartedly raised in an attempt to avoid a bargained release, albeit with the
roles switched:
This case illustrates the point. No one disputes that, when
“negotiating the settlement, neither side was aware of Brulotte.”
Without knowledge of our per se rule, the parties agreed that Marvel
would pay 3% in royalties on all of its future sales involving the Web
Blaster and similar products. If the parties had been aware of
Brulotte, they might have agreed to higher payments during the
patent term. Instead, both sides expected the royalty payments to
continue until Marvel stopped selling toys that fit the terms of the
agreement. But that is not what happened. When Marvel discovered
Brulotte, it used that decision to nullify a key part of the agreement.

680. See supra Part V. C.
681. See cases cited supra note 566.
682. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 465 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). See also id.
at 471 (“Brulotte was an antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case. The Court was principally
concerned with patentees improperly leveraging their monopoly power.”).
683. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021).
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The parties’ contractual expectations were shattered, and petitioners’
rights were extinguished.684
It is important to recall that Justice Alito’s views did not carry the day
but also to heed his acute apprehension at the outcome.685 Part and parcel
must not become a little-used latent landmine deployed primarily by
disgruntled conglomerates advised by well-paid attorneys diligent enough to
unearth the doctrine years down the line. At the same time, the courts must
not let the disallowance of part-and-parcel objections to allow an antitrust
conspiracy to use its very success at non-detection to protect itself and its illgotten gains and to silence potential whistleblowers. The most well-disguised
collusion poses the greatest challenge to governmental detection and
interdiction and thus calls for the greatest degree of entrepreneurial
assistance. Even if private attorneys general are only adjuncts to executive
action, it seems foolhardy to allow them to be sidelined specifically when
they are most needed.
In a widely separated pair of cases, imaginative plaintiffs sought to
invoke a part-and-parcel-like principle in escape releases of positive federal
laws other than antitrust.686 Neither succeeded, for as the latter court
explained, part and parcel “had its inception and sole application in antitrust
jurisprudence.”687 This uniqueness places antitrust law in a world apart,
bespeaking its centrality to the American system of governance, even if it was
pioneered only after a century of the American experience.688 In one of the
many entanglements with Standard Oil Company, the Supreme Court
reminded succinctly: “The heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as
well as the Robinson-Patman Act, ‘Congress was dealing with competition,
which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’”689 In
continuing to sculpt the contours of the “rarely discussed and more rarely
applied” part-and-parcel doctrine,690 the courts would be wise to recall just
how exceptionally integral antitrust policy is to the life of the body politic,
and strive ever more diligently to ensure its precepts are best upheld against
all who would traduce them.
*

*

*

684. Kimble, 576 U.S. at 469.
685. Id.
686. Northern Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 F. Supp. 3d 271, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
687. Romero, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 282.
688. See supra Part IV. C. 1.
689. Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951).
690. VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, at 125 (2d Cir. 2001).
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